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Summary 
This project is a narrative interview study of fifteen women who have had abortions in 
England since 2008. It aims to answer the questions: 
1. How do women in England make meaning about their abortion experiences? 
2. What aspects of their identities and life experiences contribute to this meaning-
making? 
3. In particular, how does class structure this meaning-making? 
England is in the midst of a long-term political project of austerity and neoliberal 
governance which has prompted renewed sociological attention to the issue of social 
class. In this context, discourse on abortion reflects and reproduces societal beliefs 
about gender, class and reproduction: who should reproduce; who has a legitimate 
‘excuse’ not to reproduce; and what judgement should be passed on women who choose 
to end their pregnancies. Through the work of Beverley Skeggs and Michel Foucault, 
this study examines how women who have had abortions in this context make meaning 
about their experiences, and how class and gender are constructed in their narratives.  
This study contributes to literature on the internalisation of neoliberal modes of self-
governance in relation to reproduction. It argues that the process of requesting an 
abortion extends a demand to women to perform precarity in ways that are more 
possible for some women than others. Abortion narratives are therefore shaped by 
access to classed ‘discursive resources,’ and the women’s relationships to responsibility 
were also shaped by their class positions. 
Finally, this study contributes to the rich literature on abortion stigma by applying the 
Foucauldian concepts of biopolitics and governmentality to abortion narratives, arguing 
that abortion experiences in contemporary England are shaped by the confluence of 
abortion stigma, the neoliberal injunction to self-regulate, and the societal construction 
of womanhood as biologically painful. 
Using Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self,’ I conclude that through these 
women’s accounts, the specific regulatory practices that produce middle-class 
womanhood can be better understood. The study therefore explores how wider 
processes of neoliberal governance might be insinuated, embodied, and resisted by 
individual women. 
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Chapter One: abortion, class and meaning-making 
This thesis is about three things: abortion, class, and meaning-making. Despite it being 
a relatively common phenomenon – approximately 1 in 3 women will have an abortion 
in her lifetime (Jones and Kavanaugh, 2011) – abortion stigma persists, resulting in 
silence, shame and secrecy for those who have them1 (Hoggart, 2012; Kumar, Hessini 
and Mitchell, 2009; Shellenberg et al., 2011). In the UK, abortion is understood through 
legal, medical and moral discourses which construct it as an anomalous outcome of 
pregnancy, and as ‘undesirable but necessary’ (Shellenberg et al., 2011);  this does not 
necessarily reflect the understanding of those who have abortions, whose experiences 
are often more complex (Hoggart, 2012; Lattimer, 1998).  
Women in contemporary England are having abortions in the midst of a long-term 
political project of austerity and neoliberal governance which has prompted renewed 
sociological and public attention to the issue of social class (Reay, 2011; Savage et al., 
2013; Tyler, 2015a). This is relevant to work on abortion experiences as discourse on 
abortion often reflects and reproduces societal beliefs about gender, class and 
reproduction: who should reproduce; who has a legitimate ‘excuse’ not to reproduce; 
and what judgement should be passed on women who choose to end their pregnancies 
(Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). These contemporary conditions in the UK create 
an imperative for new research which contextualises the experience of ending a 
pregnancy within this socio-historical moment, and the worsening inequalities which 
have accompanied it (Piketty, 2014).  
Whilst work on abortion and social inequality has been done before, it has often 
approached class as an a priori category, or defined class in predominantly economic 
terms (e.g. Lee et al., 2004; Press, 1991). This work therefore tends to elide the cultural 
and social dimensions of class that may be relevant to the experience of having an 
abortion. The ‘cultural turn’ in class analysis – in particular, the feminist, poststructural 
work within this tradition – offers a useful framework to re-examine abortion and social 
class in a novel way (Adkins and Skeggs, 2005; Skeggs, 2004). Rather than looking for 
differences in abortion experiences between people in different socio-economic 
categories, this framework seeks to deconstruct those very categories. Contemporary 
                                                                 
1 Whilst those who have abortions do not always identify as women, most do, and the discourse around 
abortion is heavily gendered. See page 21 for a note on gendered language. 
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poststructural work on class therefore provides a framework to examine how gender and 
class are constructed through abortion narratives, and enables an analysis of how these 
social classifications occur; who has the power to classify; and how these classifications 
might be resisted. 
Research questions 
It is this framework with which this study begins. The questions it seeks to answer are: 
1. How do women in England make meaning about their abortion experiences? 
2. What aspects of their identities and life experiences contribute to this 
meaning-making? 
3. In particular, how does class structure this meaning-making? 
In order to answer these questions, I interviewed fifteen women who had had abortions 
in England since 2008 over the course of a year of fieldwork from September 2015 to 
September 2016. I used the life story interviewing method, a narrative form of 
interviewing which aims to capture a full picture of an individual life. Whilst the study 
was open to people of any social background, the study’s methodology and recruitment 
methods (as discussed in depth in Chapter Three, p. 60) resulted in a group of 
participants with some striking similarities. All fifteen participants had at least one 
University degree, several more had been educated to Masters level, and four 
participants had completed or were undertaking PhDs. Whilst educational attainment is 
by no means a direct measure of class, all of my participants had acquired a certain 
amount of ‘cultural capital’ through their studies and subsequent careers in, for 
example, academia, teaching, and third sector work (Bourdieu, 1984). As a result, this 
study’s analysis of class focuses particularly on ‘middle-classness’ and my participants’ 
various relationships and proximities to it (although see p. 23 for a note on class 
terminology).  
The experiences of these fifteen women cannot and should not be taken to represent the 
general experience of all those who have abortions, in England or elsewhere. Indeed, the 
purpose of qualitative interviewing is rarely to make generalisations, but to examine 
particular phenomena in depth (Kvale, 1996). What these fifteen women’s narratives 
give insight into, therefore, are the processes by which individuals make meaning about 
their abortion experiences. The use of the life story interview method has facilitated an 
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analysis of this meaning-making process and its connection to the women’s identities 
and life experiences, particularly those shaped by gender and class.  
Why abortion? 
Abortion is positioned in international humans rights discourse as a fundamental right 
(Mandhane, 2004; Rebouché, 2016). However, across the globe, abortion might be 
decriminalised, legalised, or entirely criminalised dependent on the country or province. 
In addition to its variable legal status across the globe, abortion is routinely stigmatised, 
and its morality is continually debated in public discourse (Kumar, Hessini and 
Mitchell, 2009; Purcell, 2015). These debates are heavily gendered, shaped by cultural 
and historical ideas about normative womanhood (for example, that motherhood is a 
natural role for women), or philosophical ideas about the personhood of the foetus 
(Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). As Rosalind Petchesky argues, abortion is ‘the 
fulcrum of a much broader ideological struggle in which the very meanings of the 
family, the state, motherhood, and young women’s sexuality are contested’ (1990, 
p.vii).Therefore, researching how women who have had abortions negotiate this stigma 
and form understandings of their experiences offers insight into the construction of 
gender and other intersecting identities in broader society; abortion is in this sense ‘an 
entry point into the study of social life’ (Ginsburg and Rapp, 1995, p.1). 
Abortion is therefore an important object of sociological interests for two reasons. One 
is that it is a relatively common, gendered experience, yet is cloaked in shame and 
secrecy; therefore, it is of sociological interest to examine how women experience and 
create meaning about it. The second is that abortion provides an interesting way to 
access sociological understanding of a much broader range of issues, including gender 
and class.  
Abortion in the UK  
Abortion was legalised in the UK in 1967 with the passage of the Abortion Act. Since 
that date, anyone living in England, Scotland or Wales (Northern Ireland, whilst part of 
the UK, retains its criminalisation of abortion) could ostensibly access abortion services 
safely and legally. The Act reads: 
[A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a 
pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical 
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith— 
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(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy 
were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman or any existing children of her family; or 
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or 
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from 
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped (Abortion 
Act, 1967). 
The majority of abortions in England and Wales (97%) are performed under the first 
ground set out in the Act (that abortion under 24 weeks would be safer for a woman’s 
physical or mental health than pregnancy) (Department of Health, 2017). The vast 
majority of abortions are performed under 13 weeks gestation (92% in 2016), and there 
has been a steadying increase reported in the proportion of abortions being carried out 
under ten weeks since 2006 (Department of Health, 2017). Abortions which are carried 
out over the 24-week time-limit – legal only in cases of danger to the life or physical 
health of the pregnant person or in cases of ‘severe foetal abnormality’ – accounted for 
0.1% of the total in 2016 (Department of Health, 2017). 
The increase in the proportions of abortion at early stages of pregnancy can be partly 
explained by advances in abortion technology and methods in the years since 
legalisation. In general, abortion methods are split into two categories: surgical and 
medical. Surgical abortions are performed by a surgeon, with the patient often under 
general anaesthetic or conscious sedation, and can range from a simple suctioning 
procedure to a more invasive surgical removal of the foetus, depending on the 
advancement of the pregnancy. Medical abortion is, in contrast, administered with a 
combination of medicines that induce miscarriage, and does not require surgery. The 
abortion medication Mifegyne was licensed in the UK in 1991, when only 4% of 
abortions were undertaken using a medical procedure (Department of Health, 2017). 
Since then the proportion of medical abortions has more than doubled in the last decade 
in England and Wales from 30% in 2006 to 62% in 2016, and this has been the most 
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common method of abortion since 2014 (Department of Health, 2017). In Scotland this 
rate is even higher, with 81% of abortions using the medical method (Information 
Services Division and NHS Scotland, 2015). Medical abortion has been argued to be 
more convenient, marginally safer, and less resource-heavy than surgical methods 
(Berer, 2005). 
In terms of provision, the National Health Service (NHS) now funds 98% of abortions 
in England and Wales, with 68% of these taking place in the independent sector under 
NHS contract (Department of Health, 2017). In comparison, over 50% of abortions 
performed in 1981 were privately funded. Those who have abortions are not 
automatically entitled to NHS-funded services, but although wide funding disparities 
previously existed in different areas of the UK, most women today do not have to pay 
out of pocket for abortion services (Lee et al., 2004). Abortion remains illegal in 
Northern Ireland despite being part of the UK; in 2016, 724 Northern Irish women 
travelled to England in order to have abortions (Department of Health, 2017). In July 
2017, the government agreed to extend NHS funding to women in Northern Ireland who 
travel to England, something that they had been previously denied. 
Abortion in England and Wales is therefore generally free to access, and is regulated by 
a relatively liberal legal framework that leaves the approval of abortion requests to 
medical professionals’ discretion. The situation is similar in Scotland, with some 
differences in provision – it is harder to access abortion over 16 weeks, for example, 
meaning Scottish abortion seekers must travel to England to have these later procedures 
(Beynon-Jones, 2012). Northern Ireland remains the region of the UK with the strictest 
abortion regulations, banning the procedure except in circumstances that threaten the 
life of the pregnant person, or when there is a serious or permanent risk to their mental 
or physical health. 
Abortion law, policy, and public attitudes 
Aside from amendments introduced by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990, which introduced the 24-week time limit for subsection (a) and removed the time 
limit from the remaining subsections, the Abortion Act has remained largely unchanged 
since the 1960s. Over 50 additional amendments have been debated in Parliament, but 
none have succeeded in changing the legislation (Sheldon, 2017). It has been suggested 
that this is in part due to the ‘medicalised’ nature of the Act; in other words, its reliance 
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on medical authority and the ‘good faith’ opinions of doctors construct abortion as a 
private, medical matter rather than a social or political one (Sheldon, 1997). This has 
been both an advantage and a disadvantage for abortion advocates; reliance on medical 
opinion has prevented the legal time limit from being lowered from 24-weeks, for 
example, as before this point a foetus cannot survive outside the womb unassisted, but 
the same valorisation of medical opinion means approval for abortion remains, 
paternalistically, in the hands of physicians. 
Whilst abortion legislation has remained largely unchanged since the 1960s, the 
provision of abortion, as well as physicians’ and the public’s attitudes towards it, has 
shifted over the decades since legalisation. The medicalised nature of UK abortion law 
means that debate and discussion around abortion law and practice often focuses on the 
role of physicians. Malcolm Potts, a human reproductive scientist who advised in the 
development of the 1967 Act, has argued that the Act ‘is not about women, it is about 
medical practice’ (Potts, 2017), and as medical practice has shifted more generally, so 
has the provision of abortion. The responsibility the Act places in the ‘good faith’ of 
doctors means the law can be interpreted restrictively or liberally, depending on the 
conscience of physicians and prevailing cultural mores.  Sally Sheldon has argued that 
doctors’ interpretations of the Act have shifted along with a more general shift in 
medical practice from beneficence to upholding patient autonomy; while it might have 
been common practice in past decades for doctors to ask extensive, even invasive 
questions of women seeking abortion, today physicians are more likely to see their 
requirement to approve abortion decisions as burdensome and unnecessary (Lee, 2017a; 
Sheldon, 2017). The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists stated in 2007, 
however, that there was a ‘slow but growing problem of trainees opting out of training 
in the termination of pregnancy’ (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 
2007), suggesting that there may also be an upward trend in the numbers of clinicians 
conscientiously objecting to abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 gives clinicians the right 
to conscientiously object to abortion and opt out of performing the procedure, although 
objectors are still obliged to provide necessary treatment in an emergency and to refer 
abortion seekers on to a colleague who can provide care for them.  
In terms of public attitudes to abortion, there has been a trend of liberalisation of 
attitudes in the decades since legalisation. The British Attitudes Survey in 2012 asked 
members of the public whether the law should allow abortion when a) the woman’s 
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health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy, and b) when the woman decides on her 
own she does not wish to have a child. 90% of people supported abortion in case a) and 
62% in case b), with 34% opposing (Park et al., 2013). In 1983, the same survey found 
87% support for case a), and 37% supported case b), with 55% opposing. Whilst this 
demonstrates that public support for abortion has increased over the years, it also 
demonstrates that clear moral distinctions are made between ‘deserved’ and 
‘undeserved’ abortions. This is a finding corroborated by other research which has 
noted the ‘hierarchy’ of abortion reasons which renders certain abortions 
‘understandable’, for example abortion in the case of rape or risk to the pregnant person, 
and others morally questionable, such as not wanting to have a child (Cockrill and 
Nack, 2013; Shellenberg et al., 2011). 
Despite its liberal legal position in the UK, these types of moral distinctions in public 
attitudes to abortion demonstrate that it is nevertheless stigmatised, meaning many 
women who have abortions are selective about to whom – or whether – they talk about 
it (Major and Gramzow, 1999). Abortion stigma is based on societal beliefs about 
womanhood, motherhood and responsibility; for example, that women naturally desire 
to have children, and that one must therefore have an exceptional reason for choosing to 
end a pregnancy (Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). Campaigners for the 
decriminalisation of abortion in the UK argue that doing so will normalise abortion, 
combat stigma, and reduce the burden on – and public scrutiny of – abortion providers 
(British Medical Association, 2017); however, there is no indication that such a great 
legislative change is on the horizon for an Act which has remained largely unchanged 
for five decades. 
Abortion therefore enjoys a relatively liberal medical and legal framework in the UK, 
and increasing social support. However, it remains a stigmatised procedure, and its 
approval remains in the hands of doctors rather than the pregnant individual. There have 
been recent calls to develop a more substantial ‘sociology of abortion experiences’ 
which starts from women’s lived experiences and seeks to understand abortion as a 
social phenomenon (Purcell, 2015). This study seeks to contribute to this sociological 
endeavour by analysing women’s abortion experiences in contemporary England, 
particularly in relation to class. 
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Why class? 
Understandably, most research on abortion focuses primarily on gender. An issue at the 
heart of feminist organising for decades, abortion has been positioned as a fundamental 
right necessary for women’s liberation and full participation in social life (Petchesky, 
1990), and contemporary work has explored how abortion stigma is rooted in 
patriarchal ideas of normative womanhood (Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). 
However, previous research has also suggested that abortion experiences, access and 
attitudes are affected by social class (e.g. Lee et al., 2004; Press, 1991). For example, 
young women are more likely to have abortions if they are from more affluent areas 
(Smith, 1993; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001; Lee et al., 2004), and assumptions 
about social class factor into doctors’ decisions about whose abortion requests are most 
legitimate (Beynon-Jones, 2013). However, recent research has not examined how class 
structures abortion experiences through analysis of women’s narratives.  
In particular, there is a strand of sociological class analysis that has not yet been widely 
applied to work on abortion, despite its relevance. The ‘cultural turn’ in class analysis 
sought to move away from macro-scale, materialist analysis of class, looking beyond 
the economic to examine cultural, social and embodied aspects of class, working with 
and through the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s approach to 
class was to conceptualise it as a ‘system of exchange’ of capitals – economic, social 
and cultural – that could be symbolically legitimised or devalued. For example, his most 
famous work, Distinction, examined how the value of ‘taste’ was assigned to certain 
cultural activities and ways of dressing, speaking and acting by those with high ‘cultural 
capital’ (non-economic assets like education) (Bourdieu, 1984). This process, Bourdieu 
argued, served to maintain the position of the powerful by denying those with less 
cultural capital the mobility to access more.  Building on Bourdieu’s work, Beverley 
Skeggs’ influential works Formations of Class and Gender (1997) and Class, Self, 
Culture (2004) examined the relationships which make possible the ‘system of 
exchange’ upon which class is based. She argued that there was a moral dimension to 
class which was marked or ‘inscribed’ on people’s bodies, and that marginalised 
people’s struggles against this process of inscription was a key site of class struggle. 
The relevance of this strand of class analysis to work on abortion is through its 
emphasis on embodiment and struggles over meaning. An important contribution of 
Skeggs’ and those working in the same tradition – including Lisa Adkins, Diane Reay, 
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Angela McRobbie and others (see Adkins and Skeggs, 2005) – was to theorise gender 
and class together; furthermore, this work highlighted how the concepts of class, gender 
and reproduction were intimately entwined. For example, Skeggs’ work on the 
inscription of moral value to classed bodies argued that working-class women’s bodies 
have historically be associated with excess, dirt, and promiscuity, against which middle-
class femininity was constituted as restrained, controlled, and chaste (1997). The 
longevity of these moral judgments can be seen in the vilification of working-class 
mothers, figured in the public imagination as women who irresponsibly reproduce, are 
promiscuous, and are lazy (Nayak and Kehily, 2014; Tyler, 2008). In contrast, other 
researchers have analysed the contemporary production of middle-class femininity 
through institutions like education, where young middle-class women are taught the 
value of delaying child-bearing, promoting their cerebral lives (by continuing education 
or establishing successful careers) above ‘base’ activities like reproduction (Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody, 2001). 
Therefore, cultural class analysis offers a useful framework to examine how meaning is 
made about abortion. The decision to end a pregnancy is held against legal, medical and 
moral frameworks which determine how ‘legitimate’ that decision is; it is useful not 
only to examine how this judgment is made in relation to gender norms (as previous 
research has done e.g. Kumar et al., 2009), but also how classed ‘systems of exchange’ 
might be involved in this (de)legitimisation. There exists an opportunity to examine 
how the cultural aspects of class structure the narratives of women who have had 
abortions, particularly in the context of post-financial-crash Britain. 
Why now? 
This study is timely for a number of reasons. It began during the run-up to the 50th 
anniversary of the legalisation of abortion in England, Scotland and Wales, during 
which academics, activists and abortion providers have been reflecting on the progress 
that has been made since 1967, and what progress is yet to be made. During this time, 
abortion has been in the public eye in England for three main reasons: repeated attempts 
by newspapers to ‘expose’ bad practice in abortion clinics; political attempts from 
Members of Parliament (MPs) to amend the Abortion Act; and attention being drawn to 
its criminalisation in Northern Ireland. In 2006 and 2012, the House of Commons 
debated reducing the abortion time limit from 24 to 21 weeks, challenging medical 
consensus that the 24-week limit is sufficient. Whilst this amendment was rejected, 
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2012 saw prominent Conservative politicians such as then Health Secretary Jeremy 
Hunt, Home Secretary Theresa May, Culture Secretary Maria Miller and the Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, publicly supporting a reduction in the abortion time limit, in 
Jeremy Hunt’s case to 12 weeks (BBC News, 2012). 
In the same year, an exposé in the newspaper the Daily Telegraph suggested that 
doctors were permitting sex-selective abortion (SSA), which the Telegraph argued was 
illegal (Newell and Watt, 2012). Ultimately, the two doctors involved in the exposé 
were not charged with any crime (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013); however, in 
November 2014, the Abortion (Sex-selection) Bill was given its first reading in 
Parliament, sponsored by Conservative MP Fiona Bruce. The bill sought to ‘clarify’ the 
law around abortion by explicitly criminalising SSA. The bill was ultimately voted 
down, and the debate on sex-selective abortion was critiqued for its racist undertones, 
based as it was on concerns that SSA was prevalent among South Asian women 
bringing the practice into the UK from their home countries (Dubuc and Coleman, 
2007; Purewal and Eklund, 2017; Unnithan and Dubuc, 2017).  
Abortion law has most recently been in the public eye following the UK General 
Election 2017. After the Conservative Party began talks with the Northern Irish 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in order to form a majority in Parliament, the English 
press ran a number of stories which highlighted the DUP’s ‘extreme’ views, including 
its strict anti-abortion stance which was labelled as ‘deeply worrying’ by a 
spokesperson for the abortion provider bpas. (De Payer, 2017; Oliphant, 2017; Syal, 
2017). Following the election, Labour MP Stella Creasy proposed an amendment in 
Parliament to reverse the long-held policy of charging fees to Northern Irish women 
who travel to England for abortions; anticipating a defeat in Parliament, the government 
unexpectedly announced that it would agree to changing the policy, no longer charging 
women traveling from Northern Ireland (although women still have to find money to 
cover travel and accommodation) (Elgot and McDonald, 2017). Whilst this issue was 
not new, and Northern Irish campaigners have been calling for a repeal of this policy 
and the law criminalising abortion for many years, the outcome of the General Election 
has put the spotlight on Northern Irish issues which the English press has been criticised 
for ignoring in the past (Davidson, 2017). Whilst the DUP’s stance on abortion and the 
criminalisation of abortion in Northern Ireland has been recognised as ‘extreme,’ the 
contrast between the ‘extreme’ views of the DUP and those of English politicians was 
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somewhat muddied by a recent interview in which Conservative MP Jacob-Rees-Mogg, 
widely tipped to be a contender for the next Conservative Party Leader (and, therefore, 
Prime Minister), stated that he opposed abortion ‘in all cases’ (BBC News, 2017). 
Abortion has therefore been in the public eye in recent years in such a way as to 
challenge the prevailing wisdom that abortion law and policy in the UK is unlikely to be 
effectively challenged due to its framing as a private, medical issue, in contrast to its 
framing in, for example, the USA where the issue is a hotly debated public, political and 
moral issue (Sheldon, 1997). Ellie Lee has suggested that the criticism and attempted 
prosecutions of abortion providers in the past five years challenges the critiques of 
abortion as highly ‘medicalised’, if abortion providers’ discretion is no longer implicitly 
trusted (Lee, 2014). Most relevant to this study is the fact that these debates are 
occurring during a period of healthcare reform in the UK, including the increasing 
privatisation of the National Health Service, itself part of a broader political project of 
austerity and reformation of the welfare state.  
Neoliberal times 
This study recruited those who had had abortions from 2008 onwards. Chapter Three 
provides more detail about the inclusion and exclusion criteria for this study 
(‘Recruitment,’ p. 72), but the choice of 2008 as a watershed was made because this was 
the year of the global financial crisis. There have been a number of useful analyses of 
the financial crash, caused by the selling of sub-prime mortgages in the US and a 
subsequent collapse and public bail-out of large investment banks (for a sociological 
analysis, see Dinerstein, Schwartz and Taylor, 2014), but it was the subsequent global 
ramifications of this crisis which have formed the socio-political context of this study. 
To understand the current social and political landscape in the UK, it is necessary to 
trace the development of neoliberal forms of governance and the resurgence of the 
ideology of austerity as a response to the crisis.   
Neoliberal ideology is characterised by an extension of the logic of the market to all 
areas of social life, breaking down the separation of the social and the economic 
(Lemke, 2001). In structural terms, this entails reduction of the welfare state, 
privatisation, deindustrialisation, and the flexibilisation of the labour market, in the 
name of increasing productivity and economic returns (Atkinson, Roberts and Savage, 
2012). This shift has been accompanied by an individualisation of responsibility as the 
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state offloads responsibility for its citizens’ well-being onto individual citizens, and 
corporations shift economic risk to workers through reducing benefits, pensions, and job 
security (Horning, 2012). 
Using the work of Henry Giroux, Jessica Francombe-Webb and Michael Silk (2016, 
p.654) define the key tenets of neoliberalism as being to: 
…purge the system of obstacles to the functioning of free markets; celebrate the 
virtues of individualism (recast social problems as individual problems); foster 
economic self-sufficiency; abolish or weaken social programmes; include those 
marginalized into the labour market on the market’s terms (such as through the 
workfare scheme); and, criminalize the homeless and the urban poor.  
It was at the end of the 1970s that neoliberalism began to ‘blossom’ in the UK, 
exemplified by the policies of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
(Atkinson, Roberts and Savage, 2012). Whilst Thatcher left office in 1990, Tony Blair’s 
New Labour government from 1997 to 2007 embraced elements of neoliberal ideology. 
New Labour’s policies were heavily shaped by sociologist Anthony Giddens, who 
argued that selfhood was no longer constrained by birth but was a reflexive ‘project,’ 
allowing people to adapt to wide-scale changes like globalisation and the casualisation 
of labour by becoming ‘responsible risk takers’ (Giddens, 1991). Crucially, this 
approach argued that social class was no longer a relevant concept in contemporary 
society; Tony Blair famously said in his 1999 Labour Party Conference speech that ‘the 
class war is over. But the struggle for true equality has only just begun’ (Blair, 1999). 
This political truism has proven to have an enduring longevity. Following the financial 
crisis, the UK was launched into a period of recession, and after Tony Blair’s successor 
Gordon Brown held the position of Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, a Coalition 
government of the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party were elected in 2010. 
The Coalition’s emergency budget in response to the ‘reckless borrowing’ (Cameron, 
2008) of the previous Labour government introduced wide-ranging cuts to public 
spending, including reforming the welfare system and accelerating the privatisation of 
the National Health Service. Since the election of a majority Conservative government 
in 2015 (reduced to a minority government in June 2017), social welfare reforms have 
included caps on amount of benefits working-age people can receive, new rules on the 
size of state-provided accommodation, and stricter tests for those claiming disability 
benefits, in order to ‘incentivise’ people to work and dissuade reliance on welfare 
(Francombe-Webb and Silk, 2016). These neoliberal policies are ‘prefigured on the 
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need to dismantle the basic institutional components of the post-war social welfare 
consensus, and mobilise policies intended to extend market discipline, competition, and 
commodification throughout society’ (p. 653).  
This regime of austerity created a battleground which has continued to be the site of 
struggle to the present day, due to the attempts of the government and sections of the 
British media to create consensus for austerity by placing blame on already 
marginalised and reviled groups such as welfare claimants (Jensen, 2014a). Sociological 
commentary has noted the intensification of politically charged, divisive rhetoric 
dividing the ‘strivers’ – the group identified by the Conservative conference in 2012 as 
hard-working, deserving citizens  – from the ‘skivers’ who claimed benefits 
fraudulently, avoided work and whose maintenance was over-burdening the bloated 
welfare budget (Jensen, 2014b). In response, those most affected by austerity have 
protested the expectation that they bear the burden of these cuts, from disabled people 
protesting the dehumanising assessments they are now required to undergo in order to 
receive assistance from the state (Leaney, 2016) to the Focus E15 group of mothers 
rejecting the proposals to ‘develop’ the council estate on which they live as part of a 
selling off and lack of replacement of social housing (Focus E15 Campaign, 2017).  
Biopolitics and the ‘expunging of class’ 
Michel Foucault called the governing of populations and the governing of individual 
bodies under neoliberal states ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault, 2008, 1978, 1977). Biopolitics is 
concerned with fostering life and managing ‘healthy’ populations, activities which are 
not neutral but are concerned with maintaining power and knowledge, for example, 
through collecting vast amounts of statistical information about populations and 
establishing ‘norms’ in order to more effectively govern (Foucault, 1978). Neoliberal 
biopolitics in the UK has been framed using the rhetoric of equality, fairness and 
‘health,’ a framing that has masked the perpetration of deepening economic inequality 
and the scapegoating of marginalised groups in society for austerity (Tyler, 2013). 
The operation of neoliberal biopolitics in relation to abortion can be most clearly seen in 
the debate around sex-selective abortion discussed earlier in this chapter (p. 16). The 
concern about SSA was framed as one of gender equality, based as it was on the belief 
that South Asian women in the UK were aborting female foetuses due to a culture of 
‘son preference’ in their communities (despite the fact that there is little evidence this 
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practice is widespread in the UK; see Purewal and Eklund, 2017; Purewal, 2014; 
Unnithan and Dubuc, 2017). Navtej Purewal and Lisa Ecklund have argued that 
attempted criminalisation and vilification of SSA positions South Asian women as 
‘deviant aborters,’ and their entitlement to reproductive healthcare is being questioned 
in an era when healthcare provision is presented as being ‘finite, and under threat’ 
(Purewal and Eklund, 2017, p.2). Attempts to criminalise SSA in the UK have allowed 
the state to ‘sharpen its disciplinary function without addressing broader issues of social 
welfare, support for vulnerable groups, or social equity’ (p. 9); thus, whilst being 
framed as a pursuit of equality, the attempted criminalisation of SSA in the UK is an 
expression of a biopolitical urge to govern not only the population as a whole, but also 
the individual reproductive lives of a specific section of society. Whilst the proposed 
amendment to criminalise SSA was ultimately voted down in Parliament, the debate 
was argued to have undermined solidarity and collectivity in abortion advocacy by 
dividing women who seek abortions into legitimate and ‘deviant’ categories, a division 
which has been ‘institutionalised’ as a social problem (Lee, 2017b; Purewal and Eklund, 
2017). 
This manoeuvre of framing regulatory practices with the rhetoric of neutrality and 
equality has been argued to be a key mechanism of neoliberal governance (Tyler, 2013). 
For example, Imogen Tyler has argued that the language of class has been ‘expunged’ 
from political vocabulary through a deliberate and sustained effort. Instead, terms like 
‘strivers’ are employed to describe citizens who choose to work hard and earn their 
place in society, and the label ‘underclass’ has been designated to describe those who 
have ‘chosen’ a lifestyle of welfare dependency, as opposed to being a class formed by 
exploitation and unequal power relations (Tyler, 2013, p.186). At the same moment as 
class is denied, therefore, the basis of austerity politics and widening inequality in the 
UK is based on a project of classification and distinction, the very process which class 
describes (Tyler, 2015a). Whilst older forms of class groupings that describe 
historically specific conditions may now be outdated, the act of classification and 
struggles against it are very much alive.  
This socio-political context means that sociological analysis of class is an urgent 
endeavour. As Valerie Walkerdine, Helen Lucey and June Melody have argued, ‘class 
still insists upon its presence even in the midst of its remaking […] class has not gone 
away, and the challenge is to understand the new forms it takes’ (Walkerdine, Lucey 
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and Melody, 2001, p.4). This study aims to contribute to this understanding of the ‘new 
forms’ class has taken by focusing on experiences of abortion, which have been 
somewhat overlooked by researchers working in this tradition of ‘cultural’ class 
analysis. The systems of classification and distinction which characterise contemporary 
UK politics are intimately concerned with women’s reproductive lives, raising for 
public debate questions of who should reproduce and who should not, and who deserves 
state support and who is too feckless to deserve it. In other words, contemporary 
abortion experiences are located in a specific form of neoliberal biopolitics. It is within 
this context that women in England are making decisions about their reproductive lives, 
and the context that has shaped the direction of this study.  
A note on language 
I wish to draw attention to several language choices I have made throughout this thesis. 
First, the use of the term ‘abortion’ to refer to the voluntary termination of a pregnancy. 
Second, my decision to use the term ‘women’ to describe those who have abortions, 
rather than a gender-neutral term. Finally, the use of the terms ‘middle-class’ and 
‘working-class.’  
Abortion 
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘abortion’ to refer to the voluntary termination of 
pregnancy. In medical literature, this is often referred to as ‘induced abortion’ to 
distinguish it from ‘spontaneous abortion,’ another word for miscarriage of pregnancy. 
Not all the women I interviewed for this study used the term ‘abortion’ to describe their 
experience, but all of them met the criteria of having voluntarily terminated at least one 
pregnancy. Since some participants preferred alternative terms like ‘termination,’ I 
mirrored the language women chose to describe their experience during interviews, but 
apart from direct quotations from interviews I have used the term ‘abortion’ throughout 
the thesis.  
Gendered terminology 
It has been argued that in discussing reproductive rights, it is useful to use gender-
neutral terms rather than implying that women are the only people who need to access 
abortion services (Everyday Feminism, 2016; Nixon, 2013). Anyone who has the 
capacity to become pregnant can have an abortion, and that person’s gender identity is 
separate from their reproductive biology (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Wittig, 1992). Using 
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the term ‘women’ to stand in for ‘people who have abortions,’ it is argued, implicitly 
lends support to essentialist and transphobic discourse, discourse which enables 
symbolic and material violence on trans and gender non-conforming people (Everyday 
Feminism, 2016). It also erases and misgenders trans people who have abortions. 
Throughout this thesis, I have often chosen to use the term ‘women’ more often than a 
gender-neutral alternative (although I have used gender-neutral terms in places). This is 
not to be taken as an expression of the belief that only women have abortions, or that 
biological traits like possessing a womb make one a woman; indeed, I firmly disagree 
with this essentialist approach to gender (as argued in Chapter Two, ‘Intersections of 
class and gender,’ p. 32). I have chosen to use the term ‘women’ more often than a 
gender-neutral alternative for two reasons. The first is that whilst the study was open to 
people of all genders, all the people interviewed for this study identified as women. 
Therefore, when writing about my participants or the conclusions I can draw from their 
interviews with me, I have identified that they reflect women’s experiences specifically.  
The second reason is that the abortion debate is gendered and dominant discourses 
about reproduction position women as possessing the capacity to reproduce. This social 
construction is central to understanding how abortion is provided, debated, legislated, 
stigmatised, and experienced. This equation of womanhood with reproduction hurts 
women, as argued throughout this thesis; it also harms people of other genders. It makes 
it difficult for trans people to access reproductive care, for example, and several 
countries require trans people to be sterilised if they wish to medically transition or have 
their gender be legally recognised (Mitu, 2016; Nixon, 2013). 
In summary, whilst the argument to use gender neutral language is important, I have 
more often chosen to use the term ‘women’ in recognition of the fact that the huge 
majority of people undergoing abortions are people who have been compelled to lead 
their lives as girls and women by binary systems that assign gender at birth based on 
biological traits. In doing so, I also draw attention throughout the thesis to the effects 
that this imposition of an essentialist view of gender has on my participants’ narratives, 
including the moments when they drew attention to or subverted it.  
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Who is ‘middle-class’? Who is ‘working-class’? 
My participants rarely described themselves in interviews as belonging to a particular 
class. This is  not unusual, as ambivalence about or dis-identification with class labels is 
common (Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2001); Beverley Skeggs has for this reason 
described class as a ‘structuring absence’ in people’s personal narratives (Skeggs, 
1997). Furthermore, it has been argued that the traditional model of class categorisation 
(working, middle, upper) is no longer relevant, as they describe a historically-specific 
set of labour conditions which have shifted in the wake of globalisation and 
deindustrialisation (Savage et al., 2013).  
Imogen Tyler has argued that sociologists of class must question not what class is, but 
what class describes: inequality, with exploitation at its heart, and struggle against this 
inequality (Tyler 2015). Tyler’s definition of class puts this concept of classificatory 
struggle at the centre of class as ‘a description of a given place in a social hierarchy [and 
a] name for the political struggles against the effects of classification’ (2015a, p.507, 
my emphasis). If, therefore, social class is both an identity or position and a struggle 
against classification, this leaves sociologists of class the dilemma of studying class 
without appealing to or reifying essentialist categories. Tyler warns against 
revalourising historic class categories as well as the practice of creating new ones as 
these practices are not merely descriptive, but performative, and have power. Instead, 
she suggests that sociologists can expose and critique the neoliberal denial of class by 
pointing to its own production of new class categories and figures, and  by retaining 
class as a useful analytical lens by focusing on the ‘classificatory struggle’ at its heart. 
In response to this, I have drawn upon the work of sociologists like Mike Savage, 
Gaynor Bagnall and Brian Longhurst, who have argued that ‘[c]lass does not determine 
identity, but it is not irrelevant either. It is a resource, a device, with which to construct 
identity’ (p. 888). In other words, individuals might use class to construct identity and 
personal narratives, whilst class labels might be rejected. This argument owes a debt to 
Bourdieu’s theory of capitals, but also to work like Skeggs’, which argues that resources 
like ‘cultural capital’ (non-economic assets like education) are routinely used to 
construct identity and maintain power, regardless of whether or not an individual 
identifies as being part of a class group (Bourdieu, 1984; Skeggs, 2004). Class is 
therefore an unequally distributed resource, one that might be propertised by some, but 
locates others as the baseline from which distinction is marked (Skeggs, 2004). 
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The use of the term ‘middle-class’ is therefore useful for referring to practices which are 
legitimised by dominant discourses. For example, Savage uses the term ‘middle-class’ 
in this way when he refers to the middle class as the ‘particular-universal class,’ whose 
practices are regarded as ‘universally “normal”, “good” and “appropriate”’ (Savage, 
2003, p.536). It is in this sense that I use the term ‘middle-class’ throughout this thesis. 
Thus, in referring to middle- and working-classness, I am sometimes referring to class 
labels my participants have explicitly identified with. More often, I am referring to 
discursive constructions rather than individuals’ identities, and this distinction is made 
clear throughout the thesis. Furthermore, during data collection it became clear that this 
study presented an opportunity to analyse the narratives of women who had various 
degrees of proximity to middle-classness; to practices and ways of life considered 
‘normal’ and ‘good’ and their relation to the figurative Other that is ‘abnormal’ and 
‘bad’. As such, these life stories have been analysed partly as windows into the 
contested, ongoing production of middle-class womanhood in neoliberal times. 
Outline of the thesis 
Chapter One has introduced the research questions and aims of the study, as well as its 
rationale and context. The following study is based on fifteen life story interviews with 
women who have had abortions in England since 2008. The data was collected between 
September 2015 and September 2016. 
In Chapter Two, I locate my study within the field of abortion literature and class 
analysis. I begin by developing a theoretical framework using poststructural feminist 
work on class and gender, which sees both class and gender as assigned, ascribed and 
socially constructed. Through this lens, I draw on the work of Michel Foucault, 
Beverley Skeggs and Judith Butler to frame my understanding of the governed 
neoliberal subject which emerges from this dynamic, continual production of the 
classed and gendered self, and which emerges from abortion narratives. The chapter 
goes on to map the field of research on class and abortion, arguing that insufficient 
sociological attention has been paid to the subjective experience of abortion, and, 
furthermore, work which has examined class and abortion together has done so in 
limited ways. I conclude that the current study offers an exploration of the abortion 
narrative as a struggle over meaning which illuminates which forms of knowledge are 
produced, legitimised, and de-legitimised through the telling of abortion stories. 
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Chapter Three addresses the methodology of the study. My research is framed by a 
feminist epistemological framework that recognises the workings of gendered and 
related oppressions on people’s lives; in particular, I draw upon several feminist 
traditions, including feminist standpoint theory, feminist poststructural theory and 
intersectional theory. The chapter goes on to outline the research design of this study, 
including participant recruitment methods and the life story interviewing method. In 
particular, I reflect on the fact that the women who took part, whilst identifying 
themselves in various different ways, all had a degree of class privilege and cultural 
capital (for example, all of the women had at least one Higher Education degree). I 
argue that this shaped the study in useful ways, allowing an in-depth analysis of the 
construct of ‘middle-classness’ which appeared in different ways throughout the 
women’s life stories. The final section of Chapter Three deals with ethics, including the 
interpersonal ethical considerations raised by the study, as well as the political ones. I 
mobilise Judith Butler’s work on vulnerability and resistance to critique the way 
institutional ethical review processes positioned participants in this research as 
distressed or vulnerable, arguing for an alternative ethical framework which allows a 
more realistic and nuanced approach to participants in ‘sensitive’ research.   
Chapter Four introduces the first theme to emerge from analysis of the data, precarity. It 
explores the various ways in which women engaged with this concept, which describes 
‘the lived experience of ambient insecurity’ under neoliberalism (Horning, 2012). The 
chapter argues that the process of requesting an abortion extends a demand to women to 
perform precarity in particular ways, which women in different social locations may 
acquiesce to or resist. Engaging with discourses of precarity is useful for some women 
as a way to ‘legitimise’ their abortion story through systems of symbolic exchange 
(Skeggs, 2004), whereas for other women there is more risk associating themselves with 
precarity. For women whose social position means they are judged to have a lack of 
ability and resources to care for a child if they wanted to, they have less freedom to 
identify as ‘precarious’; instead, they are already classified as such, and are ‘fixed in 
place’ by the moral values associated with this (Skeggs, 2004). 
Data analysis continues in Chapter Five, which examines the theme of responsibility. 
Previous work on abortion has shown that women who have abortions are often under 
pressure to present a ‘responsible’ abortion story in order to combat stigma (Cockrill 
and Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017). In this chapter, I explicitly examine the operation of 
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classed discourses in these accounts of (ir)responsibility. I argue that by emphasising 
how their abortion decisions are rational, responsible, and compassionate, some of the 
women in this study– who mostly have some degree of class privilege – reproduced 
discourses of classed judgment and stigma. In particular, a distinction is made between 
women who ‘don’t think’ about their reproductive responsibilities, and those who do, 
which I argue is expressive of frustration with the fact that women are expected to carry 
the burden of responsibility for reproduction. Whilst this is a perennial issue for women, 
I argue that it has taken on a particular form in these women’s accounts, shaped by 
wider systems of neoliberal governance. However, this chapter also demonstrates that 
some women are critical and reflexive about this process, resisting the individualisation 
of responsibility and challenging the use of classed stereotypes about abortion and 
reproduction. In particular, some women’s complex accounts of their pregnancies open 
a disruptive discursive space for talk of ‘responsibility’ that does not fit easily into pro-
choice or pro-life discourse, and that challenges straightforward accounts of the self. 
The final theme of stigma and punishment is addressed in Chapter Six. This chapter 
contributes to the rich literature on abortion stigma by applying the Foucauldian 
concepts of biopolitics and governmentality to the women’s accounts of stigma. I argue 
that many of the women in this study employ self-regulatory practices in reaction to a 
fear of a loss of status after becoming pregnant and having an abortion. In particular, I 
examine the decision some women made to experience the painful aspects of abortion 
as a form of penance or punishment, and contextualise it within the landscape painted 
through many women’s narratives of stoicism and acceptance of pain as an inherent part 
of womanhood. I argue that the confluence of abortion stigma, the injunction to self-
regulate, and this societal construction of womanhood as biologically painful can 
produce extreme regulatory practices. Using Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the 
self,’ I conclude that through these women’s accounts, the specific regulatory practice 
that produce middle-class womanhood can be understood. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter Seven with a discussion of the study’s findings and 
implications. It argues that this study illuminates the fact that abortion narratives are 
shaped by differential access to ‘discursive resources’, predicated on class position and 
on other intersecting identity categories. Furthermore, this study adds to the body of 
literature which critiques the medicalisation of abortion, arguing that the process of 
requesting abortion requires women to perform ‘need’ for abortion which is more 
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possible for some women than others. I suggest some potential solutions to this 
problem, including supporting moves to decriminalise abortion in the UK, but argue 
that this is part of a wider expectation in neoliberal, austerity Britain that people 
perform ‘need’ for healthcare and welfare services in problematic ways. Therefore, 
abortion advocacy and anti-austerity activism go hand-in-hand. 
This final chapter also argues that whilst explicitly affective acts of differentiation such 
as class ‘disgust’ was uncommon in this study, the women’s relationships to 
responsibility are explicitly shaped by their class positions. Despite some explicit 
differentiation between women who ‘don’t think’ and women who do, classed and 
gendered understandings of responsibility were mostly internalised, more often being 
used by the women to reflect on their views of themselves than to judge other women. 
This chapter argues that this contributes to literature on the internalisation of neoliberal 
modes of self-governance in relation to reproduction.  
Finally, I argue that this study furthers understanding of the multiple dimensions of 
abortion stigma articulated in work such as Kumar et. al (2009) and Cockrill and Nack 
(2013). Previous work has identified that abortion stigma is rooted in societal beliefs 
about womanhood, motherhood, and personhood, but has lacked an intersectional 
understanding of what types of womanhood  and personhood are valued (Cockrill and 
Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017; Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). This study has taken 
the original step of theorising stigma and class together, mobilising the concept of 
governmentality to examine how middle-class womanhood is produced through 
regulatory ‘technologies of the self.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Chapter Two: Literature review 
In this section, I begin by developing a feminist, poststructural theoretical framework 
with which to examine the operation of gender and class in abortion narratives. 
Influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ in class analysis, this framework understands class to 
be something assigned, inscribed and embodied, and as a dynamic process of struggle 
between individuals’ understandings and experiences and dominant discourses (Skeggs, 
2004; Tyler, 2015a). Similarly, this framework sees gender as socially constructed and 
assigned rather than inherent in, for example, an individual’s biology. This framework 
does not elide the bodily aspects of gender and reproduction, but argues that the 
relationship between gender and biological ‘sex’ is neither straightforward nor ‘natural.’ 
Within this poststructural understanding of gender and class, the ‘neoliberal subject’ 
emerges as a continual and ongoing production. I draw on Foucault’s understanding of 
neoliberalism and governmentality to develop an understanding of the gendered and 
classed subject in neoliberal times as at once positioned by structural forces and 
dominant discourses, and yet agentic and productive. It is from this unstable 
construction of the ‘self’ that abortion narratives emerge. 
From this framework, the chapter moves on to mapping the field of abortion research, 
focusing on how abortion experiences and stigma have been understood; how class has 
been conceptualised within this literature; and what frameworks have been developed 
for theorising these empirical findings. Ultimately, it argues that insufficient 
sociological attention has been paid to the subjective experience of abortion, and that 
doing so from a feminist, poststructural perspective presents an opportunity to build on 
sociological understandings of the construction of gender and class in wider society.  
Theoretical framework 
As previous work on abortion has noted, beliefs about abortion and the stigma that 
accompanies it are often entwined with socio-cultural ideas about womanhood, 
motherhood and reproduction (Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). Furthermore, 
abortion and other reproductive rights issues are primarily positioned as ‘women’s 
issues.’ Gender is therefore one of the most important concepts to underpin work on 
abortion. In this section, I first describe the approach to gender that underpins this study, 
rooted in Judith Butler’s poststructural feminist theory, before going on to develop an 
intersectional approach to gender and class through the work of Beverley Skeggs. 
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Finally, I work together Skeggs’ work on femininity and class with Foucault’s concepts 
of biopolitics and governmentality, arguing that class and gender, whilst mediated 
through discourse, are embodied experiences that are linked to wider processes of 
regulation and control. This framework enables an analysis of abortion experiences by 
locating them within hegemonic discourses of class and gender.  
Intersections of class and gender 
In taking a poststructural feminist approach to conceptualising gender, this framework 
is based on the idea that gender is socially constructed through language and discourse. 
I use ‘discourse’ throughout this thesis in the Foucauldian sense: systems of thought, 
signs and meanings which construct objects of knowledge (Foucault, 1989, 1978). 
Poststructural feminist frameworks begin from the premise that there is no ‘social 
reality’ to apprehend outside of the language and discourse we use to understand and 
describe it (a premise I will return to in more depth in Chapter Three, ‘Epistemological 
framework’, p.60). Therefore, gender is a discursive formation; however, gender and 
reproduction are also embodied experiences. In this section, I work through Butler’s 
theorisation to argue that a poststructural approach to gender does not erase the 
embodied or the material aspects of gender, but rather draws attention to how meaning 
is made about them. 
The category ‘woman,’ a category continually discussed, examined and deconstructed 
throughout this thesis and the interviews which form its basis, is therefore a continual 
production in poststructural theorisations of gender. This is not to say that the category 
‘woman’ does not exist, but rather poststructural approaches to gender seek to draw 
attention to how that category has been formed, and specifically how certain 
understandings of this category are authorised and which are foreclosed by dominant 
discourses (Butler, 1994). In doing so, poststructural feminist theory draws attention to 
gender (and sex) as a ‘political category’ (Wittig, 1992) rather than a natural one, and 
directs analytical attention to the specificity of individual experience.  
Taking this theoretical position, then, on gender, I wish to also question the presumption 
that ‘sex’ can be separated from gender as something natural or biological, in opposition 
to gender’s socially constructed nature. Abortion is considered a ‘woman’s issue,’ as the 
category ‘woman’ is generally understood to be a biological category as well as a social 
one. In critiquing this idea that womanhood is constituted by the possession of 
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reproductive biology, some feminist work has drawn attention to the distinction 
between a person’s gender and their biology, making a theoretical distinction between 
gender as social and sex as biological and ‘natural.’ For example, Ann Oakley defined 
sex as ‘the biological differences between male and female: the visible difference in 
genitalia, the related difference in procreative function,’ differentiating it from gender 
which was  ‘a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into “masculine” and 
“feminine”’ (1972, p.16).  In contrast, I use a poststructural approach to both sex and 
gender, viewing sex as socially constructed just as gender is. 
In doing so I draw on the work of Christine Delphy who, whilst not positioned as part of 
poststructural feminist thought, drew attention to this issue in her 1993 article 
‘Rethinking sex and gender.’ She argued that rather than sex preceding gender, as is 
generally presumed, sex should instead be understood to have followed gender, being 
used as a symbol with which to mark a social division (Delphy, 1993). Biological sex is 
made up of a variety of indicators (including genitals, gonads, hormones, chromosomes, 
and secondary sex characteristics) which occur in varying combinations in individuals, 
but to reduce these variables to just one and to make it dichotomous is, Delphy argues, a 
social act. Sex is, she goes on, ‘the way a given society represents “biology” to itself’ 
(p. 5). A poststructural expression of this can be found in Butler, who writes that ‘sex 
does not describe a prior materiality, but produces and regulates the intelligibility of the 
materiality of bodies…the category of sex imposes a duality and a uniformity on bodies 
in order to maintain reproductive sexuality as a compulsory order’ (Butler, 1994, p.17). 
In other words, the category of sex, like the category of gender, is a discursive 
formation through which the material is mediated and made intelligible. 
Poststructural feminist theory therefore posits an understanding of both sex and gender 
as discursive formations through which the material (e.g. the biological) can be 
understood. This is useful for this study in that it allows an analysis of how these 
categories – of ‘woman,’ of ‘female’ – are formed and naturalised. The women in this 
study explore in several ways the idea of womanhood and how it relates to their 
experience of having an abortion; having a poststructural framework allows an 
examination of how these categories are being formed and reformed through their 
narratives. In Butler’s words, ‘if … "women" designates an undesignatable field of 
differences, one that cannot be totalized or summarized by a descriptive identity 
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category, then the very term becomes a site of permanent openness and resignifiability’ 
(Butler, 1994, p.16). 
Intersectionality and feminist class analysis 
In considering how theorisations of gender might intersect with those of class, 
intersectional theory becomes useful. Intersectionality was originally developed as a 
concept to describe the intertwined nature of gender and race, in response to the lack of 
discussion about race in the feminist movement, and the lack of discussion about sexism 
in the civil rights movement. Black women, it was argued, experienced both in a way 
that could not be easily separated. As Kimberlé Crenshaw explains (1989, p.150): 
[I]f a Black woman is harmed because she is in an intersection, her injury could 
result from sex discrimination or race discrimination. (…) But it is not always 
easy to reconstruct an accident: sometimes the skid marks and the injuries 
simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts to 
determine which driver caused the harm. 
As a theory and a political tool which was developed by Women of Colour, for Women 
of Colour, intersectionality critiqued the symbolic erasure of Black women from 
feminist and anti-racist work (Crenshaw, 1989). It has since been adopted in work 
which focuses not only on race and gender, but also on disability (Nishida, 2016) and 
sexuality (Shapiro, Rios and Stewart, 2010). Whilst theorists of class and gender like 
Skeggs have not explicitly identified intersectional theory as a part of their theoretical 
frameworks, the overlap between their work and that of intersectional feminists is clear. 
Just as Crenshaw argued that treating oppression as a single ‘axis’ theoretically erases 
Black women (Crenshaw 1989), theorists like Beverley Skeggs, Lisa Adkins and Diane 
Reay have argued that women are theoretically erased from Bourdieusean cultural class 
analysis (see, for example Adkins and Skeggs, 2005). In Formations of Class and 
Gender, for example, Skeggs focuses on a group of working-class women who she 
argues are often defined through their lack of ‘capitals,’ those economic, cultural and 
social resources which symbolically (de)legitimise people within complex systems of 
distinction that make up our social reality (1997; Bourdieu, 1984). As a result, the 
women in her study found it difficult to trade in a social marketplace which 
symbolically delegitimised them at every turn and offered no positive representations of 
working-class womanhood (Skeggs, 1997). This made class a central concern in their 
lives even if it remained unspoken; the women were constantly negotiating the politics 
of respectability in order to move through the social spaces they inhabited. This process 
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was gendered by the historical production of femininity as a classed category, and 
Skeggs argued in Formations that class and gender cannot be dealt with in isolation, but 
are inextricably linked. 
The relevance of an intersectional approach to work on class and gender is therefore 
clear: it requires a framework which does not reduce class, gender and other axes of 
oppression to single axes, and prompts the researcher to question who might be 
‘symbolically erased’ from their analysis. However, intersectionality was specifically 
developed to describe and understand the lived experiences of Women of Colour and 
methods of combatting oppression in the context of a white supremacist society; as a 
result, its adoption in other contexts have been critiqued as detaching it from its original 
aims (Carastathis, 2008; Dhamoon, 2011). Therefore, developing an intersectional 
sensibility within this study does not merely entail using it as a tool to examine how 
gender and class intertwine, but is also a reminder to consider race and whiteness as 
structuring elements of both gender and class. Intersectionality is often applied to the 
analysis of identities which are marginalised, for example those of Black women; 
however, it is less often applied to the study of the privileged (Carastathis, 2008). In 
employing an intersectional theorisation of the experiences of largely white, middle 
class women, this study examines the complex interplay of marginalisation and 
privilege which produce subjects, and through which these women make meaning out of 
their experiences of abortion. 
This study’s conceptualisation of class is therefore intersectional, but also poststructural 
in the same manner in which its conceptualisation of gender is poststructural: class is 
understood to be something assigned, inscribed and embodied. In particular, this 
understanding of class is influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ in sociological class analysis, 
and works by feminist poststructural theorists like Skeggs who theorise class as a 
gendered phenomenon. Skeggs’ argument that femininity and womanhood are 
historically classed is accompanied by an examination of the ways in which both class 
and gender are ‘inscribed’ onto the body.  This inscription – a process of ‘making 
through marking’ – is, in Skeggs’ theorisation, the mechanism by which value is 
transferred onto bodies and read off them (2004, p.13).  
In the following section, I work together Skeggs’ theorisation of class and gender with 
the work of Michel Foucault. In Class, Self, Culture, Skeggs argued that inscription was 
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‘not just discourse, but a complex set of practices for the deployment and co-ordination 
of bodies,’ a process which ‘produces the subject via various regimes, classification 
schema and control of the body’ (2004, p.12). Foucault’s work also explores how 
bodies and behaviour are regulated and disciplined under the conditions of 
neoliberalism, which he argued has developed  ‘numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 1978, 
p.140). I explore in this section how Skeggs’ and Foucault’s work can be applied to the 
phenomenon of abortion through the two key concepts of inscription and embodiment. 
Embodiment, inscription and biopolitics 
The concepts of embodiment and inscription that describe how certain bodies are 
inscribed with value based on systems of class, race and gender are useful for 
understanding the embodied experience of abortion. Skeggs (1997, p.82) writes: 
Bodies are the physical sites where the relations of class, gender, race, sexuality 
and age come together and are embodied and practised. A respectable body is 
White, desexualised, hetero-feminine and usually middle-class. Class is always 
coded through bodily dispositions: the body is the most ubiquitous signifier of 
class. 
Bodily dispositions are one of the ways in which class, gender and race are reproduced 
and discursively formed. This informs the experience of ending a pregnancy as the 
inscription of value onto bodies and the misrecognition of these values as natural leads 
to the regulation of these bodies. For example, Skeggs argues that complex processes of 
inscription and exchange mean that value can be attached to ‘privileged bodies’, 
whereas others are ‘devalued bodies’ (2004). The difference lies in where a person 
stands in the social hierarchy, and whether the values ascribed to them work in their 
interests; only certain dominant values can be legitimised in wider society. 
Legitimisation is a key mechanism of power, as it allows individuals to trade in what 
Pierre Bourdieu calls the ‘symbolic economy’, defined by Skeggs as ‘the systematic 
organisation of the symbolic, which enables exchange and the attribution of value 
across a range of fields’ (2004, p. 15).  
This can be demonstrated by this example, which Skeggs borrows from Manthia 
Diawara (Diawara 1998, p. 52 in Skeggs 2004, p. 1):  
[B]lack, working-class masculinity operates in popular culture as a mobile 
cultural style available to different characters in film, be they black or 
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white…this marking of cool attached to black bodies becomes detachable and 
can operate as a mobile resource that can be ‘transported through white bodies.’  
The cultural characteristic associated with black, working-class masculinity is ‘cool’; 
white men can appropriate this characteristic by ‘acting black’, but are then free to 
discard this performance without consequence. Black men, by contrast, are fixed in 
place by a Western symbolic economy which reads black masculinity as ‘cool’, and 
which also associates coolness (and blackness) with danger and criminality. They 
struggle to be legitimised in fields where white men are free to remain mobile. As 
Skeggs (2004, p. 2) explains: 
This cultural equation [of black masculinity with coolness and criminality] is 
useful for filmmakers yet does not help those so inscribed to gain employment 
outside of the field of popular representations where they may be read as 
interesting but dangerous and untrustworthy. In exchanging blackness for cool 
[in the symbolic economy], respectability may be lost.  
In contrast, white men do not risk losing respectability by wearing and discarding ‘black 
cool.’ Thus, the process of inscription marks bodies with moral values, restricting the 
movement of some whilst leaving others to be more mobile. Bourdieu called the 
mechanism by which this occurs ‘misrecognition’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013): the 
values and characteristics which have been inscribed on bodies through the workings of 
the symbolic economy are misrecognised as fixed and natural. Bourdieu noted that this 
works in favour of the dominant in society, as their symbolic capital – their authority 
and ability to legitimate others – appears unchallengeable. However, Skeggs argues that 
this works the other way, too: as people at the other end of the spectrum are fixed in 
place by their categorisations, the process of inscription becomes hidden, and the 
workings of the powerful are not recognised. 
This process has led to working-class and middle-class women’s bodies being 
intimately associated with different concepts and attributes, misrecognised as natural 
when they are in fact inscribed by systems of classification. Skeggs argues that 
working-class women’s bodies are coded as ‘out of control, in excess’ and associated 
with ‘the lower, unruly order of bodily functions such as that of expulsion and leakage’ 
(1997, p. 99). For example, in the 1890s, measures were taken to ‘improve’ the 
parenting of working-class mothers in the UK, who were deemed to be unhygienic, 
uneducated and therefore morally bankrupt (1997, p. 44). Skeggs argues (2004, p. 4): 
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Dirt and waste, sexuality and contagion, danger and disorder, degeneracy and 
pathology, became the moral evaluations by which the working-class were 
coded and became known and are still reproduced today.  
This Victorian attitude that conflated physical cleanliness with virtue did not end with 
the Victorian era; in the 1940s and 50s, government interventions into ‘problem 
families’ were strikingly similar to those of the 1890s (1997, p 44). This conceptual link 
between the working classes, unruly and unclean bodies, and morality is still apparent 
today; Skeggs argues that this historical legacy means that ‘conflict between social 
classes is considered a problem of morality rather than of structural inequality’ (1997, p. 
48).  
Similarly, working-class bodies are today associated with sexual immorality – 
promiscuity, vulgarity and excess – in a way that is inscribed on the body. For example, 
Imogen Tyler (2008) proposes that the figure of the ‘chav mum’ is a figuration that has 
gained corporeal qualities and has ‘bodied forth’ into a meaningful, physical 
representation of class disgust and middle-class anxiety (p. 19). Tyler analyses popular 
definitions of the terms ‘chav mum’ and ‘chavette’ on the website Urbandictionary, 
which functions as a user-generated compendium of contemporary British slang. One 
particular example she picks out is: 
[Chavs] are almost always white, and very skinny, where the chavettes are 
usually overweight, with large stretchmarks on their stomachs from excessive 
baby having. A chavette will have one baby every year from the age of 13 (Tyler 
2008, p. 26). 
Here, the inscription of moral values onto the body can clearly be seen: the vulgarity 
and excess of the working-class female body is visually represented by being 
overweight; her promiscuity is marked on the body by her stretchmarks. Other repeated 
themes that Tyler picks out are associations of the figure of the ‘chav’ with dirt, 
contamination, and vulgar fashion choices, as the journalist Gina Davidson wrote in 
2004: 
And we will know them by their dress . . . and trail of fag ends, sparkling white 
trainers, baggy tracksuit trousers, branded sports top, gold-hooped earrings, 
“sovvy” rings and the ubiquitous Burberry baseball cap … They are the sullen 
youths in hooded tops and spanking-new trainers who loiter listlessly on street 
corners and shopping malls, displaying an apparent lack of education and an all 
too obvious taste for fighting; the slack-jawed girls with enough gold or gold-
plated jewellery to put H Samuel out of business (Davidson, 2004, cited in Tyler 
2008, p. 21). 
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Both in their choice of clothing (objectified cultural capital) and in their physical 
presence (embodied cultural capital), working-class women are synonymous in this 
representation with vulgarity, promiscuity, dirt and excess. 
It is in the interests of the elite to assign these values to working-class femininity, as it 
allows middle-class femininity to be defined in contrast or distinction to it. The visual 
and bodily has historically been a prominent way of displaying ideal femininity, which 
in the eighteenth century was associated with the embodied manner of the upper classes: 
that of ease, restraint, and calm (Skeggs, 1997, p.99). This construction of ideal 
femininity as passive and frail continued beyond the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and effectively blocked off access to working-class women who generally did 
not have the luxury of cultivating such a passive, restrained vision of femininity 
(Skeggs, 1997). Ideal femininity, then, has been and still is associated with middle- and 
upper-class femininity, and ideals like respectability are still values inscribed on the 
body; in contrast to ‘vulgar’ working-class women, for example, middle- and upper-
class ‘ladies’ are meant to be restrained, chaste and quiet, both in their physicality and 
the clothing they choose to wear. 
Embodiment and middle-class femininity 
It is important to note that this process of inscribing values onto women’s bodies is 
closely related to reproduction. The immoral practices that Tyler (2008) identified as 
being associated with the ‘chav mum,’ for example, are often associated with sex and 
pregnancy. These values are closely associated with moral discourses around abortion, 
which engage in similar distinctions between the ‘deserved’ versus the ‘undeserved’ and 
the ‘responsible’ versus the ‘irresponsible’ abortion.  
Furthermore, this inscription of values is related to the regulation of bodies. In 
neoliberal times, this regulation does not only occur externally, for example through 
medical approval or rejection of abortion requests. Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality – which he also refers to as ‘the art of government’ – encapsulates not 
only the ways in which the state exercises its power over individuals, but also the ways 
in which individuals are conditioned to self-regulate (Foucault, 1977). This concept of 
governmentality is a mechanism of what Foucault called biopolitics, which denotes the 
supervision of the ‘mechanics of life’ – birth, death, and reproduction – of the 
population which is facilitated by ‘a series of interventions and regulatory controls’ 
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(Foucault, 1978, p.139). One of these mechanisms are ‘modes of subjectification’ that 
encourage individuals to self-regulate and internalise the value of individual 
responsibility. Rabinow and Rose have argued that reproduction is a ‘sphere of 
biopolitics par excellence’ in which ‘apparent choices entail new forms of 
“responsibilization” and impose onerous obligations, especially, in this case, upon 
women’ (Rabinow and Rose, 2006, p.209). In bringing the concepts of inscription, 
embodiment and biopolitics together, this theoretical framework poses questions of who 
is encouraged to reproduce, who is not, and how the regulation of abortion is disguised 
by the discourse of ‘choice.’ 
For example, Anita Harris has argued that middle-class women (particularly young 
middle-class woman) are positioned in contemporary society as the ‘vanguards of new 
subjectivities’ in neoliberal times (2004).  Neoliberal subjectivity can be read not only 
through Foucault, whose neoliberal subject is produced through technologies of 
discipline which revolve around sexual and bodily conduct (Foucault, 1978), but also 
through Skeggs’ identification of the ‘respectable’ subject as ‘White, desexualised, 
hetero-feminine and usually middle-class’ (1997, p.82). These subjects are produced 
both through what Foucault called ‘technologies of the self’ – the transformation of 
‘bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being’ which produce neoliberal 
citizens (Foucault, 1977) – and the processes of inscription and embodiment Skeggs 
describes in Class, Self, Culture (2004).  
In examining the relationship between gender, middle-classness and reproduction, we 
might examine how middle-class femininity becomes embodied and inscribed. 
Alexandra Allan and Claire Charles have argued that contemporary ideas about the 
successful or failed neoliberal subject ‘often gather around the figure of the feminine, 
and particularly the young woman’ (Allan and Charles, 2014, p.335). Allan and Charles 
use the example of socialisation of young girls in elite educational settings, in which 
they are instilled with values of responsibility, self-regulation and entrepreneurship 
through ‘every aspect of the school’s programme’ (p. 340). Whilst they note that the 
values these educational setting promote are not new, what is new is that class is no 
longer explicitly invoked as it used to be in the discourse of elite girls’ schooling. This 
‘obscuration and embedding of classed regulatory practices’ into the everyday life of the 
school lends them a ‘new luminosity, occupying a spectacular space and forming a 
proliferation of interpellations that are hard for young women to refuse’ (p. 348).  
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This is an example of what Foucault called ‘productive’ rather than ‘repressive’ power; 
power which creates the desire to be rather than suppresses the ability to be (Foucault, 
1978, 1977). Rather than these young women being explicitly disciplined into 
conducting themselves in a certain way, the school employed a different kind of 
disciplinary practice which encouraged the girls to embody an entrepreneurial, 
cosmopolitan form of femininity positioned as healthy and successful (Allan and 
Charles, 2014). In becoming inscribed by and embodying this form of successful, 
neoliberal femininity, these young women are encouraged to engage in ‘self-invention 
through a discourse of limitless choice,’ a practice which Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody note is a form of governance (2001, p.3). This can be seen in relation to the 
reproductive choices of young middle-class women, who Walkerdine et al. note are 
more likely to have abortions after unintended pregnancy than their working-class 
counterparts (2001). Whilst making the decision to have an abortion is understood 
through the discourse of choice, Walkerdine et al. argue that middle-class women’s 
‘inscription as the bourgeois subject’ is incompatible with fertility; she is not supposed 
to be pregnant, whereas working-class women are the fecund Other (p. 187). For 
middle-class girls, Walkerdine et al. argue, regulation of their sexuality and 
reproductive capacity is part of the wider regulation of academic achievement: they are 
not allowed to fail, and pregnancy and motherhood is seen as a failure, incompatible 
with success in academia and work (p. 194). Therefore, middle-class, feminine 
embodiment is regulated through  ‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 1978, p.140) which 
determine what is normal and ‘successful’ for middle-class women. 
Competing frameworks: ‘Pro-choice’ vs. ‘reproductive justice’ 
The discourse of ‘choice’ is therefore an important aspect of the production of the 
neoliberal subject. As Allan and Charles’ (2014) and Walkerdine et al.’s (2001) work 
demonstrate, an integral mechanism of neoliberal governance (and the production of 
middle-class femininity) is the ‘veiling’ of regulation behind discourses of choice and 
self-invention. It is possible to similarly problematise the dominant framework through 
which abortion is understood in Western public discourse, that of ‘pro-choice’ politics. 
In the US, it has been documented that advocates of legal abortion initially placed the 
concepts of rights at the centre of their politics, before shifting to the language of choice 
in a bid to make their arguments more accessible (Solinger, 2002). This has become the 
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basis of pro-abortion politics in Western and English-speaking countries, pitted against 
anti-abortion campaigners who have placed the concept of ‘life’ at the heart of their own 
politics.  
At its heart, the pro-choice position holds that all women should have the right and the 
freedom to continue or end pregnancies without stigma or obstruction. However, this 
discourse has been critiqued for its underlying assumptions and values. Common 
critiques include its tendency to ignore understandings of pregnancy and the foetus that 
are not highly medicalised; that it is dominated by liberal feminist ideology which 
dovetails with neoliberal politics; and that it marginalises women of colour and queer 
women (Gilbert and Sewpaul, 2015; Ludlow, 2008; Smith, 2005; Solinger, 2002). 
For example, Kirkman et al. (2011) note that women who have had abortions rarely 
articulate the experience as one which is liberating in the way in which pro-choice 
discourses position it. Whilst ‘decisional authority’ was an important predictor of 
whether the women in the study had negative emotional outcomes after abortion (so 
bodily autonomy and choice are clearly important concepts in abortion provision), 
Kimport et al. (2011) show that it is equally important to experience that decision as 
socially-embedded.  ‘The need for decisional authority’ they write, ‘is not a wish for 
decisional isolation, and does  not exempt partners, friends and family from engaging 
with women during this time’ (p. 108). The framing of abortion as ultimately a ‘private 
issue’ is not a neutral one; it has been constructed as a private issue through medicalised 
discourse and moral discourse which positions it as distasteful or shameful (Sheldon, 
1997). 
The framing of abortion as an issue of individual choice and its legal framing as 
primarily a medical issue is at odds with a recognition of the abortion decision as 
‘socially embedded’ (Kimport, Foster and Weitz, 2011). In balancing the tension 
between agency and structure in the abortion decision, Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal 
governance becomes useful. He argued that neoliberal governance is at once totalising 
and individualising, focusing its biopolitical aims both at the control over whole 
populations and at the conduct of individual citizens (Foucault, 1978), and the concept 
of governance is where the connection between the two become apparent. Framing 
abortion as primarily a matter of choice risks uncritically adopting the neoliberal 
understanding of subjects as able to engage in constant self-invention and re-invention 
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without consideration of the matrix of knowledge/power that frame these moments of 
choice. As Rabinow and Rose argue, reproductive issues constitute a space where ‘an 
array of connections appear between the individual and the collective, the technological 
and the political, the legal and the ethical’ (2006, p.208). 
Therefore, an alternative framework to that of ‘pro-choice’ politics is required for the 
study of abortion through a poststructural lens. An alternative politics of ‘reproductive 
justice’ has been developed in response to some of the perceived shortcomings of ‘pro-
choice’ politics, which moves away from centring ‘choice’ and the ‘private’, individual 
nature of abortion, widening its focus to include the social and the structural. This 
framework, developed by Black and working-class women, was coined in 1994 after the 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, following which a 
group of Women of Colour met to develop a reproductive rights framework which more 
effectively served the needs of Women of Colour, other marginalised women and trans 
people (Forward Together, 2005; Price, 2011; Ross, 2006; Sistersong Collective, 2017). 
These groups pointed out that the intersections of privilege and oppression produce 
different concerns for different women; for example, Black, poor and disabled women 
faced programmes of state-sanctioned, forcible sterilisation in the UK and the US which 
more privileged, white and able-bodied women were not exposed to (as discussed in 
more detail below in ‘Medicalisation and regulation: stratified reproduction inside the 
abortion clinic’, p. 52). Loretta Ross, of the Woman of Colour reproductive justice 
collective Sistersong, writes (Ross, 2006): 
We believe that the ability of any woman to determine her own reproductive 
destiny is directly linked to the conditions in her community and these 
conditions are not just a matter of individual choice and access. For example, a 
woman cannot make an individual decision about her body if she is part of a 
community whose human rights as a group are violated, such as through 
environmental dangers or insufficient quality health care. Reproductive justice 
addresses issues of population control, bodily self-determination, immigrants’ 
rights, economic and environmental justice, sovereignty, and militarism and 
criminal injustices that limit individual human rights because of group or 
community oppressions. 
This framework is therefore broader in scope than the pro-choice framework, which 
focuses narrowly on abortion (rather than reproductive issues more generally) and 
bodily autonomy. It draws attention, for example, to the right to have children and to 
raise families, a right denied to or obstructed from marginalised communities for many 
years (Amos and Parmar, 1984; Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 1985; Jones, 2013; 
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McLaughlin, 2003). It also rejects the framing of abortion as an individual, private 
matter, and the distinction of private/public, instead understanding the individual and 
their reproductive life as socially embedded. 
The reproductive justice framework therefore decentres choice in order to articula te a 
less individualistic ontology, but also to reflect the inequality of access that women face 
dependent on their social position. Solinger (2002) notes that ‘choice’ (unlike ‘rights’ or 
‘justice’) connotes possession of resources, thus creating hierarchies of women who are 
able to choose. As a result, this study adopts a reproductive justice framework rather 
than a pro-choice one, and maintains a critical approach to choice which takes into 
account both women’s agency and their structural positioning within the ‘matrix of 
domination’ which makes up society (Hill Collins, 2002). This framework is more 
compatible with the intersectional, poststructural framework articulated throughout this 
chapter than that of ‘pro-choice’ politics, in its conceptualisation of power, 
marginalisation, and the impact of structural and discursive formations on the choice to 
have an abortion. This does not, of course, mean that ‘choice’ is not a useful concept in 
abortion research. As Rosalind Petchesky argues (1990, p.11): 
That individuals do not determine the social framework in which they act does 
not nullify their choices nor their moral capacity to make them. It only suggests 
that we have to focus less on ‘choice’ and more on how to transform the social 
conditions of choosing, working and reproducing. 
In conclusion, this study aims to examine the ‘social conditions of choosing’ that shape 
the narratives of the women in this study, taking a deconstructive, poststructural 
approach to the gendered and classed subject.  Contemporary sociological work on class 
has drawn attention to the centrality of the ‘classificatory struggle’ over meanings and 
values that characterises the construction of social class is austerity Britain (Tyler, 
2015a). These struggles over meaning are mediated through processes of inscription, 
embodiment and regulation which produce gendered and classed subjects (Foucault, 
1978; Skeggs, 2004). The body is a key site of this struggle, and reproduction has long 
been a regulated site where moral values are inscribed, reified and mobilised in order to 
regulate bodies seen as out of control or transgressive. Contemporary classificatory 
struggles are informed by wider processes of deepening neoliberal reform which have 
cast old figures of class disgust in new roles, and by political rhetoric which attempts to 
justify austerity by attributing global, structural inequality to the failure of individuals to 
reinvent themselves and become ‘responsible risk takers’ (Giddens, 1991). 
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In this climate, it is pertinent to examine what happens to those who undergo a 
procedure still veiled in shame and secrecy partly because the unwanted or unintended 
pregnancy is seen as a failure of self-regulation. I argue that viewing abortion 
experiences through the lens of poststructural class theory, which focuses particularly 
on the contestation of classed and gendered categories, offers a useful opportunity to 
link abortion, often framed as a private, personal experience, to wider societal processes 
of regulation and value-making. As Butler argues, ‘[t]o deconstruct is not to negate or to 
dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to open up a term, like 
the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized’ 
(Butler, 1994, p.15). In this way, this study seeks to question the formation of class and 
gender through the telling of individual abortion narratives. 
Mapping the field of abortion research 
With this theoretical framing, I now turn to the field of abortion research in order to 
locate my own study. I begin by arguing that current research on abortion experiences 
and abortion stigma leave many opportunities to explore in more depth how women 
experience and narrate abortion, as well as to more explicitly examine how intersections 
of gender and class produce different experiences for different women. I go on to 
explore the limited ways in which abortion and class have been thought together, 
arguing that the concept of ‘stratified reproduction’ is useful for expanding this. Using 
the poststructural theoretical framework articulated in the first half of this chapter, I 
argue that within the context of ‘neoliberal times’ in England, there is a need for 
research that attends to which forms and objects of knowledge are produced, 
legitimised, and de-legitimised through personal narratives of those who have had 
abortions. I finish by arguing that there is space for research that centres the role of 
discursive meaning-making about abortion, gender and class, and that interrogates 
abortion stories as social actions (as does Beynon-Jones, 2017) that produce and 
reproduce particular subject positions.  
Abortion experiences and abortion stigma 
Reviews of the literature have noted that studies on the qualitative experience of 
abortion are thin on the ground (Purcell, 2015; Lie, Robson and May, 2008). Research 
that has addressed abortion experiences has focused largely on women’s reasons and 
justifications for abortion, or their experiences of medical care. This research has 
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indicated that common reasons given for having an abortion are waiting for the right 
time to have children, wanting to finish education, relationship factors, age, and 
financial concerns (Ingelhammar et al., 1994; Purcell, 2015; Sihvo et al., 2003). It is 
also clear from existing research that the majority of women who have abortions were 
using contraception, and that around two-thirds already have children (Jones, Frohwirth 
and Moore, 2008). Some of the most consistent findings across this literature has been 
that women almost always make the decision to end or continue a pregnancy before 
interacting with medical professionals (suggesting that doctors’ role is largely to 
approve decisions women have already made about their reproductive lives), and that 
the decision is made within the often complex context of an individual’s life (Kimport, 
Foster and Weitz, 2011; Kirkman et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2004; McIntyre, Anderson 
and McDonald, 2001).  
Whilst this research has laid important groundwork for sociological work on abortion, 
the focus on women’s reasons for and decision-making around abortion – and what 
‘types’ of women have them – has been critiqued as carrying the implicit assumption 
that women need to justify having had an abortion, and that in understanding why 
women have them, their frequency can be reduced (Purcell, 2015). This is problematic 
in that it reflects and potentially reproduces the position of abortion in medical, legal, 
and public discourse as a procedure which one must have a ‘good reason’ to undergo 
(Beynon-Jones, 2013; Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Lattimer, 1998), a position reflected  
both in regular attempts in Parliament to introduce amendments and limits to existing 
abortion law (Lee, 2013) and negative media portrayals (Purcell, Hilton and McDaid, 
2014). 
In response, a small amount of research has focused on women’s own accounts of their 
abortion experiences, and the ways in which meaning is made about them. This research 
has noted that the stigmatised nature of abortion, even in a relatively liberal context like 
the UK, means women are under pressure to present acceptable or respectable abortions 
stories (Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017); thus, research which has explored 
abortion stigma directly and how women make meaning about abortion in its shadow 
offers a valuable window into the workings of discourses about abortion. For example, 
there has been some focus in abortion literature on challenging the assumptions that 
position abortion as a selfish act, or one that is inherently opposed to motherhood, 
which presents further opportunities to deconstruct the moral discourse around abortion. 
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One of the earliest examples of this is Carol Gilligan’s work (1982), which argued that 
women use an ‘ethic of care’ in their moral reasoning around abortion, carefully 
considering the needs of not only themselves but also of their families, relationships and 
communities. More recent work has also emphasised the fact that few women make the 
decision to have an abortion lightly, and that abortion is generally understood by 
women who have them to be a ‘difficult’ solution to a problem (although it is important 
to note that not all women experience abortion in this way) (Kirkman et al., 2011). 
Other work, like Jones et al.’s (2008) has challenged the societal understanding of 
abortion as the opposite to motherhood by pointing to the ways in which women who 
have abortions often cite the desire to be ‘good mothers’ as a reason for abortion. This 
work further notes that issues of responsibility and care are central to many women’s 
abortion decisions, echoing Gilligan’s argument.  
This work challenges ‘received wisdom’ about abortion, such as the stereotype that 
those who have them are selfish and lack maternal feeling. However, one effect of this 
is the reproduction of limiting discourses about womanhood. For example, Gilligan’s 
writing constructs an alternative psychological framework for women’s moral reasoning 
about abortion which is based on the virtues of care and selflessness, and research like 
Jones et al.’s reproduces discourses of ‘respectable’ womanhood in its focus on the 
motivation to be a ‘good mother’ as part of abortion decisions. Whilst these studies 
challenge stigmatising discourse about abortion as a rejection of motherhood and 
therefore of responsibility, they lack an examination of the role of power and discourse 
which delineate acceptable or ‘intelligible’ (Butler, 1994) reasons for abortion. This can 
be understood through Foucault’s argument that when power meets resistance, it is not 
overcome, but takes on a new form (Pylypa, 1998); in challenging an understanding of 
abortion as selfish, for example, these analyses do not rupture the broader discursive 
positioning of women who have (or intend to have) children as ‘respectable’ aborters. In 
framing the purpose of my own study as a deconstructive one, I aim to take the 
analytical step of interrogating the formation of these discursive positionings through 
the lens of gender and class. 
Formations of abortion stigma 
One of the mechanisms by which these discursive formations are produced and 
maintained is through abortion stigma. There are questions raised by the literature on 
abortion stigma that suggest there is opportunity to explore in more depth how women 
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experience and narrate abortion, as well as more explicitly examining how intersections 
of gender, race and class produce different experiences for different women. There is a 
tendency in this literature to conceptualise stigma as an interpersonal, individualised 
experience, an approach shaped by Erving Goffman’s influential work, Stigma: Notes 
on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963). Goffman’s definition of stigma was a 
discrepancy between the expected attributes we expect a ‘normal’ person to have, and 
the attributes someone actually has. This discrepancy between normative personhood 
and their ‘actual’ social identity might be visible – like physical disability – or invisible. 
A person with an invisible stigmatised attribute, Goffman argues, is constantly self-
conscious and worried that their ‘blemish’ will be discovered, rendering them a ‘tainted, 
discounted’ person rather than a ‘whole and usual’ one (1963, p.3).  
Goffman’s work uses an interactionist framework, focusing on how stigma is produced 
in social interactions; Stigma is ‘specifically concerned with the issue of “mixed 
contacts”  - the moments when stigmatized and normal are in the same “social 
situation”’ (1963, p.12). This focus on the interpersonal and socio-interactional is 
common in work on abortion stigma, for example Kate Cockrill and Adina Nack’s 
study of the intra- and interpersonal strategies of abortion stigma ‘management’ (2013); 
Brenda Major and Richard Gramzow’s study on the psychological and interpersonal 
effects of abortion concealment (1999); and Edna Astbury-Ward et al.’s study on the 
difficulty of disclosing abortion experiences in the anticipation of negative reactions 
(2012).  
However, other research has adapted Goffman’s work in order to develop a framework 
for abortion stigma that considers the role of power and social structures, influenced by 
Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s conceptualisation of stigma (2001). Link and Phelan’s 
theorisation of stigma focuses on the ‘context of social, economic, and political power’ 
which ‘devalues and differentiates’ certain people, arguing that ‘power…is essential to 
the social production of stigma’ (2001, p.375). An example of work on abortion stigma 
that has adopted this approach is that of Anuradha Kumar, Leila Hessini and Ellen 
Mitchell (2009), who define abortion stigma as ‘a negative attribute ascribed to women 
who seek to terminate a pregnancy that marks them, internally or externally, as inferior 
to ideals of womanhood’ (2009, p.628 my emphasis). The latter dimension they identify 
explicitly characterises abortion stigma as a product of societal and structural 
inequalities. 
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Kumar et al. (2009) argue that the process of stigmatisation is enabled and produced in 
multiple arenas: in dominant discourses and mass culture; in societal institutions like 
law and policy; on an organisational level including the segregation of abortion care 
from other medical services; on a community level; and, finally, in the individual, 
including internalised stigma. Their argument concludes with a call for a research 
agenda that moves away from focussing only on the latter individual, psychological 
level, but looks at these other, structural loci of abortion stigma. This is emphasised by 
the over-arching argument of their paper: that abortion stigma is not universal, but is 
‘locally produced’. This argument, however, is in tension with another claim: that ‘a 
woman who seeks an abortion is inadvertently challenging widely-held assumptions 
about the “essential nature” of women’ (p. 628). 
Indeed, whilst arguing that abortion stigma is produced in context of local ideas about 
womanhood and femininity, they suggest that women who have abortions are 
conceptualised as transgressing three ‘archetypal constructs’ of the ‘feminine’: 
perpetual fecundity and female sexuality for procreation; the inevitability of 
motherhood; and instinctive nurturing (p. 625). This is a central tension in their 
theorisation not explored fully, that whilst stigma is ‘locally produced,’ there are 
simultaneously universal understandings of womanhood that abortion is seen to 
transgress. This contradiction or tension offers a space to more fully explore the ways in 
which meaning is made about abortion on both an individual and discursive level, 
taking into account the ways in which not only gender but also other axes of oppression 
such as race and class produce differing accounts and understanding of abortion. Indeed, 
whilst Kumar et al. do note that stigma will be determined by ‘socio-economic status, 
occupation, race or ethnicity and age,’ they call these ‘individual characteristics’ rather 
than axes of structural inequality (p. 628).  
Research on abortion stigma influenced by Kumar et al.’s theorisation have advanced 
understanding of the link between stigma and power in several ways. For example, 
Katrina Kimport, Kira Foster and Tracy Weitz (2011) have argued that rather than the 
abortion itself, it is the social and political context of the person who has the abortion 
that produces ‘emotional difficulty’. Furthermore, they identified a division of labour 
between women and men regarding pregnancy prevention, abortion and childrearing; as 
a result, ‘the majority of abortion-related emotional burdens fall on women’ (p. 103). 
Maggie Kirkman et al.’s discursive analysis of women contemplating abortion also 
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emphasised the importance of ‘the complex personal and social contexts’ in the 
production of stigma (2011), and Lesley Hoggart’s work on internalised abortion stigma 
has explored the way women construct alternative narratives of responsibility and 
morality in the face of social norms which position abortion as a discrediting attribute 
(2017).  
What is missing in this conceptualisation of abortion stigma, and in much of the 
research influenced by it, is explicit attention to intersecting dimensions of structural 
oppression other than gender. This is glaring omission considering that much of this 
literature has pointed to the importance of social context on the experience of abortion 
and the production of stigma (e.g. Kimport, Foster and Weitz, 2011; Kirkman et al., 
2011; McIntyre, Anderson and McDonald, 2001). If abortion stigma is a ‘compound 
stigma’ which ‘builds on other forms of discrimination and structural injustices’ to 
produce particular experiences for women who have abortions (Kumar, Hessini and 
Mitchell, 2009, p.634), then attention to not only gender but other axes of oppression is 
needed to make more explicit the situated nature of women’s abortion experiences and 
narratives. 
The question of how to do this has not been addressed in great detail in the existing 
literature, with some exceptions. Carrie Purcell’s review of abortion experience research 
notes that an interrogation of language in constructing experiences of abortion is 
‘largely absent’ from recent literature ‘despite the powerful role of language in 
constructing experiences of abortion and perpetuating stigma around it’ (Purcell, 2015, 
p.591); a recent exception to this is Siân Beynon-Jones’ work on identity formation 
through abortion narratives (2017). Beynon-Jones argues that work on abortion stigma 
‘risks reifying it’ by failing to consider ‘how identities are continually re-negotiated 
through language-use’; using a discursive psychology framework, she explores the 
capacity of women who have had abortions to construct ‘untroubled’ i.e. non-
stigmatised identities within constraints (2017, p.225). Whilst some subject positions 
are ‘harder to claim than others’ due to cultural norms and expectations (and 
transgressing these norms entails ‘trouble’), her discursive psychological approach 
emphasises the nature of identity as not static but articulated through ‘socially available 
discourses or “interpretative repertoires”’ which position speakers in certain ways, 
allowing them to take up and reject different subject positions (p. 226). 
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From this poststructural and Foucauldian position, the ‘discursive labour’ of women’s 
abortion narratives becomes apparent, as does the nature of abortion stigma as the 
reproduction of social relations of power (Beynon-Jones, 2017, p.238). Her approach 
offers a way of building on the existing work that has illuminated the shaping of 
abortion experiences and narratives by social and cultural discourses. As argued 
throughout this chapter, both gender and class are continual (re)productions on the 
discursive level, part of a complex interaction of subjectivity and wider ‘regimes of 
truth’ (Foucault, 1978) which shape what it is possible to know about oneself. The 
question of how both gender and class shape and are reproduced through abortion 
narratives can therefore be answered by close attention not only to how ‘individual 
characteristics’ differentiate abortion experiences, but by how meaning is made about 
abortion through continual, on-going narration of the self through personal narratives.  
Classed dimensions of abortion access  
The literature on abortion experiences and stigma, therefore, has indicated that 
experiences of abortion are often mediated through socio-political understandings of 
womanhood, understandings that are locally formed. However, there are few studies 
that have incorporated class into their analysis, and of those few studies, none have 
employed the feminist poststructural framework articulated in the first half of this 
chapter. Instead, there have been attempts to map broad trends using quantitative 
indicators of class, like level of education or the National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification (NS-SEC) measurement of occupational class, and to determine what the 
most important socio-economic factors are for women who decide to end their 
pregnancies. In particular, teenage women have been the subject of a vast number of 
studies seeking to understand the ‘problem’ of teenage pregnancy, and its socio-
economic trends (e.g. Garlick, Ineichen and Hudson, 1993; Social Exclusion Unit, 
1999; Wilson, Brown and Richards, 1992). This means we have a great deal of data on 
how socio-economic factors impact teenage pregnancy and abortion rates, but fewer 
clear indications of how these effects remain or change throughout the life course, nor 
how the cultural and discursive elements of class affect the abortion experience. 
For example, research suggests that teenage pregnancies are more likely to result in 
abortions in more affluent areas, whereas in less affluent areas, these pregnancies are 
more likely to end in live births (Garlick, Ineichen and Hudson, 1993; Lee et al., 2004; 
Smith, 1993; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001). For pregnancy in over-18s, some 
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studies also suggest that the abortion rate is higher in more affluent communities. For 
example, one French study (Sihvo et al., 2003) suggests that higher levels of education 
increase likelihood of abortion for women in France, whilst another study in Scotland 
(Wilson, 2000) argues that abortion rates, for all age-ranges, ‘tend to be highest in 
regions with highest proportions of the materially advantaged or, alternatively, lowest 
where deprivation measures are highest’. This latter study has been corroborated by 
more recent data (Information Services Division and NHS Scotland, 2015). This 
suggests that certainly in their younger years, and possibly throughout the life course, 
women are more likely to end unintended pregnancies if they are more affluent or 
middle-class.  
One study which has explored this issue in more depth is that of Ellie Lee et al. (2004). 
In a national, mixed methods study, Lee et al. explored why there was regional variation 
of under-18 ‘abortion proportions’ in the UK; in other words, why the proportion of 
teenage pregnancies ending in abortion was higher in some areas than others. They 
found that the ‘primary factor’ accounting for the variation was ‘social deprivation,’ 
meaning that the more ‘deprived’ the area, the more teenage pregnancies ended in live 
births (a finding which corroborated previous research) (p. 48). Lee et al.’s 
measurement of ‘social deprivation’ used indices including, amongst others, the ONS 
area classification system (which groups together local authorities that have similar 
socioeconomic and demographic profiles across a broad range of measures), percentage 
of unemployment in the local area, and the percentage of 15/16 year-olds obtaining five 
or more GCSEs (p. 10).  
The qualitative phase of Lee et al.’s study indicated that cultural and community values 
relating to responsibility, motherhood and life expectations were highly relevant in the 
young women’s decision making about abortion and pregnancy, and reflected their 
socio-economic contexts. For example, the authors argue that for young women whose 
backgrounds were marked by insecure or unstable employment and whose life 
expectations did not include education or work prospects, young motherhood offered an 
‘escape route’ and a sense of direction (p. 19). In contrast, young women who were 
‘certain that future life will develop through education and employment’ were more 
likely to opt for abortion (p. 21).  
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Lee et al. do not use the language of class in their analysis, but in viewing their findings 
through the lens of cultural class analysis, it is clear that classed discourses of 
responsibility and motherhood are relevant to their findings. If indeed more affluent or 
middle-class women are more likely to have abortions following unintended pregnancy, 
we might consider what cultural and social expectations surround women in different 
social locations that shape these reproductive decisions, and consider different ways to 
conceptualise class than Lee et al.’s study has. For example, Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody (2001) argue that middle-class discourses of motherhood emphasise delaying 
child-bearing until the ‘right’ time, after completing education and establishing careers; 
they argue that this produces middle-class women as ‘bourgeois subjects’ whose minds 
are given predominance over their bodies. Within these discourses, pregnancy and 
motherhood are positioned as failure if done at the ‘wrong’ time, incompatible with 
success in academia and work. Therefore, middle-class women are positioned as 
successful if they regulate their fertility closely, and start families at an appropriate time 
(Allan and Charles, 2014; Francombe-Webb and Silk, 2016; Walkerdine, 2003; 
Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001). This can be conceptualised as part of the project 
which constitutes white, middle-class womanhood as the ideal neoliberal subjectivity, 
invested in self-regulation and self-invention through making the ‘right’ choices 
(Francombe-Webb and Silk, 2016; Harris, 2004). 
In contrast, working-class women are positioned as fecund and embodied in a way 
middle-class women are expected to reject (Skeggs, 1997; Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody, 2001). The higher rates of teenage pregnancy resulting in live births that Lee et 
al. (2004) attributed to socially-deprived areas are positioned in moral discourse around 
reproduction by lack: lack of education, lack of control, lack of ambition (Tyler, 2008). 
This framing was somewhat reproduced by Lee et al.’s framing, which defined the 
‘disadvantaged’ women in their study through lack (of employment, of educational 
qualifications etc.). This framing was resisted by their own participants who, for 
example, shared alternative assignments of value to young motherhood, which (as Lee 
et al. note) is generally framed as a social problem. Framing young motherhood as 
responsible (p. 19) was one way in which these young, socially ‘deprived’ women 
resisted their positioning as lacking in responsibility. This echoes a finding from an 
earlier study (Press, 1991) in which the assumption that low income is an obvious or 
particularly understandable reason for abortion was questioned by working-class 
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women who shared their experiences of raising children on low incomes. As one 
participant explained, 'there are always options, if you get pregnant and want that child 
badly enough’ (p. 435). These ‘options’ included shared child-caring amongst family 
and neighbours. Within this understanding of motherhood and responsibility, abortion 
can be framed as a middle-class practice, and as ‘taking the easy way out’, rather than a 
commitment to ‘seeing through’ a pregnancy and accepting motherhood (Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody, 2001).  
Applying Skeggs’ theorisation of class and gender formations to this phenomenon, it is 
clear that class produces a struggle over the meaning and value of pregnancy and 
abortion. For example, investment in caring through motherhood is an accessible form 
of value in for working-class women, who create this local form of value to a practice 
that is devalued in the wider symbolic economy (Skeggs, 1997). This type of analysis, 
however, has not been applied directly to studies on abortion experiences, and certainly 
not recently. The work explored in this section has used proxies for class like social 
deprivation (Lee et al., 2004) or has applied a priori class categorisations to participants 
(Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001); has focused on young or teenage women only 
(Lee et al., 2004; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001); or has addressed motherhood 
but not abortion (Skeggs, 1997). Thus, there remains space for research to be done on 
abortion which deconstructs rather than makes use of class categorisations, and explores 
the experiences of women of all ages, not only young women.  
Stratified reproduction 
I now turn to work which has explored how certain discourses of reproduction are 
legitimised and others are devalued. For this, the concept of ‘stratified reproduction’ is 
useful. Coined by Shellee Colen (1995), the term is defined by Faye Ginsburg and 
Rayna Rapp as 'an idea…to describe the power relations by which some categories of 
people are empowered to nurture and reproduce, while others are disempowered’ (1995, 
p.3). Stratified reproduction occurs on both macro- and micro-levels, and both inside 
and outside the abortion clinic, and can be usefully thought in conjunction with 
Foucault’s concept of biopower, the ‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 1978, p.140). In the 
case of abortion, the regulatory practice of stratified reproduction is enabled both by the 
control of abortion through law and medicine, and by the internalisation of the 
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knowledge this regulation produces; thus, it is useful to conceptualise the processes by 
which stratified reproduction occurs both within and outside the abortion clinic. 
Medicalisation and regulation: stratified reproduction inside the abortion 
clinic 
Middle-class discourses of delaying childbearing and  individualisation of responsibility 
for childcare are positioned as the norm (Beynon-Jones, 2013). Indeed, this is a 
phenomenon which occurs in relation to many concepts and practices, not just 
pregnancy, so much so that Mike Savage has described the middle-class as the 
‘particular-universal class,’ whose practices are regarded as ‘universally “normal”, 
“good” and “appropriate”’ (Savage, 2003, p.536). One of the ways in which middle-
class understandings of reproduction are legitimised is through medical discourse and 
practices of abortion. As argued in Chapter One (‘Abortion law, policy, and public 
attitudes,’ p. 11), abortion legislation in the UK is highly medicalised; it defers to 
medical knowledge and judgment, and positions medical professionals as the legal 
gatekeepers of abortion. Several aspects of the Act demonstrate its medicalised nature. 
The first is the time limit of twenty-four weeks, which is deemed the point at which, if 
labour were induced, a live birth could result. Below twenty-four weeks, a foetus is not 
considered ‘viable,’ i.e. it would not survive outside of the womb. The time-limit for 
legal abortions is therefore dependent on medical consensus about viability (and the 
only exceptions to this time limit are also medical: danger to the life of the pregnant 
woman, or serious ‘handicap’) (Abortion Act, 1967).  
The second notable aspect of the Act is that it contains no special provision for rape, 
incest, or other circumstances which in other legal contexts are considered exceptional 
justifications for abortion (for example, in Brazil, where abortion is only permitted after 
rape or to save the mother’s life (Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw, 1998)). Instead, the 
Act is couched in medical language, foregrounding the importance of physical and 
mental health. Finally, the Act legalises rather than decriminalises abortion, and does 
not create a right to abortion, meaning that it remains illegal under the terms of the 
Offenses Against the Person Act unless performed under the circumstances delineated 
by the 1967 Act, positioning doctors as the legal gatekeepers of abortion. 
The result of these elements is that the Abortion Act allows for both permissiveness and 
regulation. It is easily proven, for example, that continuation of pregnancy is more risky 
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than a termination for women in terms of both physical and mental health: more women 
die in childbirth than from abortion procedures each year, and any indication that a 
woman’s pregnancy is unwanted suggests her mental health would be at risk if forced to 
continue with it (Raymond and Grimes, 2012). Doctors can therefore quite easily fulfil 
the Abortion Act’s criteria, which Emily Jackson points out could be seen as a 
‘harmless legal fiction,’ if in practice doctors are simply approving decisions that have 
already been made (Jackson, 2001).  
Whilst it is true that the decision to have an abortion is normally made before 
consultation with a medical professional (Kumar et al., 2004), the primacy of medical 
opinion and knowledge in the Abortion Act locates regulatory power in the hands of 
doctors. In Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic, he argues that the development of the 
‘medical gaze’ acts as a powerful site of ‘truth,’ enabled by the modernist positioning of 
science and medical discourse as objective, wise and all-knowing (Foucault, 1973). This 
is reinforced by legal discourse which has positioned abortion as a private medical 
matter between a woman and her doctor (Sheldon, 1997). This medical, legal, and 
societal valorisation of medical professionals as holders of knowledge and truth means 
that the doctor’s office can act as a site of medical regulation and the practice of 
stratified reproduction. 
Doctors are obligated to talk to patients in order to determine which (if any) of the legal 
grounds an abortion can take place are fulfilled. Whilst some doctors may agree with 
Jackson that the Act allows them to simply approve decisions women have already 
made (as recent research such as Lee, 2017a suggests many do), it remains the case that 
women are required to express their request in a way which fits the framework of the 
Abortion Act. This has been critiqued as imposing a framework of understanding 
premised on negative constructions of abortion as a ‘last resort’, an anomalous outcome 
of pregnancy, and therefore not ‘woman-centred’ (Lattimer, 1998, p.59). Furthermore, 
as these discourses or frameworks are expressed in the language of medicine, they can 
be argued to be neutral, objective, or apolitical, when in fact these discourses produce 
power ‘legitimised…by expert knowledge [which] operates through surveillance, 
normalisation and judgment’ (Sheldon, 1997, p.11). 
Maxine Lattimer gives the example of one interaction she observed in her ethnography 
of British abortion clinics (1998). She observed a woman who had already been referred 
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by her GP becoming frustrated with the requirement that she now had to have another 
consultation at the abortion clinic. In the face of this woman’s frustration, the nurse 
expressed some sympathy, but reminded her that it was a ‘legal requirement’ that she 
put something on her form. The woman was encouraged to provide standard, 
perfunctory justifications – ‘it wasn’t planned, I don’t have any money, the father 
doesn’t want to know’ –  in order to proceed (1998, p.70). Lattimer concludes that 
‘women have to have a very good reason to have an abortion, and simply choosing to 
have one is not enough’ (1998, p.70). 
Therefore, despite the potential permissiveness of the Abortion Act, medical 
professionals are complicit in a requirement for women to provide ‘appropriate’ 
justifications for having an abortion shaped by medical discourse that positions 
childbirth as a normal outcome of pregnancy, and abortion as an anomalous one. What a 
doctor or nurse deems to be an ‘appropriate’ reason is not only shaped by the Act, but 
by assumptions about gender, race, class and disability which form the basis of stratified 
reproduction. For example, there is evidence that positive antenatal tests for conditions 
like Down’s Syndrome carry an assumption that the parent will want an abortion, and 
that obstetricians in particular can be directive in their advice to parents following 
positive test results (Shakespeare, 1998). Tom Shakespeare calls this ‘weak eugenics’: 
‘promoting technologies of reproductive selection via non-coercive individual 
choices…based on the medical judgement that disabled lives involve unacceptable 
suffering’ (Shakespeare, 1998, p.669). This is arguably expressive of a belief that the 
lives of living disabled people are worth less than those of able-bodied people, and, 
furthermore, that people should avoid having children who are at risk of passing on 
inherited conditions (Edwards, 2004; McLaughlin, 2003).  
Additionally, the UK has a history of medically regulating the reproductive lives of 
Black women and poor white women. Prescription of the long-term injectable 
contraceptive Depo-Provera was prescribed on a trial basis to Black and poor white 
women in the 1980s before its adverse effects were known (later tests established its 
carcinogenic contraindications) (Amos and Parmar, 1984; Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 
1985; Jones, 2013). Black British feminists argued during this time when the white-
dominated reproductive rights movement was focusing narrowly on access to abortion 
and contraception that Black women were already more likely to be offered abortion 
and sterilisations by doctors than their white counterparts (Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 
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1985; Jones, 2013; Torkington, 1995). Black women were fighting for their right to be 
mothers against a backdrop of racist tropes which positioned them as hyper-fertile and 
feckless, and yet unfit to be mothers (Jones, 2013; Torkington, 1995).  
One of the most recent academic studies to shed light on this process of stratified 
reproduction through the gatekeeping of abortion is Siân Beynon-Jones’ interview study 
with medical professionals involved in the provision of abortion (2013). Beynon-Jones 
argues that medical professionals, when asked questions about how they distinguish 
between rational and irrational abortion requests, mobilised concepts like age and parity 
(e.g. young women’s abortion requests are more understandable, as are those of women 
who already have children) as well as social class. Certain women’s abortion requests 
were deemed ‘rational’ because they conformed to health professional’s ideas about 
which types of women should avoid motherhood, for example women from ‘deprived’ 
areas dealing with ‘unemployment, drug dependence, violence’ (p. 518). In contrast, 
‘nice middle-class couple[s] with resources and money’ were positioned as problematic, 
as they, in the eyes of some interviewed medical professionals, had no ‘rational’ reason 
not to be able to have a baby (p. 518). 
Similarly, Hawkes’ earlier research with family planning professionals examined the 
‘covert’ and ‘striking regulatory content’ of their practice which was ‘directed, in 
particular, towards young women whose life-styles are deemed “irresponsible,” and 
who are, therefore, considered illegitimate “family planners”’ (Hawkes, 1995, p.257). 
The disjunction between the professionals’ stated understanding of their practice as 
amoral and purely technical and the clear moral dimension of their ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
conversations about their work demonstrates the positioning of medical discourse and 
practice as apolitical or objective. It also demonstrates the explicitly classed dimensions 
of the moral regulation of reproduction. For example, one professional interviewed by 
Hawkes explained that in the nearby ‘stable middle-class area’, women were ‘more 
responsible,’ indicated by their contraceptive choices; ‘there’s a lot more use of the cap 
and the diaphragm, because women there are more motivated to use it’ (p. 266). In 
contrast, women in another nearby but working-class neighbourhood were ‘feckless and 
irresponsible,’ indicated by their choice of ‘the pill, the coil and Depo-Provera’ which 
are contraceptive options ‘you don’t have to think about’ (p. 266). These understandings 
of responsibility and who is capable of exercising it are directly related to the practice of 
stratified reproduction, as whilst working-class women’s choice to use long-acting 
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contraception was understood as evidence of fecklessness, at the same time their 
decisions to have children were interpreted as irrational and whimsical. 
Whilst Hawkes and Beynon-Jones do not include race in their analyses, it is clear that 
specific discourses about which ‘types’ of women should reproduce are operating in 
both classed and raced ways in the doctor’s office (Jones, 2013; Bryan, Dadzie and 
Scafe, 1985; Amos and Parmar, 1984). What remains unclear in the current literature is 
how these practices might affect the experience of women seeking abortions. In 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality, analytical focus should not only be 
centred on power concentrated within institutions like medicine and the state, but should 
also attend to the ‘technologies of the self’ which co-constitute it (Foucault, 1977). In 
this sense, there remains opportunities to research women’s abortion narratives which 
maintain a ‘critical bifocality’ between the micro and macro, accounting for the ways in 
which wider processes of neoliberal government might be ‘insinuated, embodied, and 
resisted’ by individual women (Weis and Fine, 2012, p.173). Beynon-Jones warns that 
her work does not provide direct evidence of contemporary abortion practice working as 
a site of stratified reproduction, but are evidence of ‘the operation of dominant 
discourses of abortion and motherhood in contemporary Britain’ (p. 521). It is to these 
wider dominant discourses, and their relation to individual abortion narratives, that I 
now turn. 
Stratified reproduction outside the abortion clinic 
As well as medical regulation, the practice of stratified reproduction is embedded in 
both overt and covert forms of social regulation of reproduction.  One of the ways in 
which this can be seen most starkly is through the construction of teenage pregnancy as 
a ‘social problem.’ In the same way that youth was legitimised by medical professionals 
as a rational, understandable reason to grant an abortion request in Beynon-Jones’ 
(2013) study, the decision to continue a pregnancy as a teenager is positioned as deviant 
in policy discourse (Arai, 2003). Furthermore, teenage pregnancy’s association with 
classed and raced assumptions about responsibility and social degeneration both 
reproduce stigmatising discourses which devalue and delegitimise poor, working-class 
and black women, and produce a powerful figuration of the ideal, white, middle-class 
mother (Arai, 2003). 
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The position of teenage pregnancy as a social problem is reflected in policy, which 
pathologises early pregnancy as arising out of ‘out of inappropriate motivations, 
ignorance or sexual embarrassment’ (Arai, 2003, p.202). For instance, the higher rates 
of teenage conception and pregnancy (and lower rates of abortion) in ‘deprived’ areas of 
the UK have produced what Lisa Arai describes as ‘puzzlement’ in policy makers and 
researchers, who have attributed them to lack of sexual education/knowledge and low 
aspirations and expectations (Arai, 2003). The decision-making of these young, often 
working-class, women is therefore devalued as evidence of a lack, leading Saara Greene 
to note that ‘feminist perspectives on “choice” do not appear to permeate the lives of 
working-class women and women from specific racial, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds’ (2006, p.38).  
Paradoxically, at the same time as being positioned as lacking agency and sufficient 
knowledge to avoid pregnancy, young, working-class mothers are also routinely 
accused of having children as early as possible in order to claim benefits (Nayak and 
Kehily, 2014; Tyler, 2008). This particular construction of young working-class 
mothers has been argued to be a figuration of middle-class anxieties about ‘female 
sexuality, reproduction, fertility, and “racial mixing”’ (Tyler, 2008, p.17). These women 
are at once feckless and calculating, un-aspirational and greedy in this representation. 
Against this unstable yet powerful figuration of the young, working-class mother, the 
ideal mother is silently produced. She is white, middle-class, and wealthy; she waits for 
the ‘right’ time to start a family within the context of a stable relationship and career. 
Women’s decisions about pregnancy are taking place in the midst of these discourses of 
responsibility and aspiration. Much work on reproduction and class has focused on 
young, working-class women, but little attention has been paid to how middle-class 
women experience and narrate their encounters with these discourses. This is 
problematic, as it leads to a particular construction of working-class women as less able 
to be agentic in the face of these dominant discourses. For example, Saara Greene’s 
(2006) study with young working-class mothers notes:  
Throughout my interviews with the young mothers, it became increasingly clear 
that even when news about the pregnancy initially resulted in feelings of fear 
and anxiety, class and cultural values prevented the majority of the young 
mothers from considering abortion as a solution to dealing with an unplanned 
pregnancy (p. 33). 
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Whilst Greene goes on to share some of the strategies of resistance these young mothers 
developed in reaction to the ‘social problem’ discourse surrounding young motherhood, 
it is notable that ‘working-class culture’ is identified here as preventing the women from 
exercising full reproductive agency. There are few examples of researchers framing 
middle-class culture as ‘preventing’ women from making choices about their 
reproductive lives. Greene goes on to suggest that young motherhood in working-class 
communities will continue until this group’s structural position in society changes, or 
‘until such time as [young working-class women] are socially and culturally 
programmed to seriously consider or to access’ other life goals (p. 38). This analysis 
reproduces the classed ‘social problem’ discourse surrounding young motherhood, and 
presents the young women’s narratives about motherhood as a vocation or a 
demonstration of responsibility as false consciousness; Greene fears ‘they do not have 
any choice apart from becoming a mother’ (p. 38). Again, it is notable that it is 
working-class ‘culture’ is positioned as at fault. 
Whilst it is clear that social, political and cultural dimensions of class are important 
aspects of abortion experiences and attitudes, it is problematic to assume that working-
class culture requires more scrutiny than middle- or upper-class culture. Similarly, 
whilst scholarly work on class has understandably focused heavily on working-class 
experiences and positioning, if the middle-class are the ‘particular-universal’ class 
whose experiences are assumed to be normal and universal (Savage, 2003), it is 
incumbent on social researchers to turn as critical an eye on this as they have on the 
working class. This study offers an opportunity to examine how women who are 
structurally positioned as relatively privileged narrate their abortion experiences, 
negotiate stigma, and resist or reproduce discourses of class and gender in their abortion 
stories. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that previous work on abortion has laid important ground work for developing 
a ‘sociology of abortion experiences’ (Purcell, 2015). However, questions and puzzles 
remain, and central to these are the idea of ‘meaning-making’ about abortion. The body 
of work seeking to expand knowledge about abortion experiences has made some use of 
a discursive framework to analyse what subject positions are made and unmade in 
abortion narratives (e.g. Beynon-Jones, 2017); however, this work rarely engages 
directly or in-depth with identities or axes of oppression other than gender. Work that 
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has directly addressed class and abortion has approached the former from as an a priori 
category, and has not achieved the in-depth, discursive analysis of abortion experience 
literature. Women’s abortion stories are not only useful for discovering the reasons why 
women decide to end pregnancies, but offer insights into how individuals negotiate, use 
and resist dominant discourses about a stigmatised procedure. Furthermore, analysis of 
abortion narratives using a feminist, poststructural understanding of class enables an 
analysis of these narratives as productive of, not simply reflective of, wider discourses 
of class and gender that characterise abortion experiences. 
The role of discourse is key to this question, referred to in previous work on abortion 
variously as ‘cultural narratives,’ (McIntyre, Anderson and McDonald, 2001) 
‘interpretative repertoires’ (Beynon-Jones, 2017) and ‘framing discourses’ (Kumar, 
Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). MacIntyre et al. argue that abortion narratives are 
characterised by ‘struggle’ for individual women to ‘create her own narrative’ against 
the risk of being defined through discourses that do not reflect her own understanding or 
experience (2001, p.50). This presents an interesting parallel to Imogen Tyler’s 
theorisation of social class as a ‘struggle against classification’ (2015a) within which 
individuals attempt to narrate their lives against dominant discourses which might 
devalue and delegitimise them. There is space for research which centres these struggles 
over meaning, and approaches abortion narratives as social actions that produce and 
reproduce particular subject positions (Beynon-Jones, 2017). Doing so in the context of 
‘neoliberal times’ in which the divisions in British society are increasingly clear is 
possible to do using a poststructural, Foucauldian framework which attends to which 
forms of knowledge are produced, legitimised, and de-legitimised through the telling of 
abortion stories. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
In this chapter, I outline the process of designing this study, from its epistemological 
and theoretical basis, to the choice of method, analysis, and ethical framework. I begin 
by developing an epistemological framework that synthesises aspects of three feminist 
traditions: standpoint theory, poststructural theory, and intersectional theory. What 
results is a framework that understands the subject as a continual production rather than 
a static, unified self through which a particular ‘truth’ can be accessed; this subject is 
formed within a ‘matrix of domination’ (Hill Collins, 2002) which includes gender and 
class. 
I go on to outline the research design that proceeded from this epistemological 
framework. I explain the choice of the life story method as a useful way of allowing a 
full, participant-led narrative to be created; who was recruited to take part in the 
research; and the method of narrative discourse analysis I chose to analyse their stories. 
I go on to reflect on the role of the researcher and the practice of ‘feminist 
interviewing’, and finish with an articulation of an ethical framework for the research 
that uses Butler’s reconceptualization of vulnerability as resistance (Butler, 2014) to 
conceptualise participants in ‘sensitive’ research. 
Epistemological framework: feminist traditions, feminist 
innovations 
This study is fundamentally feminist for several reasons. It recognises the workings of 
gendered and related oppressions on people’s lives; it is concerned with the experience 
of a marginalised group of people; and it seeks to change these conditions of oppression 
and marginalisation (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002; Smith, 1987; Stanley, 1990). As 
such, it approaches empirical research from a particular standpoint and makes particular 
claims about how one can and should understand the social worlds of others. 
The concept of ‘feminist’ research has its roots, at least in Western academia, in the 
1960s and 70s. Alongside the second wave of the social movement from which it 
sprung, feminist research was developed in reaction to the way women’s lives and 
experiences were being ignored in academia, in favour of the assumption that men’s 
lives and perspectives could be considered universal. Feminist academics challenged 
this not only by shifting the focus of what social scientists should be studying, but how 
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it was studied (Harding, 1986; Smith, 1987). For example, scholars like Ann Oakley 
(1981) challenged the assumption that social researchers should embody a detached, 
‘objective’ manner when conducting sociological interviews, arguing in defence of a 
style of interviewing that considered the power dynamics between researcher and 
researched, and embraced principles like emotionality and friendship. Feminist 
approaches to social research like these challenged what was seen by feminist 
academics as a male preoccupation with positivist principles and concepts like 
objectivity, which, whilst useful in disciplines like the hard sciences, were inappropriate 
for qualitative study of women’s lives (Oakley, 1981).  
These feminist innovations – which have since become feminist traditions – have 
shaped the epistemological and methodological foundations of this study in several 
ways. First, this study begins with the assumption that it is useful to begin from the 
experience of those who have abortions. Whilst this may seem an uncontroversial 
starting point, it is necessary to locate this assumption within the tradition of feminist 
standpoint theory and the ontological and epistemological claims it makes, particularly 
the idea that certain marginalised subjects enjoy ‘epistemic privilege’ (Harding, 1986).  
This assumption is troubled by feminist postmodern approaches which suggest that all 
knowledge is partial, and question the idea of a stable, unified ‘self’ from which a 
position of ‘epistemic privilege’ can be produced (Butler, 1994). The feminist 
standpoint approach is also troubled by intersectional feminist theory, which has 
critiqued the tendency of feminist research to centre the experiences of white, middle-
class women and to claim this standpoint can speak for all women (Crenshaw, 1991). In 
bringing these different feminist approaches into conversation with each other, I 
develop an epistemological framework influenced by all three traditions. This 
framework shaped a study which begins from the experience of those who have 
abortions (who are almost always women), whilst maintaining a critical awareness of 
how these experiences are shaped by gender, class and other intersecting axes of 
oppression and privilege. In so doing, this study does not aim to make generalised 
claims about the experience of abortion, but rather aims to explore how meaning is 
made about that experience through particular constructions of class and gender. 
One of the epistemological claims of feminist standpoint theory is that the perspective 
of the marginalised is more ‘objective’ than the privileged, by virtue of having 
experienced oppression which the privileged may never perceive (Harding, 1986). This 
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claim was developed as a rationale for beginning feminist research from the experiences 
of women. In contrast, feminist poststructural theory has argued that no perspective 
escapes partiality, therefore the idea of ‘objectivity’ is not possible (Hawkesworth, 
1989). Indeed, poststructural theory questions the very possibility of a unified, stable 
‘self’ from which a standpoint can be taken; in Butler’s words, the subject is ‘never 
fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again...[it is] the permanent 
possibility of a certain resignifying process’ (Butler, 1994, p.13). If the self is a 
continual production and reproduction, then the category of ‘woman’ is one of ‘multiple 
significations’ (Butler, 1994, p.16). This therefore problematizes feminist standpoint 
theory by questioning whether knowledge from one standpoint can ever really be 
universal. 
In thinking through this tension, the work of intersectional feminists becomes useful. 
Intersectionality bears some relation to both standpoint and poststructural feminism. Its 
critique of the assumed universality of the white, middle-class subject is similar to the 
standpoint critique of the assumed universality of the white, male subject, for example, 
and the concept of ‘epistemic privilege’ developed by standpoint theorists bears some 
relation to bell hooks’ intersectional theorising of the subject on the ‘margins’. Hooks 
argued that Black women, living on the ‘edge’ or ‘margins’ of mainstream feminist 
organising, ‘developed a particular way of seeing reality’: 
We looked from both the outside in and the inside out. We focused our attention 
on the center as well as the margin. We understood both. This mode of seeing 
reminded us of the existence of a whole universe, a main body made up of both 
margin and center. […] At its most visionary, [feminist theory] will emerge 
from individuals who have knowledge of both margin and centre (2000, p.xvi). 
This bears similarities to the idea of ‘epistemic privilege’ that standpoint theorists 
argued women possessed as subjects routinely excluded from practices of power, 
developing their own forms of knowledge in order to both survive and undermine their 
own subordination (Essers, 2009, p.164).  
In discussing the development of intersectionality, Crenshaw notes that it is a ‘concept 
linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory’ (1991, p.1243). She argued that 
intersectionality can aid the ‘postmodern project’ of ‘thinking about the way power has 
clustered around certain categories and is exercised against others’ and efforts to ‘unveil 
the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes are experienced by 
people who are subordinated and the people who are privileged by them’ (p. 1297). 
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Intersectionality therefore offers a useful framework for a research project explicitly 
interested in an intersectional experience: how abortion, a gendered phenomenon, 
intersects with social class. It also offers a framework which both considers the 
partiality of the subject positions created at these intersections of identity, and how their 
production is located in a ‘matrix of power’ which legitimates some subjects and not 
others (Butler, 1994). 
Therefore, in choosing to research abortion through the life histories of those who have 
had them, I am influenced by all three epistemological traditions: standpoint, 
postmodern, and intersectional. It begins from the experience of those who have 
abortions, whilst rejecting the idea that any one standpoint can lay claim to objectivity. 
It does not seek to separate out the experiences of gender and class, recognising that 
people do not live ‘single-issue lives’ (Lorde, 1982). As Essers (2009) argues in relation 
to the relationship between standpoint and postmodern feminism, ‘feminist standpoints 
[are] multiple’ (Essers, 2009). In choosing to examine the experience of abortion 
through the life stories of women who have had abortions, this study does not claim to 
access a universal or ‘objective’ standpoint through which to understand the experience 
of abortion. Instead, it provides a critical examination of how a group of mostly white 
and middle-class women made meaning about their experiences, and the ‘contingent 
foundations’ upon which this knowledge is produced (Butler, 1994).  
From epistemology to methodology 
This epistemological framework therefore shaped a study that used the qualitative 
interview as a useful way to explore the experience of and meaning-making about 
abortion. I wish now to make explicit how it has shaped the methodology of this study, 
from the research design phase, to the field, to the analysis process. A feminist 
epistemological framework entails certain methodological decisions about how best to 
understand people’s social worlds, and how to conceptualise the role of the researcher in 
gaining this understanding. In starting from individual’s narratives about their lives, this 
project was guided by principles of feminist qualitative interviewing which include anti-
positivism, collaboration, and emotionality. I here outline how these guiding principles 
shaped my methodological approach to the actual practice of interviewing, before 
detailing how participants were recruited and chosen to take part, how the life story 
interview worked in the field, and how I employed the method of narrative discourse 
analysis to answer the research questions that framed this study. 
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Life story interviewing 
As a methodology which ‘attempts to understand the world from the subject’s point of 
view’ (Kvale, 1996), the qualitative interview ‘is a construction site of knowledge…an 
inter change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest’ 
(p. 3). Rather than using a traditional semi-structured interview method to construct this 
‘site of knowledge’, I chose to use the life narrative, or life story, method. At its most 
basic, a life story is ‘a fairly complete narrating of one’s entire experience of life as a 
whole, highlighting the most important aspects’ (Plummer, 2011, p.198). Life story 
research is part of a broader umbrella of biographical research methods, which includes 
life history and oral history methods. In practice, these terms are largely 
interchangeable; they all seek to explore individual accounts of a life, understood within 
its socio-cultural context. However, I have chosen to use the term life story in order to 
foreground my focus on the constructed nature of the narratives my participants tell. 
The terms ‘life history’ and ‘oral history’ are more common in History research, and 
often indicate a realist focus (Miller, 2000); using the term ‘life story’ explicitly 
indicates that I am less interested in piecing together what ‘really happened’ to my 
participants than exploring how they construct narratives about abortion. 
The motivation for using life story interviews as the most appropriate way to answer my 
research questions was threefold. First, fully understanding the impact of class on a 
person’s life and their understanding of it requires more than a brief account of that life. 
A life story gives space for the participant to paint a complex picture of the various 
threads that weave their experiences together, as well as space to elucidate the ways in 
which they construct their identities. 
The second reason, following directly from the first, is that as Skeggs (1997) found in 
her research on class and respectability, class is often unspoken. Class was almost never 
talked about by her participants in terms of recognition (e.g. ‘I am working class’), but 
was displayed by their efforts not to be recognised in this way. Class was the 
‘structuring absence’ in these women’s claims to respectability (p. 74). Inviting all of 
my participants to share their narratives rather than asking them outright to ‘speak’ their 
class was a technique that was more likely to give participants space to communicate 
the complexity of their circumstances. 
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Finally, Marylin Porter and Diana Gustafson (2012) argue that due to the medicalisation 
of women’s reproductive experiences, there is a tendency to compartmentalise events 
like pregnancy, abortion and miscarriage, treating them as pathology and severing them 
from the context of a whole life. They mobilise the term ‘reproductive life’ to reflect 
that these individual events occur in a ‘complex web’ of both bodily and social factors 
(p. 13). I would like to expand this framing beyond the reproductive life by exploring 
my participants’ abortions within the context of their whole life story and its gendered 
and classed dimensions. Additionally, it was important to me to provide an unstructured 
interview space which did not contribute to ‘troubling’ or stigmatisation of abortion, 
and which did not over-emphasise the need for the participants to justify why they had 
one (Beynon-Jones, 2017). 
As a method, life story research often employs narrative interviewing, which differs 
from traditional sociological interviewing in several ways. Susan Chase (2005) 
characterises the relationship between a narrator and a listener as distinct from that of an 
interviewer and an interviewee, advising life story researchers to approach their 
interactions with participants in a way that facilitates this unique relationship. This 
entails a move away from the idea that interviewees are there to answer the 
interviewer’s questions, and towards the idea that interviewees are narrators with stories 
to tell. In practical terms, this means framing the interview in a way that explicitly 
invites participants to tell stories rather than asking what Chase calls ‘sociological 
questions’: questions organised around the researchers’ interests which might prompt 
answers the participant thinks the interviewer wants to hear. 
As a result, despite the method differing according to discipline and theoretical outlook, 
life story research usually involves unstructured interviewing, in which the researcher 
does not prepare an interview schedule or specific questions, but rather invites a 
narrative (or a dialogue) that develops organically. This unstructured method is useful 
for life story research because it allows the narrator to indicate what the most important 
themes, stories, or events are in their life story without the researcher imposing with 
their specific research interests.  
However, that is not to say that the researcher’s questions have no place in life story 
interviewing. One highly structured method of biographical interviewing, Biographic-
Narrative Interpretive Method or BNIM, offers a model that allows for both 
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unstructured narration from the participant and for the researcher to subsequently hone 
in on their research interests. In BNIM interviewing, the first phase is an ‘open 
narrative’ where the interviewer asks a broad eliciting question and listens with few 
interruptions to the resulting narrative. Second, the researcher asks for clarifications that 
arose for them during phase one, and asks interviewees to go over in close detail 
particular memories to add detail. Finally, the researcher hosts a more traditional semi-
structured interview, focused on their own research interest, after analysing the open 
narrative interview (Ross and Moore, 2014; Wagner and Wodak, 2006). 
As a method rooted in psychoanalysis, I did not feel that BNIM was appropriate for my 
study. Its focus on uncovering participants’ ‘unconscious motivations’ through 
techniques designed to elicit specific memories seemed invasive; for example, Ross and 
Moore (2014) note that using BNIM provokes emotional responses ‘unparalleled’ by 
more traditional, semi-structured interviews (p. 8). The question arises whether this is 
desirable, and if it is, for whom. One researcher on the analysis panel for Ross and 
Moore’s study noted that ‘the interview felt more like therapy, but without a trained 
therapist to hold the emotions expressed’ (p. 8). This approach to narrative interviewing 
therefore seemed inappropriate for the subject matter of this study (although see ‘The 
interview as therapeutic,’ p. 91). 
Despite this, the multi- interview model used in BNIM, in which the interviewee’s 
narrative voice is initially centred followed by the researcher’s own questions and 
research interests provides a useful model for narrative interviewing. I was keen to 
provide a similar structure for my interviewees, so piloted a two-interview method: 
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This method worked well in many respects. I was sure to confirm with all of the women 
who volunteered to take part that they understood that our first interview would be very 
open, that they could begin wherever they liked, and that I was interested in their whole 
life story, not only their abortion experience. After some introductory talk (small talk, 
giving the participant a chance to ask me questions, reminding them of what the 
interview entails), I would ask a broad eliciting question. This would be some variation 
of: ‘if I were to ask you to tell your life story, where would you start?’  
For several interviewees, this had the intended effect; they would begin with whatever 
felt natural in response to the prompt, and their narrative proceeded organically with 
minimal questions or interjections. However, there were some participants for whom 
such a broad question was intimidating or confusing, and who asked for more guidance 
before telling their narrative. For example, here is an extract from my first interview 
with Karen2: 
                                                                 
2 All names are pseudonyms. See Appendix A for biographical sketches of participants. 
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Gill So if I were to ask you what your life story is- 
 
Karen 
 
(Laughs) Oh god! 
 
Gill (Laughs) Where would you start? 
 
Karen Goodness, that is a really big question, um…I’m trying to think how I’d 
respond to that. 
 
Gill 
 
You can start wherever you like. 
 
Karen So do you mean in terms of, uh, in time, where would I, what, could you 
explain the question, sorry (laughs) 
 
Gill Sure! I’m sort of letting people choose where they want to start, so my ideal 
situation would be that throughout the interview I get a sense of your 
backstory, almost. You know, where you came from, how it leads to what 
you’re doing now, and what you feel like are the most significant times in 
your life. 
 
Karen Sure, well, the first thing that springs to mind is that I’m an academic… 
 
On reflection, my choice of eliciting question – essentially, ‘what is your life story?’ – 
was rather broad, and slightly awkward. In subsequent interviews, I chose to modify 
this by using eliciting questions that were more conversational, and prepared a 
prompting question to follow if this proved too intimidating. For example, here is an 
extract from a later interview, my first with Lucy: 
Gill So what I’m interested in most of all is, what makes you you? So what you, 
what’s brought you to where you are today? What’s your story? (Laughs) 
 
Lucy (Laughs) I don’t know! God. One of my friends said she wanted to write a 
play about my life. 
 
Gill Oh fantastic (laughs) 
 
Lucy (Laughs) I don’t know, those are quite big questions. I don’t know where to 
begin. 
 
Gill Well, you can begin wherever you like. Maybe, shall we start with, well how 
about we start with what you’re doing now and we can work back from there? 
So (overlapping speech) tell me a bit about your life at the moment. 
 
Lucy (Overlapping speech) OK, so. Um, so like I say, I’m moving jobs, moving 
house again… 
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Asking for people to begin from their life today and work backwards worked well as a 
prompt for anyone who found the broader eliciting question difficult to answer. 
The usefulness of unstructured life interviewing and broad, eliciting questions are 
therefore not the same for everyone. On one hand, broad, open questions can be non-
threatening and enable narrators to freely construct an understanding of their own life 
(Merrill and West, 2009). On the other hand, this freedom can feel intimidating, and 
some participants may not feel they have anything interesting to tell without the 
researcher asking them questions (Ross and Moore, 2014).  
This intimidation is almost certainly classed and gendered; Merrill and West (2009) 
suggest that more ‘vulnerable’ groups may appreciate the likely topics of an interview 
being disclosed beforehand in the form of a list of key questions. Whilst I chose not to 
provide a list, I did act on feedback I received from my pilot participant, who said that 
although I had indicated our interview would be a life story, she was surprised by the 
breadth of my questioning, and felt confused as to how much of the interview related to 
the topic of abortion. In response to this, I added more explicit information to the 
Participant Information Sheet (Appendix F) related to this study, explaining that the 
interview is as much about forming a full picture of people’s lives as it is about their 
abortion experience. I also made sure that this was part of my introductory talk; I would 
explain that it may not be clear why I ask certain questions but that I was happy to 
explain my line of thought, and also that I like to let the people I’m interviewing take 
the lead in painting a picture of their life during the first interview. After the first pilot 
interview, no participants fed back that they felt confused about the format or topics 
covered. 
I interviewed most participants twice. Five of the women either dropped out of contact 
after the first interview, or were not available to meet up a second time. The second 
interviews were more structured, beginning with an invitation to comment on anything 
from the first interview they had thought about or wanted to reflect on. I offered 
everyone the option of having the transcript of our first interview emailed to them for 
their reference before the second interview, which many people accepted; only one or 
two of the women used them explicitly as a prompt for the second interview, however. 
After this, I asked questions that had arisen during transcription and analysis of the first 
interview, which were either clarifying questions or more analytical ones relating to my 
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own research interests. Holding multiple interviews also helped establish rapport 
(Oakley, 1981). 
I chose to only ask explicit questions about class in this second interview, following the 
example of Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, (2001), who did the same in their interview 
study on class identities in order to avoid loaded questions which prompt ‘classed’ 
answers, instead waiting to see if class was salient to people themselves. There were a 
set of questions – mostly about social class, but some about abortion – that I asked near 
the end of every second interview: 
 Are there any circumstances you feel abortion can’t be justified? Are there any 
reasons that might make you feel uncomfortable? 
 Conversely, are there any circumstances in which you think it’s right or wrong 
to start a family? 
 I’m interviewing people who have ended pregnancies over the last 8 years or so 
– one of the things that has happened in those 8 years are the recession, and 
austerity and that kind of thing. So I have a few questions for you about our 
current society: 
o One thing people seem to have started talking more about over the past 8 
years is the idea that social class is still a relevant thing. What do you 
think about that? 
o What do you feel it means to be working-class, and middle-class? 
o At any point in the decision-making process, did the current political and 
economic situation enter your mind at all e.g. austerity? 
 
These questions, which in some cases had already been answered organically in the 
previous interview, were helpful in elaborating, and in some cases contrasting with, 
people’s previous talk about social class and their attitudes towards abortion.  
Visual methods 
Whilst designing this research, I anticipated that visual, interactive methods like 
timelining would be helpful. In the field, however, I found that they were not 
particularly welcomed by participants, and felt clumsy. The purpose of preparing these 
interactive methods was twofold. On one hand, asking participants to physically 
construct a timeline with me of important life events and create diagrams of important 
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relationships and networks seemed helpful to me as a researcher. Timelining can have 
particular value for narrative research, as a heuristic tool for eliciting talk (Sheridan, 
Chamberlain and Dupuis, 2011), and other activities like card sorting have been linked 
to obtaining more detailed and ‘sensitive’ information from participants (Lugina et al., 
2004). These types of visual and interactive methods have been argued to be useful for 
participants, for example by providing a visual focus if the participant is disclosing a 
distressing or embarrassing story, and helping them feel less on-the-spot about 
remembering details of their timeline (Sutton, 2011). 
However, my experience of these visual methods was less positive. I was keen to have 
participants create a timeline on a large, A3 sheet of paper with post-it notes. To that 
end, I bought an A3 sketchpad with a black hardcover. Bringing it out during the pilot 
interview immediately indicated that this method may not be as useful as I had 
anticipated; the open sketchpad barely fitted on the small table I was sitting at with my 
participant, and the hard cover and obvious quality of the paper (it was an ‘artist’s 
sketchbook’) appeared excessive and even intimidating in this context. Anna, the 
woman I was interviewing, joked with me that she was worried about using up my 
supply of post-it notes, and did not seem particularly keen to use then or to write 
anything on the paper without prompting from me. 
It was clear to me that I had romanticised this interactive element of the interview 
before entering the field. I had expected, somewhat naively, that I would be able to lay 
the paper in front of the narrator, and they would happily scribble away and move post-
it notes around without much prompting. In reality, in both the pilot and a following 
interview with another participant, people did not touch the timelining materials whilst 
they talked, and if prompted by me made a perfunctory effort to write things mostly, it 
seemed to me, to be polite. Whilst these methods have been demonstrably useful to 
other researchers (e.g. Sutton, 2011; Lugina et al., 2004), my feeling is that whilst 
narrative interviewing came very easily to me, and allowed me to embody the role of a 
relaxed, engaged listener, I felt awkward with the interactive methods, and that no doubt 
came across to my participants. It may also be the case that because my participants 
were prepared to tell their sometimes emotional and distressing stories to me – in some 
cases, were eager to – that timelining served more as a distraction from engaging with 
an active, sympathetic listener rather than a helpful focus.  
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Another consideration that may explain lack of engagement with timelining is the 
imposition of a linear structure it entails on a narrative. Throughout the correspondence 
I had with participants prior to interviews and the interviews themselves, I encouraged 
people to begin wherever they liked, and in interviews I followed the logic of their 
narrative with limited interjections (especially in first interviews). Prompting 
participants to use the timeline materials I had brought was arguably a major 
interjection, an encouragement to think in a linear and chronological manner. This 
jarred with the open, sometimes circular and iterative nature of the narratives my 
participants chose to tell. 
As such, I abandoned use of these visual methods after the first few interviews. 
However, their use was not entirely for nothing. Months after I had moved on from 
attempting to use the time line exercise with interviewees, one participant, Violet, 
mentioned during a follow-up interview that it had been an interesting exercise for her, 
as it had prompted her to reflect on why she had chosen certain moments in her life as 
important or defining. This lead to an interesting and wide-ranging discussion that may 
not have been possible if I had not used the time line as a prompt in our first interview. 
It is therefore a method I am keen to try again in future research, with these experiences 
in mind. 
Recruitment 
This study used a purposive, non-randomised sampling method to recruit fifteen 
participants who had had abortions in England, Scotland or Wales since 2008. The 
nature of this study meant that participants would be self-selecting, coming forward in 
response to recruitment material. 
The study had three inclusion criteria. First, participants must have had an abortion in 
England, Scotland or Wales. Recruitment was restricted to abortions in England, 
Scotland or Wales rather than the UK as a whole because although Northern Ireland is 
part of the UK, the 1967 Abortion Act has not been extended there and therefore 
abortion access is far more restricted. As a result, people who have abortions in 
Northern Ireland will be subject to a different set of medical, legal and moral discourses 
and regulations. In the end, only women who had had abortions in England came 
forward to take part in the study. 
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The second inclusion criterion was that participants must have had an abortion since 
2008, in order to reflect that this study was interested in the socio-political landscape of 
post-financial-crisis Britain, and its importance as a socio-historical moment (as 
described in Chapter One, ‘Neoliberal times,’ p. 17). The final criterion was that 
participants must be 18 or over. If participants ended a pregnancy when they were 
below 18, they could still take part in the study as long as they were over 18 at the time 
of interview (participants below the age of 18 are not considered to be adults and 
therefore unable to give fully informed consent) (University of Sussex, n.d.). 
The desired number of participants I found difficult to gauge and the number was 
revised several times as recruitment progressed and the data was collected. Life stories 
tend to produce a mass of rich data, more so than a traditional sociological interview, 
and it is a method that has been successfully used in case study research, in which only 
a handful or even one life story forms the basis of analysis (for example, Crapanzo, 
1980). I took as a template studies such as Kirin Narayan’s life history interviews with 
women in North-West India, in which she interviewed fourteen women (2004), and 
Wendy Watson, Nancy Bell and Charlie Stelle’s life history interviews with eight 
women who married in later life (2010). Small numbers of participants allowed these 
researchers to collect wide-ranging, in-depth narratives and analyse them in a similarly 
in-depth manner; I therefore aimed to recruit between ten and fifteen participants, 
ultimately recruiting fifteen people for interview. 
Participants were recruited through a combination of online advertising through 
Facebook, Twitter and the study’s website (Appendix B), flyers and posters at two 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service (bpas) abortion clinics (Appendix C), and word of 
mouth. The study was first approved by the University of Sussex Cross-School 
Research and Ethics Committee, and subsequently by the bpas Research and Ethics 
Committee, and the Surrey and Borders NHS Research and Ethics Committee 
(Appendices K, L and M). As a result of the latter approvals, permission was given to 
advertise the study in two bpas clinics, both in large Southern cities (the process of 
obtaining ethical approval is addressed in ‘Institutional ethics,’ p. 83). In discussion 
with the research nurse at bpas, my initial request to advertise the study in five clinics 
across the country was revised down to two clinics within easy travel distance, as it was 
advised that recruitment would be improved if I were able to visit the clinics as a 
‘human face’ to the research. Whilst it was beneficial to visit the clinics in order to 
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speak with staff to thank them for their co-operation as well as answer their questions 
about the study, it was in discussion with staff that it became apparent that my visiting 
the clinics regularly would not be particularly helpful. Prospective participants were 
more likely to want to take away recruitment material and consider whether they wanted 
to take part at home rather than speak directly to the researcher in the midst of a 
potentially stressful time, and my presence would have been an inconvenience for staff. 
In retrospect, it would have been helpful to have advertised in more clinics across the 
country as per my original request; this is something I will bear in mind in future 
research using this recruitment method. 
It was agreed with staff in both clinics that posters would be displayed in waiting rooms 
that advertised the study (Appendix C), and reception staff agreed to let people know 
when they signed in for their appointments about the study, and would give everyone a 
flyer along with their other paperwork (Appendix C). Flyers were translated into a 
number of other languages including Polish, Italian and Hungarian, reflecting the 
demographics of patients who accessed these clinics. 
All recruitment material provided my contact details, as well as a link to an online 
questionnaire (Appendix D). Participants could email me directly to indicate they 
wanted to be interviewed, or could leave their email address at the end of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire collected basic information like age, ethnicity, and 
sexual orientation, as well as details about their abortion(s). The questionnaire served 
several purposes: firstly, to filter out anyone who did not fit the inclusion criteria, 
secondly to allow me to see who was being represented or under-represented, and to 
provide some talking points for interviews if needed. 46 people completed the 
questionnaire; 33 of these left their email addresses. All were contacted, but several did 
not reply, or dropped out of contact. Ultimately, fifteen women were interviewed. All 
participants were given a consent form (Appendix E) and information sheet (Appendix 
F), as well as a resources sheet at the end of the interview in case they needed further 
support (Appendix G). 
The questionnaire, set up on Google Forms, invited people to self-identify when it came 
to their ethnicities, genders, and sexualities. All participants identified their gender as 
either ‘woman’ or ‘female’, with one participant answering ‘AFAB’ (assigned female at 
birth). No participants identified as transgender. The majority of participants identified 
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as White British (13), with one participant identifying as Mixed African Black/White, 
and one not answering. Ten identified as heterosexual, one as bisexual, one as queer, 
one as ‘soulsexual’ (attracted to people’s internal qualities as opposed to their gender), 
one described herself as ‘liking more than one gender,’ and one did not answer.  
Whilst the questionnaire did not use any indicators of social class (apart from 
occupation), it became clear that of the fifteen women I interviewed, all of them had at 
least a bachelor’s degree, with four of them either completing or having been awarded 
PhDs. There are several reasons why women in Higher Education were so over-
represented. Firstly, the most successful recruitment method I used was online 
recruitment through social media, and therefore this method was to some extent shaped 
by my own social circles. Indeed, three women contacted me because they followed my 
academic supervisor on Twitter and had seen her advertising my study. Secondly, 
university students, particularly those in the social sciences and humanities, will be 
more familiar with university research and what an interview study entails, perhaps 
making them more likely to take part. Finally, the PhD students in particular expressed 
a desire to help out a fellow researcher, as they had experienced first-hand the difficulty 
that can arise from recruiting for studies. 
Whilst initially I had not planned to interview such a homogenous group of women, 
during data collection it became clear that this presented an opportunity to analyse the 
narratives of women who had various degrees of proximity to middle-classness. For 
example, many of the women interviewed were securely middle-class in the sense of 
their levels of economic, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu, 1984), but expressed 
ambivalence towards that label, or the idea of belonging to a social class entirely 
(echoing the findings of Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2001). Conversely, several 
women came from what they described as working-class backgrounds before entering 
Higher Education, and reflected on what this entry into the academy meant for their 
class identities, and how their accrual of cultural capital in this way was both beneficial 
to them and uncomfortable at the same time. As such, these life stories have been 
analysed partly as windows into the contested, ongoing production of middle-class 
womanhood in neoliberal times. 
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Location of interviews 
After having completed the questionnaire and being contacted by email, participants 
were sent the study’s consent form (Appendix E) and information sheet (Appendix F). 
If they were happy to go ahead after reading this material and asking for clarification, 
we arranged a place and time to meet. As Elwood and Martin (2000) argue, choosing 
the location of research interviews is not trivial, as the ‘microgeographies’ of interview 
spaces ‘constitute power and position of researcher and participants’ (p. 650). For 
example, an interview conducted in the researcher’s university office might feel formal 
and constitute the researcher as ‘expert,’ affecting the dynamic of the interview; a more 
‘neutral’ space like a local café, in contrast, might lack privacy. After considering the 
nature and length (between one and three hours, usually) of the interviews I would be 
conducting, I offered participants a choice of locations. I explained that I was happy to 
meet them at home, that they were welcome to come to my own home if they lived 
nearby, or that we could arrange a sufficiently private space elsewhere. None of my 
participants chose the latter option; if they had, I would have drawn upon their local 
knowledge to choose a location they were happy with, or if they lived in my city, I 
would have offered to book a private space in the local library. 
Most participants did invite me to visit them and conduct our interviews in their homes, 
since we would be discussing personal issues unsuitable for discussion in a public place. 
This choice of interview location was ideal for a number of reasons: it meant that 
participants were on ‘home turf’ rather than somewhere unfamiliar; it provided a 
comfortable and informal space to conduct a wide-ranging, personal interview; and it 
did not require travel time and expense on the part of the women who took part. As 
Elwood and Martin note, being at home enables a discussion of ‘home life’ and the 
private sphere more readily than a less intimate space might (2000).  
Being in these participant’s homes also gave an opportunity make observations that may 
not have been possible elsewhere. For example, one participant, Violet, had vibrant and 
unusual decorations in her living room. After I commented on them, she explained that 
she had shared her flat with a long-term partner, and after the break-up of that 
relationship had redecorated in an effort to make the space ‘hers’. These small details 
and interactions added to the richness of the data.  
77 
 
I travelled to various locations across England to interview participants. From a safety 
perspective, I made sure that I informed a friend when I was travelling to a participant’s 
house for the first time, how long I expected to be there, and agreed check-in times to 
contact them and let them know I was safe. However, all of my experiences of 
interviewing participants at home was a positive experience. 
Three participants took up my offer to be interviewed at my flat. These three 
participants all lived nearby, but preferred not to be interviewed at home either because 
they lived with others and felt it was not private enough or, in the case of one 
participant, my flat was conveniently on their route home from work. I was aware that 
the dynamic of these interviews might be affected by being in ‘my’ space, but all three 
participants seemed comfortable and at ease. In fact, these interviews at my flat 
produced some of the longest, richest interviews in the study. Being in a space that was 
comfortable, where we could make tea and engage in easy small talk about where 
people had travelled from proved to be a positive, informal space in which it felt natural 
to talk at length about people’s lives.  
Once again, I took the safety precautions in these situations as I had done when 
travelling to participants’ homes: letting someone know when participants would be 
visiting, and arranging a check-in phone call. 
Finally, one participant, Alex, asked to be interviewed at the University campus, where 
she lived in halls and I was based as a PhD student. After discussing the possibilities, 
we agreed to use the office of one of my colleagues. Whilst this was not ‘my’ space – I 
did not have a private office on campus – this interview location proved to be less 
conducive to a relaxed, easy interview. I asked more questions than in previous 
interviews, and Alex and I settled quickly into a more traditional sociological interview 
format, in which I asked questions and Alex answered. Whilst this may have nothing to 
do with the interview space – the narrative interview method does not work for 
everyone, as discussed above in ‘Life story interviewing,’ p. 67 – it was not lost on me 
that Alex was a University student being interviewed in a member of staff’s office, and 
that we may have both slipped into the respective roles this suggests. 
Despite this, my experience of interviewing participants at home (theirs and mine) was 
largely positive. Whilst this practice may not be suitable for all interview studies, it is 
appropriate and useful for life story interviews, particularly for those that deal with 
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‘sensitive’ issues like abortion. Many participants invited me into their private lives, 
both metaphorically and literally, by telling me their stories in their own spaces, and, in 
the spirit of feminist research (Oakley, 1981), I was happy to reciprocate by inviting 
them into my own in this way.  
Analysis 
From the beginning of this research project, I was interested in narrative. In inviting 
participants to tell their life stories, I was interested not only in the content of their 
stories but the ways in which they chose to tell them. As a result, my analysis was 
informed by narrative research, an interdisciplinary field that takes as its basis the idea 
that human beings make meaning through telling stories (Byrne, 2003; Josselson, 2011). 
Elliot Mishler describes narrative analysis as a ‘problem-centred area of inquiry’ (1995); 
in other words, it is not a specific methodology but a range of related approaches which 
depend on what narrative ‘problem’ the researcher is addressing. In this case, the 
‘problems’ I sought to address were, first, how the women in this study made meaning 
about their abortions, and second, how class (and gender) were being constructed 
through these narratives.  
In order to address both issues, my analysis was informed by a narrative form of 
discourse analysis. Howarth describes the aims of discourse analysis as being to 
‘describe, understand, interpret and evaluate the constructed objects of investigation,’ 
and to examine the historical and political construction of these objects (2000, p.139). 
In this sense, discourse analysis offered a useful way to address my second ‘problem’ of 
how class and gender were constructed through my participants’ narratives, within the 
socio-historical context of neoliberal England. What distinguishes narrative discourse 
analysis from other forms is, Ruthellen Jossleson argues, its interest in exploring ‘the 
whole account’ and considering ‘how the parts are integrated to create a whole’ (2011, 
p.225); this approach offered a useful way to address the first ‘problem’ of how the 
women made meaning about their abortions through narrative.  
My data analysis was therefore framed by this narrative sensibility, attuned to the 
creation of meaning through narrative interplay between the part and the whole. In 
giving an account of my analytical process, I wish to present less a chronological 
progression than a process of layering. The stages of my analysis were often 
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overlapping and iterative, and took place from the beginning of data collection and 
continued during the ‘writing up’ process. 
The first layer of analysis was aimed at gaining an ‘intimate familiarity’ (Plummer, 
2001) with individual life stories, analysing them in isolation initially. From the 
beginning of data collection, I transcribed interviews as soon as possible and imported 
transcripts into NVivo. I found it helpful to begin a process of ‘open coding’ the data, 
inductively identifying themes and categories arising from the data without any 
overarching theoretical constructs to guide this process. In particular, I looked for what 
the narrator indicated were the ‘organising principles’ (Plummer, 2001) of their story, 
and the elements they identified as most significant. In my follow-up interviews with 
participants, I was able to ask questions arising from this inductive analysis and gauge 
their agreement with my interpretations.  
After conducting and transcribing follow-up interviews, I began to integrate my 
analyses of individual stories, looking across narratives as well as within them. The 
concept of ‘coding’ data in this way has been criticised by Elizabeth St. Pierre and 
Alecia Jackson as a ‘fetish’ which qualitative researchers often mistake for analysis 
itself, when in fact, they argue, analysis begins after coding (Pierre and Jackson, 2014, 
p.715). Whilst I disagree with St. Pierre and Jackson’s framing of this process as not 
analysis, it is the case that this step of inductively coding was more a foundation for the 
following narrative analysis than an end in itself. The purpose of coding in this way 
with the help of NVivo was useful for three reasons: as an initial ‘sweep’ of the data; as 
a way of becoming highly familiar with each individual’s narrative before comparing 
across life stories; and as an organising tool to easily access data across interviews 
which related to a particular theme or concept.  
This process of coding resulted in a coding ‘tree’ (Appendix H) with three main 
categories: data relating to the experience of having an abortion and the decision-
making process involved, data relating to class, and data relating to narrative. The final 
category focused on the form as well as the content of the data, highlighting moments I 
wanted to analyse in more depth. For example, in analysing how the gendered and 
classed ‘self’ was constructed, I looked for moments which demonstrated the multivocal 
and dialogic nature of the life narrative, and the multiple subject positions occupied 
throughout (Chase, 2005; Josselson, 2011). These moments were often contradictory, 
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and exposed the processes by which these selves were constructed. I also looked for 
moments which were marked by omission and the unsayable, viewing these moments 
not as the lack of or the limit of discourse, but as ‘an element that functions alongside 
the things said’ (Foucault, 1978, p.27). 
Alongside this process, I also ‘transposed’ data into other forms in order to aid 
understanding and analysis. This included creating diagrams, visual aids and an analysis 
grid (Appendices I and J). This process helped to layer the analysis by bridging the 
‘particular’ to ‘wider concerns’ (Plummer, 2001); in other words, finding links not only 
within the data but also bringing them into interaction with wider discourses and 
theoretical ideas. This process of transposition also helped me to keep in mind the 
‘whole’ of the life story as well as the particular elements my analysis had focused on, 
for example through summarising each participants’ ‘class story’ in an analysis grid 
(Appendix I) and referring back to it as I analysed particular moments within each 
participant’s narrative. This practice in narrative analysis of movement between the 
particular and the whole in order to illuminate understanding of both is indebted to the 
school of hermeneutics, in particular the concept of the ‘hermeneutic circle’  in which 
‘an understanding of the whole illuminates the parts, which in turn create the whole’ 
(Josselson, 2011, p.226).  
Through these layered practices, certain concepts emerged around which my analysis 
was beginning to coalesce, including ‘choice,’ ‘the self’ and ‘the body’ (Appendix J). 
The final layer that further refined my analysis was the process of writing. Rather than 
separating the process of analysis from the practice of ‘writing up’ findings, I 
approached writing as a ‘rich and analytic process’ (Rapley, 2011, p.286) through which 
understanding and analysis of data continues. I therefore conceptualised this layer of 
analysis as one of theorising, using Plummer’s definition of the concept as ‘bridging the 
particular or specific….to wider concerns’ (2001, p.163), and of entering a 
‘conversation with wider theoretical literature’ in order to refine analysis (Josselson, 
2011, p.228). It was during this late stage of analysis that the three structuring concepts 
around which my analysis could be organised became clear. These three concepts – 
precarity, responsibility, and stigma – are therefore the titles of the following analysis 
chapters. 
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This process of multi-layered, narrative analysis enabled a form of knowledge 
production that in many ways reflected my participants’ acts of narration. The telling of 
a life story is a temporally located ordering of experience that is rarely entirely linear, 
and involves lateral connections, a constant movement between the particular and the 
whole, and an element of dialogue between narrator and listener. In a similar way, this 
process of narrative analysis enabled an attention to the ‘bifocality’ of the particular and 
the whole (Weis and Fine, 2012), and the creation of meaning about abortion, class and 
gender as a social production.  
 
 
Ethics 
From the beginning of this project, I understood that it would be considered ‘high risk’ 
by institutional review boards. Abortion is, of course, a sensitive and potentially 
distressing topic, and a large part of my research design has been considering the 
wellbeing of my participants and how best to elicit their narratives in a sensitive 
manner. However, the ethical review process – which included a full review from three 
different research and ethics committees – highlighted some of the problems with 
conceptualising abortion research as always high-risk. 
This section begins by locating abortion research within contemporary political 
discourse, in particular the ways in which socio-political understandings of abortion 
shape the way participants in this kind of research are perceived as vulnerable. It then 
moves on to the institutional review process, arguing that by conceptualising 
‘sensitivity’ in a particular way, it reinforces the problematic view that ‘every abortion 
is a tragedy’. In response, Judith Butler’s reconceptualisation of vulnerability as 
resistance (2014) is mobilised in order to reflect that participants in this project are as 
much agentic as they are vulnerable. It finishes with the practical ethical issues that 
arose during the course of the research and how they were managed, namely, sensitive 
interviewing, remuneration of participants, and confidentiality and anonymity. 
Ultimately, it is argued that operationalising concepts like ‘sensitivity’ and 
‘vulnerability’ is inherently political in abortion research, and Butler’s framework 
allows us to do so in a critical way. 
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Abortion as ‘always a tragedy’  
One of the most important questions I was asked to consider when designing this 
project was how to respond to a participant who becomes distressed, or who discloses 
something sensitive. Of course, this is a question that applies to any researcher doing 
qualitative interviewing; even interviews on the most mundane or ‘safe’ topics can 
potentially elicit unexpected reactions from participants. Guillemin and Gillam call 
these ‘ethically important moments’ – ‘the difficult, often subtle, and usually 
unpredictable situations that arise in the practice of doing research’ (2004, p.262). In 
other words, qualitative research with human beings always has the potential to lead the 
researcher into unexpected territory. 
Despite this, qualitative researchers are expected to outline as far as possible the 
potential risks of their research. Whilst in some respects this was a straightforward 
process for this project – and I go into detail about how the specific ‘risks’ of this 
project were managed below – the ethical review process necessitated conceptualising 
abortion in a certain way. In this section, I discuss the problematics of framing abortion 
as a distressing or high-risk subject and how this maps on to political discourse about 
abortion.  
The framing of abortion as a high-risk topic is partly, a recognition of the complex and 
varied experiences women have of ending pregnancies. However, it is also influenced 
by its political and cultural understanding. Institutional review processes tend to 
conceptualise ‘sensitivity’ on the level of the individual – might this topic have negative 
consequences for the participant or researcher? – but another aspect of research deemed 
sensitive is its relationship with the cultural and political context in which it is 
conducted (Lee and Renzetti, 1990). The context of this research has been examined in 
depth in Chapter One, but there is one particular element I wish to engage with here: the 
common understanding that abortion is ‘always a tragedy’ (Abbott, 2012) 
Political understandings of abortion in the West are often positioned within the binary 
poles of ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’. Whilst it is not clear that many people necessarily 
identify with these labels (Planned Parenthood, 2017) both positions (and much of the 
vast landscape between those two poles) are invested somewhat in the idea that abortion 
is ‘always a tragedy’ (Abbott, 2012). Pro-life campaigners have an obvious stake in this 
claim; they have propagated the idea of post-abortion trauma as an inevitable 
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consequence of ending a pregnancy, and despite this being roundly disproven by 
research (Rocca et al., 2015), this idea is strongly rooted in the public imagination. 
Analyses of TV and film representations of abortion reveals that it is often portrayed as 
a torturous decision, with negative consequences for the characters (Sisson and 
Kimport, 2014). This does not reflect reality; a recent US study, for example, has found 
that that ‘claims that many women experience abortion decision regret are likely 
unfounded’: 95% of women believe they made the right decision to abort three years 
after the experience, and that both positive and negative emotions tended to subside in 
the same time period (Rocca et al. 2015). 
As a way of reconciling the vast middle-ground between pro-choice and pro-life – and 
in an attempt to acknowledge the complexity of the emotions involved in abortion 
experiences – pro-choice rhetoric sometimes engages with the ‘every abortion is a 
tragedy’ trope. An example of this being employed is during a Parliamentary debate, in 
which Labour MP Diane Abbott responds to a motion to lower the legal time limit on 
abortion: 
We have heard the concerns about high levels of abortions and repeat abortions. 
Let me say from the Opposition side of the Chamber that we all share those 
concerns. Every abortion is a tragedy. I think that we would all in this Chamber 
want levels of abortions to come down, but we do not fairly bring down levels of 
abortions by restricting women’s right to choose  (Abbott, 2012, my emphasis). 
It is possible to see abortion as unpleasant or undesirable whilst supporting the choice to 
have one. However, rhetorically associating abortion with tragedy potentially adds to 
the stigmatisation of those who have them. It leaves little room for those with neutral or 
even positive experiences of ending pregnancies. On one hand, treating abortion as a 
high-risk ethical subject reflects the complex and sometimes distressing emotions it can 
involve. However, it also reinforces the cultural consensus that abortion is always 
distressing. In reality, most people do not feel deeply distressed by their experience, but 
express both negative and positive emotions that subside over time (Rocca et al 2015). 
This should inform the way abortion researchers approach their ethical responsibilities, 
both towards individual participants and towards their potential to reinforcing certain 
political discourses. The institutional review process makes it difficult, however, to do 
this in a nuanced way. 
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Institutional ethics 
As well as approval from the University of Sussex’s cross-school arts and social science 
committee (Appendix K), this study required approval from the abortion provider the 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service (bpas) (Appendix L), and the NHS (Appendix M). 
Permission from bpas alone to advertise the study in clinics was not sufficient; most 
people who have abortions through bpas are NHS patients, and therefore a full review 
by an NHS REC was required. 
Seeking ethical approval for a piece of qualitative research through a process designed 
for the review of medical research like clinical trials was difficult. As Hoeyer et al. 
(2005) have noted, medical ethics focuses largely on ‘protection of the individual 
through preservation of autonomy,’ via focus on issues like informed consent, whereas 
social scientists also attend to political implications of their work. Bio-medical ethics 
locates the ‘sensitivity’ of research within the interpersonal relationship between 
researcher and participant, rather than between the research and its socio-political 
context. As a result, the NHS review forced a framing of this study’s participants as 
vulnerable and at risk of distress in a way that left little room for nuance. It led me to 
over-emphasise the status of my participants as moral objects, towards which I had 
responsibilities, and de-emphasised their status as moral subjects, with their own 
agency, agendas, and responsibilities (Carnevale et al., 2015). 
Tension of this type between social science researchers’ aims and the aims of 
institutional review boards has been explored particularly within literature on 
community-based participatory research (CBPR). CBPR throws this tension into stark 
relief because it subverts many of the tenets of more traditional methods, for example, 
in its emphasis on collaboration and partnership with participants. It has been argued in 
the context of CBPR that academia protects institutional power at the expense of 
community empowerment (Malone et al., 2006). A similar issue arises in explicitly 
political, qualitative interview research when faced with an institutional review process 
that assumes, for example, a clear distinction between researcher and researched, and 
predictability of outcomes and processes. 
This was highlighted for me during the NHS REC panel discussion of my application, 
which I was invited to in order to answer questions and clarification. As Malone et al. 
(2006) point out, ‘[s]tudies that fit neatly into the biomedical ethics model are perhaps 
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more welcome [by institutional review boards] because they do not require so much 
additional deliberation’ (p. 1918). This was certainly on my mind after arriving at the 
panel, where I was told rather ambiguously that my application had been talked over 
‘for longer than usual.’ 
The questions and clarifications the board had revolved heavily around issues of data 
protection, informed consent, and a protracted discussion about which circumstances 
might require breaking participants’ confidentiality (see ‘Anonymisation and 
confidentiality,’ p. 97). I am left in agreement with Malone et al. (2006) that this type of 
institutional ethical review does not necessarily serve to enable safe research with 
‘vulnerable’ groups. First of all, the review board adhered to the idea of ‘sensitivity’ as 
located within the researcher-participant relationship, ignoring the political sensitivity 
of the project. As a consequence, the conceptualisation of women who have abortions as 
fragile and in need of protection that arose from the process served, in my mind, to 
reinforce conservative and anti-feminist discourse around abortion. Women are 
positioned in these discourses as victims of a traumatic event, and incapable of speaking 
for themselves about their reproductive choices. As a result, the voices of women who 
have had abortions are routinely shut down, silenced, and appropriated; there exists 
virtually no space for women to tell their full, complex narratives without judgment. 
One aim of this research project was to resist this by carving out some space for these 
voices that are not usually heard. The ethical review process hindered this effort, rather 
than helped, by ring-fencing women who have had abortions and suggesting they were 
vulnerable. 
In response, I was prompted to consider how best to balance the idea of vulnerability 
with the agency of my participants; in order to do this, I now turn to Judith Butler’s 
reconceptualization of vulnerability as resistance. 
Reconceptualising vulnerability 
The framing of abortion research as always ‘high risk’ constitutes participants as 
vulnerable, but Butler (2014) suggests that vulnerability can be reconceptualised as a 
‘deliberate exposure to power,’ a condition that can facilitate resistance. In admitting 
that she has had an abortion, a woman risks being named and fixed in place; however, 
in the same moment she is articulating her story, resisting the injunction that she 
remains silent or adheres to societally approved narratives about what abortion is like. 
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In this sense, the abortion story can said to be a performative act in that it at once invites 
naming – as a woman who had an abortion – and at the same time resists and 
complicates this designation.  
Butler argues that conceptualising vulnerability as the opposite of resistance misses the 
radical potential a ‘deliberate exposure to power’ has. She also warns against 
conceptualising vulnerability as an existential state, occupied only by the oppressed. All 
bodies are vulnerable, in that all bodies are dependent on others and their environment: 
[T]he body is less an entity than a relation, and it cannot be fully dissociated 
from the infrastructural and environmental conditions of its living (Butler, 2014, 
p.8). 
In this sense, imagining participants in this research as vulnerable only and because they 
are women who have had abortions misunderstands the reasons women might have for 
taking part in this research, and also misunderstands the nature of participants’ 
relationship to me as the researcher. Whilst the potential power the researcher holds in 
the interview setting cannot be dismissed (and is discussed in ‘Feminist interviewing,’ 
p. 87) participants in this study often expressed their agency and their own agendas. For 
example, Lisa explained that the reason she wanted to take part in my research was that 
‘it’s actually really hard to find abortion resources for people who are fine,’ and she 
hoped to contribute to this normalisation of abortion. Rebecca noted in my interview 
with her that taking part in research like this is ‘quite a nice thing to be able to do,’ 
because: 
People are so quiet about it. That’s one of the things I noticed about it, as soon 
as you say, I had an abortion, hands start popping up. Me too, me too, me too. I 
love what you’re doing because people just don’t talk about it. 
She also shared with me that ‘I find talking about it so therapeutic,’ joking that it was 
‘selfish’ to make me travel across the country to listen to her talk about her abortion. In 
each of these examples, the women I interviewed made it clear that there was a reason 
they had chosen to take part in the research, and how it benefitted either them or others. 
They also recognised that by sharing their stories, they were resisting the culture of 
silence surrounding abortion.   
As a result, I approached interviewing participants as a relational exercise, one that 
required responding to each participant differently. Lisa, reflecting on her experience at 
a bpas clinic, remarked: 
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bpas staff were fine, bpas staff didn’t expect me to be sad, or anything, they just, 
they took where I was and went with it, they didn’t treat me like I needed to 
think more about it or anything like that. 
In the same way, I did not go in to interviews expecting participants to be distressed or 
upset, but responded to cues from each interviewee. However, the experience of seeking 
institutional ethical approval for the study forced me to flatten and simplify this into a 
problematic picture of my participants and of abortion as ‘always a tragedy.’ 
Ultimately, the final ‘negotiation’ between the committee and me resulted in full 
approval. In my final correspondence with the committee, I argued that some of the 
suggested amendments were not in line with the ethical framework with which I wished 
to conduct the study, resisting as much as I felt able to the problematic assumptions the 
committee had made about the project and my participants. In the next section, I explore 
these practical issues further, focusing in particular on three: the quasi-therapeutic 
nature of sensitive interviewing, the act of paying participants for their time, and 
anonymization and confidentiality. 
Feminist interviewing 
As a methodology which ‘attempts to understand the world from the subject’s point of 
view’ (Kvale, 1996), the qualitative interview ‘is a construction site of knowledge…an 
inter change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual 
interest’. As a qualitative interviewer, I understand my research to be an act of 
generating rather than collecting data. This recognises the fact that qualitative 
interviews are not mining sites from which a researcher can extract data (Kvale, 1996), 
but are dialogues in which the researcher actively co-constructs meaning with the 
participant. As Dunne, Pryor and Yates argue:  
The absence of an explicit acknowledgement of the influence of the social in the 
interview acts to de-socialise and de-politicise research, and reduce the plane of 
vision to the disembedded individual level (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005, 
p.31).  
This approach to interviewing is inherently feminist, and owes a debt to the work of 
researchers like Oakley. As discussed in ‘Epistemological framework’ (p. 60), Oakley 
critiqued contemporary approaches to the research interview as a ‘masculine model of 
sociology and society’ which was symptomatic of the marginalisation of women’s 
experiences in sociology (Oakley, 1981). She used the example of her research with 
women about their experiences of motherhood, during which she interviewed them 
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before and after giving birth. Talking about such a recent, intimate experience meant 
that maintaining the role of stern, detached researcher was unhelpful; instead, Oakley 
reframed the research interview as a two-way social interaction with personal meaning. 
It is this methodological approach that stems directly from a feminist epistemology. 
There are recent examples of sensitive research that has used feminist interviewing 
methods based on Oakley’s work. For example, a 2010 study empirically tested the 
efficacy of feminist interviewing in relation to interviewing rape survivors about their 
experiences (Campbell et al., 2010). It posed two questions: How do participants 
characterise their experiences of participation and what impact did the study have on 
them? In addition, did feminist interviewing techniques contribute to positive outcomes 
for participants? The overwhelming majority of participants reported that they found the 
interview to be a helpful, supportive, and insightful experience. Additional analyses 
revealed that the feminist interviewing principles were noticed and appreciated by the 
participants and contributed to their overall positive participation outcomes. Campbell 
et al. (2010) defined the tenets of feminist interviewing that they employed in their 
research in three ways:  reducing hierarchy between interviewer and interviewee; 
providing information and linking survivors to resources; and embracing emotionality 
by communicating with warmth and respect. Taking their lead, I developed 3 principles 
to follow during my interviews, inspired by the work of Oakley, Campbell et al. and 
others: 
1. The participant leads the interview as much as possible 
This guided the choice of method as well as how to interact with participants within 
interviews. The unstructured, narrative style of the life history interview offered 
opportunities for the interviewee to lead the conversation, and ideally, for me to 
interject as little as possible.  
2. The interview is a two-way process 
Qualitative interviews are frequently called ‘dialogues’ (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005). 
Whilst it is impossible to avoid the fact that research interviews are always shaped to 
some extent by the researcher’s interests (Kvale, 2006), this principle meant explicitly 
inviting and encouraging participants to ask questions about the research, or to query 
why they were being asked certain questions. This was an attempt to demystify the 
89 
 
researcher role and re-establish the interview as a dialogue between two subjects rather 
than the researcher-subject’s investigation of the participant-object. 
3. Warmth, emotion, and compassion are features, not bugs 
The narratives collected for this study ran the gamut of emotion. As well as talking at 
length about their abortions, people shared intimate details of their lives and histories 
with me; they made me laugh, they made me feel like crying, and everything in 
between. The nature of this study meant that strong emotional testimonies were often 
features of interviews, and should be considered a necessary feature of sensitive 
interviewing rather than something to avoid. In the same way, displaying appropriate 
emotional or sympathetic responses as a listener in a research interview is an ethical 
practice. 
Sara Ahmed writes (2004, p.3): 
To be emotional is to have one’s judgement affected: it is to be reactive rather 
than active, dependent rather than autonomous. Feminist philosophers have 
shown us how the subordination of emotions also works to subordinate the 
feminine and the body (Spelman 1989; Jaggar 1996). Emotions are associated 
with women, who are represented as ‘closer’ to nature, ruled by appetite, and 
less able to transcend the body through thought, will and judgment. 
In other words, emotion is considered antithetical to the principles of rationality and 
objectivity that guide neopositivist research. However, to remain unemotional and 
unsympathetic when a participant shares an intimate, upsetting account of their 
experience would not only be uncompassionate, it would be bad research practice. On 
many occasions, the women I interviewed described, sometimes in the same breath, the 
emotional journey of their abortion alongside the logical, rational decision-making 
process they had to negotiate. Similarly, being a responsive, emotionally expressive 
researcher (without centring one’s own emotions at the expense of the interviewee’s) 
can sit alongside being an effective, rational one. 
Role of the researcher: Power 
The role of the researcher in a feminist interview, then, is to be a friendly, emotive and 
compassionate listener who values the participant’s voice above their own, whilst 
recognising their own part in shaping the interview. Embodying this role raises ethical 
questions, however, particularly for ‘sensitive’ research. The issue I will focus on here 
is that of romanticising particular methods or methodologies as inherently 
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‘emancipatory’ or empowering for participants. I will first address the dangers of 
assuming life history or narrative interviewing as a method levels the playing field 
between the researcher and the interviewee.  
The anthropologist Crapanzano in his ethnographic study Tuhami: Portrait of a 
Moroccan (Crapanzo, 1980) explores this issue in-depth through his relationship with 
Tuhami, the Moroccan man whose life story forms the basis of his study. In his 
introduction, Crapanzano writes that the life story ‘presents the subject from his own 
perspective,’ but immediately problematizes this by noting that the interview ‘is an 
immediate response to a demand posed by an Other and carries within it the 
expectations of that Other’ (p. 8). Crapanzo’s text is striking in its refusal to hide the 
presence of the researcher, challenging the reader to consider ‘the anthropologist’s 
impress on the material he collects and his presentation of it’ (p. ix) as well as the 
impact on the subject of research. Crapanzo writes openly about his uneasiness and 
‘regret’ (p. xi) that Tuhami, who is illiterate, is the subject of research he cannot access; 
the anthropologist is unable to hide the feeling that he is an ‘obtrusive presence’ in 
Tuhami’s life (p. xi). 
In other words, regardless of the choice of method, sociological research always ‘carries 
within it the expectations of [the researcher]’ (Crapanzo, 1980, p.8), and any research 
interview is shaped fundamentally by it. Furthermore, the tenets of qualitative and 
feminist interviewing, designed to ostensibly shift the power balance between 
researcher and researched, may also carry elements that serve only the researcher’s 
agenda. 
For example, the third interviewing principle I created for myself was ‘Warmth, 
emotion, and compassion are features, not bugs’ (see p. 89). Does this principle serve 
the participant, or the researcher? Oakley encouraged emotive interviewing because she 
saw the prevailing attitude that researchers should be ‘friendly, but not too friendly,’ as 
a symptom of a masculinist ideology (Oakley, 1981). However, it could be argued that 
using techniques to build rapport and emotional trust is a way of ‘faking’ a quasi-
friendship, designed to ‘get some printable information on tape,’ as Kvale has argued 
(Kvale, 2006). In fact, Kvale goes further by warning researchers against enabling 
quasi-therapeutic encounters using techniques that are like a Trojan horse, slipping past 
respondents’ defence mechanisms into their inner world. 
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Whilst these concerns are valid, studies like that of Campbell et al. (2010) provide a 
counter-argument. If the participants in sensitive interviews, which sometimes cross 
over into therapeutic territory, report that their experience of taking part was not only 
not distressing but actively helpful and positive, this reminds us that participants have a 
degree of choice. They can exercise their agency and their own interests to shape the 
nature of the interview. The assumption that participants in such research will always be 
at the negative end of a power differential, or that they do not have their own agendas 
for taking part, is flawed.  
The feminist commitment to ‘emancipatory’ and critical research which empowers the 
researched and contributes to social change is therefore not guaranteed through choice 
of method; as Joan Acker, Kate Barry and Joke Esseveld note, ‘an emancipatory intent 
is no guarantee of an emancipatory outcome’ (Acker, Barry and Esseveld, 1983, p.431). 
Indeed, the idea of ‘empowering’ others through research has been critiqued as 
paternalistic, carrying assumptions about the relative status of researchers and their 
ability to ‘enlighten’ marginalised people through prompting them to engage in 
‘emancipatory’ research (Cornwall, 2003; Lather, 1988; Opie, 1992). In using Butler’s 
theorising of vulnerability as resistance, my ethical framework positioned participants in 
this research not as women in need of help or emancipation, but as agentic beings 
negotiating complex systems of power (Butler, 2014). 
The abortion interview as therapeutic 
There were moments during fieldwork, however, when the women I was interviewing 
did seem to need support. Throughout my interviews, I often reflected on the role of the 
researcher in sensitive research, and my responsibilities to my participants. I had in 
mind, for example, Kvale’s critique (discussed above) of qualitative researchers using 
rapport and emotional trust as a ‘Trojan horse’ to access participants’ intimate lives 
(2006). As I argued above in ‘Life story interviewing’ (p. 66), I wanted to avoid 
interviewing methods which seemed invasive, and avoid an interview that ‘felt more 
like therapy, but without a trained therapist to hold the emotions expressed’ (Ross and 
Moore, 2014). 
Despite this, there were moments when participants displayed emotional distress, or 
when I felt I was doing quasi-therapeutic work. I do not believe that a researchers’ role 
is to avoid provoking any sort of negative emotions in a participant when interviewing 
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on a sensitive subject. To attempt to do so would produce potentially shallow data (if 
the researcher were avoiding asking much about the topic in question). It also does a 
disservice to the participant, who has volunteered to share with the researcher their 
potentially complex and emotional testimony.  If I had responded to any participant who 
had become emotional during an interview with an attempt to change the subject or 
avoid acknowledging their valid emotion response, this would have produced an 
uncomfortable experience for both of us. 
As McIntosh and Morse (2009) argue, ‘emotional distress is a richly-textured, poly-
valent emotion that defies simple assignment of negativity and harm’ (p. 81). Sadness, 
confusion or anger are as valid and natural a response to a life event like abortion as 
relief, happiness or calmness. In light of this, I did not see my role extending so far as to 
ensure no participant felt upset at any point in the interview process; rather, my 
responsibility was to ensure that participants could narrate their emotional reaction to 
their experience in a safe, supportive environment. 
However, the research interview can be experienced by the interviewee as more than 
simply a safe, supportive environment: as a therapeutic encounter. Work on abortion 
stigma notes that non-disclosure and secrecy characterise many women’s abortion 
experiences (Beynon-Jones, 2017; Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Major and Gramzow, 
1999), and as a result, women are often deprived of social and psychological support 
that they might need. Opportunities to disclose to ‘someone who understands’ can be 
scarce, and take on great importance (Cockrill and Nack, 2013, p.984). Thus, I argue 
that an ethical abortion interview does not try to avoid any therapeutic work, but should 
seek to provide an appropriate, supportive framework with signposting to other services 
if needed. I articulate this ethical framework with an example of a moment in the 
research where I felt I was doing ‘therapeutic work,’ and the reflections it prompted 
about my role. 
During one of my interviews with Lucy, who was telling me the story of how she 
became pregnant before her most recent abortion, it quickly became clear to me that I 
was unexpectedly receiving a disclosure of rape. However, in Lucy’s telling of the 
story, the word ‘rape,’ or anything close to it, was absent; she described a male 
colleague taking her home, which she does not remember, waking up the next morning, 
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receiving an assurance from her colleague that ‘nothing happened,’ before later finding 
out she was pregnant.  
During Lucy’s story, I was suddenly very conscious about how I should respond. The 
manner in which she told the story indicated she felt uncomfortable and embarrassed; 
when I first asked her about her abortion, she said, through nervous laughter that she 
had got herself ‘into a sticky situation,’ and after starting to tell the story she hesitated: 
Lucy It was at (laughs) oh, I feel like I’m the worst person. It was at the clinic the 
other day (laughs) oh god, I got myself into a sticky situation (laughs) 
 
Gill Oh OK, tell me about that then? 
 
Lucy I don’t want to! (Laughs) Oh, no 
 
Gill You don’t have to if you (overlapping speech) don’t want to 
 
Lucy (Overlapping speech) Well, it’s fine. No, no, no, it’s fine. So (sighs). 
Somehow… 
 
She went on to tell me the story, which culminated with her colleague taking her home 
after a night out: 
And he said then I passed out on the sofa and he carried me to bed. And 
obviously something else happened, but he’s not mentioned this to me. But 
that’s the only time it’s possible [that she could have gotten pregnant]. It makes 
me cringe, it’s just really creepy, so. 
I was still in a position where I could barely take care of myself, I was just 
beginning to change things so that I could start becoming more stable 
consistently. I have moments of feeling like I’ve got my shit together, and then I 
just throw it out the window (laughs). And so, I was like, no, no, this is 
definitely not happening. So yes, I rang [the abortion clinic], and, yes I think it 
was the first time I went they gave me your little thing… 
The moment of disclosure was brief, and flew by before I registered what Lucy had just 
told me. By the time I had processed her disclosure, she had moved on to another topic, 
and it was several minutes before a break in her story.  
I chose not to circle back to her disclosure throughout the rest of the interview. 
However, leading up to our second interview, I thought carefully about how best to 
address it (or indeed whether to). On reflection, I decided that it was ethically important 
that I drew attention to it and carefully asked her more, for two reasons. The first was 
that the way she told the story in our first interview made it clear that she blamed herself 
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for having been drunk and not remembering what happened between her and her 
colleague. I felt it was important to offer an alternative reading of this that questioned 
the assumption that she was to blame. The second reason I felt it was important to 
address is that I wanted to be sure how she felt about it, and whether she had talked 
about it to others; in short, if she needed any more support, which I could not provide 
but could signpost her towards professional services which could. 
In revisiting the disclosure in our second interview, Lucy and I had what I would 
describe as a ‘therapeutic encounter.’ Maxine Birch and Tina Miller define the term 
‘therapeutic’ as ‘a process by which an individual reflects on, and comes to understand 
previous experiences in different—sometimes more positive—ways that promote a 
changed sense of self,’ noting that qualitative interviews often involve processes similar 
to those employed by professionals in therapeutic work (Birch and Miller, 2000, p.190). 
This includes ‘creating a space in which individuals can reflect on, reorder and give new 
meanings to past, difficult experiences’ (p. 190). 
In order to create this space, in our second interview I begin to offer my interpretation 
of what happened, but before I finished, Lucy jumped in: 
Gill I was thinking particularly about the circumstances around you getting 
pregnant the second time. Cause I read over that bit quite a few times, 
because it’s quite a, well, I don’t know if you feel this way about it, 
but it’s quite a difficult story, really. Because I feel like you talked a 
lot about how you got yourself into this situation, you know, you were 
drunk, or you went home with this person, or whatever. But it really 
seemed to me in terms of who’s at fault in that situation, your co-
worker (overlapping speech) really was more so than you. 
 
Lucy (Overlapping speech) (Makes a kind of squeaking, awkward noise). 
To be fair, it’s so awkward to talk about. My best friend in the world, I 
didn’t tell her what had happened cause I didn’t want her to be like, 
what have you done, again? But she rang me the day after and said 
she’d had a miscarriage. And she said, I feel like you’re going through 
the same thing. Like, she had a sense. So I ended up telling her the 
whole thing. She was like, mate, that’s really rapey. That’s really 
creepy. And I was like, yeah, I guess, it is. She said, it’s weird and 
kind of not OK. I was like, fair enough, you’ve got a point.  
 
[…] in hindsight, after speaking to my best friend I was like, OK. 
She’s got a point. But I suppose by acknowledging that, I could then 
become angry. And I don’t want that, I don’t like being angry and 
blameful. So I try not to think about it too much, does that make 
sense?  
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[…] It annoys me cause I’m like, can I not have a normal sexual 
experience? Does it always have to be really weird or attacky? 
(Laughs). I like to think that if I take responsibility, I haven’t had such 
a bad experience again, I can make it just silly. Maybe make it less 
serious. Because it’s happened a few times before, and I’m sick of it 
(laughs) sick of it. I need to work on being assertive maybe (laughs). 
 
Gill Well, yeah that’s a good habit to develop, but it just struck me this 
sense that you feel like even if that situation was weird and creepy and 
not nice to think about, you want to take as much control as you can? 
 
Lucy Ah! Very good. That is what I’m doing, trying to control it. […] This 
time I wanted to be, like. Yeah you’re right. That makes me feel a bit 
better (laughs). 
 
This exchange was useful for both of us. On my part, it confirmed that Lucy did 
acknowledge that what her colleague had done was not entirely her own fault, and that 
she had talked to other people about it, including her best friend and her mum. On 
Lucy’s part, this portion of the interview was a process of working through something 
difficult, and linking different moments in her life story in ways that enabled a new way 
of understanding. This is, at its heart, the very definition of a therapeutic encounter 
(Birch and Miller, 2000). 
Other researchers may have acted differently in this situation. For example, one could 
argue that I had a responsibility to use the word ‘rape’ to describe what happened to 
Lucy, and to more explicitly ask about whether she felt she needed support from outside 
sources. However, I feel comfortable that Lucy left this research encounter having had 
an opportunity to think through something difficult in an environment that did not 
attempt to impose another person’s understanding of what happened to her (that this 
was rape, and that therefore she needed support), and with carefully signposted 
professional services that were available to her if she felt she did need them (in the form 
of the resource sheet I gave to every participant – see Appendix H). 
I believe that the ethical responsibility in sensitive, intimate research, therefore, is to 
acknowledge how far one can offer a therapeutic encounter, and take seriously the 
weight and importance of the intimate, emotional moments that occur during sensitive 
interviewing – not avoid to avoid therapeutic moments entirely. There were many 
moments, in discussing their abortions as well as other aspects of their life stories, when 
participants in this research talked through something difficult with me, or told me their 
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interview had helped them see something in a new way. These moments are valuable to 
both researcher and interviewee, and, if guided with an appropriate ethical sensibility, 
can result in positive experiences for both parties. 
 ‘Giving back’: paying participants 
Another ethical issue I considered during the course of the research was the principle of 
‘giving back’ to my research participants. In total, each participant spent at least three or 
four hours with me (sometimes longer), sharing intimate details of their lives and 
inviting me into their homes. On both an abstract and practical level, remunerating 
participants seemed important. The feminist roots of my research meant the act of 
‘giving back’ to participants was built into the research design (Oakley, 1981), and this 
was a particularly concrete means of doing so. It was also an acknowledgement that it 
may be difficult for many people to afford the time to talk to me. Head (2009) argues in 
her paper on the ethics of paying participants that by offering to remunerate the single 
mothers who took part in her research, she was acknowledging the value of a busy, 
financially strained parent taking hours out of their day to talk to her. Payment was 
therefore also an effort to increase the accessibility of my time-consuming study to 
people who might have wished to take part but risked incurring financial or other types 
of penalties by taking time out to talk to a researcher. 
In all advertising material for the study, it was made clear that participants would be 
given £30 (4 hours at the national living wage of £7.85 an hour, Living Wage 
Foundation, 2017). As Head (2009) suggests, in order to minimise any impression that 
payment was contingent on a certain amount of interview time or amount of questions, 
participants were given their payment at the beginning of the interview, along with the 
information sheet, consent form, and debrief sheet (Appendices E, F and G). As a result, 
and considering the amount of payment offered was not disproportionately high, I did 
not feel the standard of consent was lowered by offering participants remuneration. 
Anonymisation and confidentiality 
The stigma surrounding abortion means that anonymization and confidentiality were 
particular concerns for this research project. Most participants had only told a select 
number of people about their abortions, and many had concerns about family members 
or friends finding out that they had had a termination.  
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All participants were given a pseudonym, and a number of measures ensured that 
unanonymised data was protected. Audio of interviews was recorded on a Dictaphone, 
and at the earliest opportunity was uploaded to an encrypted computer file. The 
recordings were then deleted from the Dictaphone. The only places this unanonymised 
data was stored was on the University of Sussex’s networked N: drive (a secure drive, 
backed up regularly), and on an encrypted external hard drive. The encryption software 
Veracrypt was used to set up encryption. I was the only person to access these audio 
recordings in order to transcribe them; transcriptions were anonymised through removal 
of identifying information. 
The act of seeking consent posed some issues. Presenting participants with an 
information sheet and consent form, which went into some detail about what 
participants were agreeing to, had a distinct cooling effect on our interactions before the 
interviews started. Although I sent each participant both documents in advance to look 
through at their leisure, the highly formal action of producing a piece of paper to sign 
when we met face-to-face usually interrupted small talk that I was hoping would 
establish rapport and warmth. In particular, because the NHS REC were particularly 
concerned about which circumstances obligated me to consider breaking confidentiality, 
there was a section in the information sheet about breaking confidentiality: 
Your confidentiality will not be broken (i.e. nothing of what you say in 
interviews will be repeated anywhere else) except under the following 
circumstances: 
- The researcher believes someone is in immediate danger of harm which 
could be prevented by breaking confidentiality 
- Disclosure of current child abuse, which researchers are obliged to report 
- If Police request a statement from the researcher about illegal activity 
which is being investigated in relation to the participant 
 
In line with ethical practice, the researcher would endeavour to talk to you first 
before breaking confidentiality, and will avoid the need to break confidentiality 
as far as possible. 
In addition, in the consent form: 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no 
information I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the 
reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party. I 
understand that the only reason confidentiality would be broken is if the 
researcher believes a vulnerable person is in danger of harm, and that that the 
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researcher has no obligation to report illegal activity (but that such information 
may subsequently be required by Police). 
I was anxious about this. My anxiety was that informing participants in such detail 
might put them off; I doubted many of them had worried about under what 
circumstances I might have to co-operate with the Police, and it might be unnecessarily 
emphasising the seriousness and risks of taking part in the study. However, no 
participants seemed perturbed by this clause or needed to ask any more questions about 
it. 
Overall, in recognising the sensitive nature of this research project and its potential risks 
for participants, I was prompted to carefully consider my responsibilities towards the 
people who generously shared with me highly intimate life narratives. The feminist 
framework of this study enabled this. However, the lengthy process of seeking 
institutional ethical approval, particularly from the NHS, was problematic in its inability 
to recognise that ‘sensitivity’ in research is not only located in the relationship between 
researcher and participant, but also between research and its socio-political context. 
I have argued here that abortion researchers, and indeed any researchers interested in 
‘sensitive’ topics, can mobilise Butler’s reconceptualization of vulnerability as a 
framework which allows a more realistic and nuanced approach to participants. As a 
social researcher, the consequences of suggesting that women who have abortions 
should be expected to be emotionally distressed sits uneasily with me, and this 
framework remained at the forefront of my mind both when interviewing and when 
analysing this project’s data. Butler’s framework allows a recognition of participants’ 
vulnerability whilst also recognising that this does not entirely define them. 
Reconceptualising vulnerability in this way therefore enables research with hard-to-
reach or hidden groups who might be denied a voice not only in wider society, but also 
in research by lengthy institutional review processes.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have outlined the development of the design of this study, from its 
theoretical and epistemological framing, to the minutiae of ‘practical’ matters of method 
and ethics. Ultimately, this study takes the life story as an opportunity not to simply 
access the lived reality of women who have abortions, but also as an opportunity to 
deconstruct the ways in which the gendered and classed self is produced through them. 
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In doing so, I have articulated an ethical framework which is conscious of the abortion 
interview as a potential ‘therapeutic encounter,’ and which uses Butler’s radical 
reimagining of vulnerability as resistance to conceptualise participants in sensitive 
research as agentic. What follows is an analysis of the narratives produced in these 
research encounters. 
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Chapter Four: Precarity 
In the next three chapters, I provide a narrative discourse analysis of the life story data 
collected during this study. The three chapters reflect the three concepts around which 
the narratives of the women who took part coalesced: precarity, responsibility, and 
stigma. This chapter explores the first concept, precarity: how it was constructed, 
contested, and problematized through the life narratives my participants3 told. Whilst 
few of the participants in this study used the term ‘precarity’ to describe their 
experiences, many of them talked about material and subjective feelings of uncertainty 
and insecurity. I have chosen to mobilise the term precarity in my analysis as it 
describes a ‘lived experience of ambient insecurity’ under the conditions of 
neoliberalism (Horning, 2012), a phenomenon I have interpreted their accounts as 
expressing.  
Through this analytic lens, I examine here the ways in which the women in this study 
experienced different forms of precarity: as a material condition, a subjective 
experience, and a discursive resource. The process of requesting an abortion extends an 
unspoken demand to women to perform precarity in particular ways, which women in 
different social locations may acquiesce to or resist. Engaging with discourses of 
precarity is useful for some women as a way to ‘legitimise’ their abortion story through 
acts of distinction, which position certain abortions as justifiable, and others as morally 
suspect. For other women, however, there is more risk in associating themselves with 
precarity. For women whose social position means they are judged to have a lack of 
ability and resources to care for a child if they wanted to, they have less freedom to 
identify as ‘precarious’; instead, they are already classified as such, and are ‘fixed in 
place’ by the moral values associated with this (Skeggs, 2004).  
This chapter therefore uncovers precarity as a discourse that participants used or resisted 
in narrating their abortion experiences. In mobilising the term ‘discourse’ here I am 
drawing upon Foucault’s understanding of discourse as systems of thought, signs and 
meanings which construct objects of knowledge (in this case, precarity) (Foucault, 
1989) , but also upon Skeggs’ theorisation of culture and discourse as resources 
(Skeggs, 2005).  My analysis also draws attention to two related but not identical 
dimensions of precarity: material conditions and subjective experience. Even women 
                                                                 
3 Biographical sketches of each participant can be found in Appendix A. 
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who enjoyed relatively secure material conditions, such as home ownership and stable 
employment, expressed uncertainty and insecurity about their lives and their abortion 
decisions. I interpret this as an increasing feeling of precarity amongst middle-class 
women in comparison to previous generations, produced by the atmosphere of ‘crisis 
management’ and austerity in the UK following the global financial crash and 
expectations on them to perform particular neoliberal subjectivities (Francombe-Webb 
and Silk, 2016; Tyler, 2013). I argue that middle-class women experience a sense of risk 
about reproductive decisions, which, if the ‘wrong’ choice is made, threatens to position 
them as failed neoliberal subjects. I argue overall that this sheds light on the implicit 
assumptions and demands inherent in the process of obtaining an abortion, and the ways 
in which one’s social position affects which discourses can be drawn upon to name 
one’s experience. Through the work of Beverley Skeggs on classed systems of 
‘symbolic exchange’ (2004), I offer a theorisation of the ways in which women with 
various relationships to ‘middle-classness’ manage the risks associated with making 
reproductive decisions in an era of intensified responsibilisation and surveillance 
(Foucault, 2008). 
Dimensions of precarity 
The concept of precarity has several dimensions and uses. In this chapter, I 
conceptualise precarity in three ways, all of which were evident in my data. The first 
dimension is precarity as a description of material and labour conditions characterised 
by casual and insecure employment (Horning, 2012; Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). The 
second is a subjective experience of insecurity and uncertainty produced by 
contemporary neoliberal conditions, not only related to work but to broader aspects of 
life (Ettlinger, 2007; Worth, 2016). The final use of precarity in this chapter is as a 
discourse that was used and resisted in various ways by my participants in relation to 
their abortion experiences. In this section, I elaborate on these three dimensions of 
precarity. 
Precarity as a material condition 
Precarity emerged in 2003 as a concept and an ‘organising platform’ for a series of 
social struggles in Europe which focused on the casualization of labour and under- and 
unemployment (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008; Worth, 2016). These changes in the labour 
market have been linked to the conditions of neoliberalism, which include the state’s 
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offloading of responsibility for its citizens’ well-being, and corporations’ shifting of 
economic risk to workers through lack of benefits, pensions, and security (Horning, 
2012). In others words, ‘precarity’ expresses the effects of individuals bearing the 
burden of wider economic forces like recession and austerity. 
Opposition to these processes and the poverty and insecurity associated with them for 
workers formed the basis of a number of social and labour movements in the early 
2000s, and the concept of precarity which linked them was used to imagine a ‘new kind 
of political subject’ who had their own forms of organising and modes of expression 
(Neilson and Rossiter, 2008, p.52). In 2011, Guy Standing argued that conditions of 
precarity constituted a new class formation, the Precariat, a group that globalisation and 
neoliberal policy had created who were under-employed, insecure, and whose political 
mobilisation by the left was essential to avoid their dangerous drift to the extreme right 
(Standing, 2011). The Great British Class Survey project named the Precariat as one of 
the seven new formations of class, characterised by low economic, cultural and social 
capital (Savage et al., 2013). 
In response to this, there has been some debate as to whether the concept of ‘precarity’ 
is simply a description of a phenomenon most workers experience under capitalism, 
rather than a new concept produced by the conditions of neoliberalism, or indeed a new 
class formation ( Di Bernardo, 2016). Critiques have in particular cast doubt on the 
political usefulness of interpellating a class which includes people as diverse as self-
employed creative freelancers and undocumented migrant workers; as Horning argues, 
this risks shifting political focus to ‘first world problems’ and blunts the term’s critical 
edge (Horning, 2012). Whether or not one accepts ‘precarity’ as a theoretically sound 
tool, it has nevertheless shaped discussions of conditions under neoliberalism and 
globalisation, and has been adopted by a range of groups. Additionally, it is not only the 
material and economic aspects of precarity that have received analytical attention, but 
also the broader, subjective experiences of precarity which individuals in a variety of 
material and labour conditions might experience.  
Precarity as a subjective experience 
This dimension of precarity as a subjective experience has been described as an 
‘existential’ and ‘ontological’ experience (Butler, 2009; Neilson and Rossiter, 2008), a 
‘lived experience of ambient insecurity’ (Horning, 2012) and ‘a condition of 
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vulnerability relative to contingency and the inability to predict’ (Ettlinger, 2007, 
p.320). Precarity is thus conceived in this literature as both a material condition and a 
subjective experience. Furthermore, the relation between these two dimensions may not 
be direct. Nancy Ettlinger has argued that precarity ‘spares no one, haunting even 
privileged persons’ in an age where phenomena as diverse as terrorism, domestic 
violence, repressive surveillance and environmental disasters produce ambient fear 
(2007, p.322). The effects of this are explored in Nancy Worth’s  research with 
millennial women workers in Canada, many of whom felt a sense of insecurity even 
when in permanent, stable employment, picking up on a ‘zeitgeist’ of millennial 
precarity (2016, p.609). Thus the affective dimensions of precarity can ‘supersede the 
rational’ (Worth, 2016, p.602). I mobilise this second dimension of precarity to 
understand how even women in this study with relatively high amounts of security and 
privilege in some areas of their lives described their lives in terms of insecurity, 
uncertainty, and risk.  
Precarity as a discourse  
Skeggs argues that ‘ways of telling and knowing are limited resources’ (2005, p.973). 
The ‘imperative to produce oneself’ and display one’s subjectivity depends on access to 
discursive and symbolic resources, and the knowledge of how to ‘display one’s 
subjectivity properly’ using these resources (p. 973). In this sense, as well as talking 
about both their material precarity and their feelings of precariousness, my participants 
engaged with what I have interpreted as the discourse of precarity in order to make 
meaning out of their experiences, and also in their representations of their abortion 
decisions to the medical staff who act as gatekeepers to abortion.  
In the face of ambient insecurity and uncertainty in everyday life, Ettlinger argues 
(2007, p.325): 
The everydayness of precarity holds clues as to how people routinely, if 
implicitly, develop strategies that permit feelings of certainty amid uncertainty. 
People grope for the surety to navigate social, political, economic, and cultural 
life through everyday discursive and material practices. 
This chapter focuses on the discursive practices used by the women in this study to 
negotiate their feelings of precarity and risk in relation to both their abortions and their 
wider lives. The act of requesting an abortion, as will become apparent in the following 
analysis, requires on one hand a performance of certainty, and on the other, a 
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performance of precarity. Medical staff are tasked with looking out for signs that an 
abortion seeker is unsure or may be being coerced into ending their pregnancy, and 
women have described in my own and previous research their strategies of presenting 
their abortion decisions in as certain terms as possible (Beynon-Jones, 2017). However, 
the process of obtaining an abortion also invites some performance of precarity in ways 
that render abortion requests understandable and less likely to be challenged by medical 
staff or friends and family (Beynon-Jones, 2013; Lattimer, 2001). Thus, the discourse of 
precarity can be used to communicate certain and ‘understandable’ abortion requests. 
This use of precarity as a discursive resource, however, is more possible for some 
women than others, as the following analysis argues. 
This chapter, therefore, focuses on how women who have had abortions talk about 
precarity, which emerges from the data as a material condition, a subjective experience, 
and a discourse. The women in this study talk about their economic, labour and housing 
conditions affecting their decisions to end pregnancies – in other words, their relation to 
economic precarity – but they also express anxiety about their relation to femininity, 
middle-classness, and respectability. If precarity is partly about individuals managing 
risk and the demand to be effective neoliberal citizens, then it is a useful tool for 
understanding the experiences of these women. 
Experiences of precarity 
In listening to the stories of the women interviewed for this study and analysing the data 
they produced, certain themes emerged almost immediately. Many women described 
their desire to have children, and their feeling that the timing of the pregnancies they 
had ended were wrong. In explaining their decision, their hopes for the future included 
descriptions of what the ‘right’ or ‘ideal’ conditions would be for them to have children. 
These ideal conditions were often described using the language of stability and security 
and were contrasted with the women’s current lives, for example Alex’s hope that she 
would have children ‘when I’m married and have a job’ rather than a poor student, or 
Heidi’s wish that in future she would be in ‘a good financial situation’ and would 
‘actually have time to raise a child’ rather than struggling to make ends meet in jobs that 
she does not enjoy. 
Most of the women who described their lives in this way were of the generation born 
between 1980 and 1995, commonly referred to as millennials (Worth, 2016). This 
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generation are particularly associated with the concept of precarity in the UK and the 
rest of Western Europe, as they have grown up and entered a labour market 
characterised by casualisation and under- and unemployment (Worth, 2016). This 
chapter therefore focuses mainly on the narratives of the younger women who took part. 
The felt precarity of these young women, many of whom are part of a traditionally 
middle-class group in terms of their economic, social and cultural capitals (Bourdieu, 
1984), reflects the subjectification of responsibility in neoliberal times (Foucault, 1988). 
‘It was austerity’ 
At the end of every interview, I asked participants explicitly about whether austerity had 
affected their lives and their reproductive decision-making, but it was a topic that 
emerged organically from several women’s conversations with me without my 
prompting. For example, Violet voiced her frustration with what she saw as an 
‘ideological’ programme of austerity that scapegoated the poor and benefits claimants, 
and removed the ‘safety nets’ that the government used to provide. She described living 
with a constant feeling of precarity, as she worked in a place where ‘they could easily 
lay me off,’ and if she lost her job ‘I’d be really struggling. I don’t have any savings 
whatsoever, and there’s no way this government would help me at all.’ 
Similarly, Rebecca described the frustration and sadness she felt that austerity had 
curtailed her desire to have children. A 26 year-old PhD student, she had had two 
unplanned pregnancies in her early twenties, both of which she chose to terminate. She 
described finding the first abortion when she was 23 hard, for a variety of reasons. She 
had been told when she was younger that she was probably infertile, making her 
pregnancy quite a shock, and was not on good terms with the father, who she described 
as unsupportive throughout her decision-making process. Furthermore, she wanted 
children, and so seriously considered continuing her pregnancy. However, she was not 
on a high income, working part-time as a nanny and part-time as a shop assistant, so 
looked into what state support she could receive. ‘I was looking and I realised I’d still 
have to go to work and look after someone else’s children whilst putting mine in what 
was then a free nursery,’ she said. ‘I was like, what kind of, how am I gonna feed 
myself, you know…Yeah, that was it, it was austerity.’ 
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Whilst there were several factors that prompted Rebecca to choose an abortion, 
including her unsupportive boyfriend, she concluded that ‘the main reason I couldn’t do 
it was because I was poor, basically.’ When she had her consultation, she recalled that 
‘the nurse was like, well, can you give your reason, and I was like, David Cameron4 
(laughs).’ Her feeling that there was not enough state support available for her to 
support a child was also an important factor in her decision to have a second abortion 
two years later; ‘if I had a successful job and wasn’t living off £13,000 a year,’ she said, 
she might have been able to continue her pregnancy, but ‘I found it so difficult to find a 
job after I finished my first degree. I’ve ended up just continuing my education to the 
point where there’s nowhere else I can go now, because I just, I just, yeah, the job 
market has just dwindled and disappeared.’ 
This is not an uncommon experience for women of Rebecca’s age. Millennials have 
been identified as the first generation in many years to earn less than previous 
generations (Resolution Foundation, 2017; Social Mobility Commission, 2016). Their 
demographic has been described as more precarious than previous generations, having 
taken on more student debt than their parents or grandparents, facing lower employment 
rates, higher rent, and worse mental health (Mendelson, 2013). They are therefore 
somewhat trapped by the contemporary lengthening of youthful precarity: for example, 
an increasing number of university graduates in their twenties and thirties are moving 
back in with their parents after university or relying on their money to buy property 
(Social Mobility Commission, 2016).  
As a result, circumstances which previous generations may have experienced as stable 
are experienced by women like Rebecca as precarious, as she explained in reference to 
her mum’s belief that ‘babies don’t need very much, they just need you to love them 
and somewhere warm to sleep’. Rebecca feels differently, and talked extensively in our 
interviews about the importance of both financial security and availability of support, 
both from the state and from her friends, family and partner. Partly as a result of the 
rollback of the welfare state, the media and political commentators have noted that 
middle-class millennials are increasingly reliant on the ‘bank of mum and dad’ as their 
safety net (ITV News, 2017; Walker, 2017), moving back in with their parents after 
university rather than establishing a career and an independent life as previous 
                                                                 
4 At the time, Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party  
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generations might have been able to. However, this type of safety net is not available to 
everyone. Rebecca said that her parents had been hit quite hard by the recession, and 
‘where I might have once been able to call on my mum and dad if I wanted to have a 
baby…that’s not really a support network I can rely on [for financial support].’ 
Furthermore, Rebecca pointed out that her mum’s belief that babies ‘don’t need very 
much’ is tempered by Rebecca’s own memories of growing up in a family without 
much material wealth. She recalled that when she was growing up, she ‘never had cool 
trainers or clothes or anything’ and she ‘used to get picked on and stuff’ because her 
parents did not have much money. Thinking about continuing her first pregnancy, she 
said, ‘I had this thought that my kid would come to me and want, like, some Air Max or 
something and there’s no way I’d be able to buy them one. That was a huge, like the 
trainers thing, it was huge.’  
Rebecca’s reference to her feeling as a child that her family was too poor to afford 
‘cool’ trainers is an example of a marker of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) that she 
worries about reproducing for her own child. Clothing and ‘bodily dispositions’ act in 
the ‘symbolic marketplace’ as cultural markers which attach value to certain bodies and 
devalue others (Skeggs, 2004). Rebecca’s desire to have children and to offer them a 
life not marked by lack is difficult to achieve in circumstances she experiences as 
precarious, lacking in material security, firm job prospects, and support from either the 
state or her social networks. Despite her high cultural capital as a highly educated 
woman, and her relative security in terms of her relationship with her partner and their 
cohabitation, she experiences her life as too precarious to have a child. 
‘To be a mum you have to be a superhero’ 
Anja, also 26, felt a similar frustration. Despite being in a relatively privileged and 
stable position in some ways – she was in employment and lived with her partner who 
owned the house they lived in – her pregnancy came at the ‘wrong time’ and she made a 
difficult decision to have an abortion. She was tearful in our first interview, explaining 
that she had had a bad morning; she had been trying to apply to her dream job to get out 
of her current part-time work that she hated, but had just discovered she was probably 
not eligible to apply. She had only recently moved to the country, because her partner 
had wanted to, and was finding it difficult to make friends and connections. This, along 
with her abortion, which had taken place weeks before the interview, had given her a 
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dismal view of the state of the world: ‘This experience triggered a lot of other emotions 
and thoughts and feelings about life in general, and what it means to be a woman in this 
world,’ she said. She felt that the world was ‘harder than [she] thought before,’ 
prompting her to ask, ‘why do we do that? Why do we keep producing? And have 
people working crazy hours? It’s just, I dunno. The world’s just gone so wrong. 
Everything’s so wrong.’ 
In particular, Anja knew that she wanted to have children and would have continued 
with her pregnancy, but found it difficult to find a sense of security and certainty in the 
decision to become a mother. She located that sense of uncertainty both externally, in 
society, and internally, in herself. For example, she explained the main reason for 
choosing abortion were her work and financial situation; she worked multiple part-time 
jobs, and said, ‘I know I want children and I could have had it now. But that would have 
meant that I’d be struggling for money for a long time, and I’d be stuck in a job that I, 
that’s difficult for me to do.’ Having a child now, she explained, would be selfish, as 
she would not be able to provide for it, and furthermore, would not be able to rely on 
anyone else to provide: 
I think, just to cut a long story short, I think the world or maybe just our country 
doesn’t support families with children enough. So a lot of people end up 
struggling, so unless you’re in a good financial situation and actually have the 
time to raise a child, it’s kind of unfair for the child. 
Anja suggests that the decision to become a mother today is an acceptance of total, 
individual responsibility, as the state has divested itself of obligation to mothers and 
families; a successful mother has to be a successful neoliberal subject. Furthermore, 
Anja said, ‘there doesn’t seem to be any space for femaleness in the working world,’ 
from menstruation to having children, meaning that ‘to be a mother you have to be a 
superhero.’ Thus, she is unable to find reassurance that the state or society will support 
her as a mother, so must turn inward to judge her ability to provide for a child against an 
impossible standard of motherhood. 
Both Anja and Rebecca critiqued the demands this expectation places on women by 
reflecting on the external forces that mean women are not supported in their attempts to 
balance work and family. Nevertheless, they have shouldered the responsibility for this 
type of precarity by deciding to end a pregnancy they otherwise might have continued, 
citing both their own welfare and that of the potential child as the factors at the forefront 
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of their minds. Their experiences of precarity reflect the subjectification of 
responsibility of the effects of wider economic forces like recession and austerity. 
Managing risk 
As the welfare state in the UK has shrunk and institutions previously owned by the state 
have been privatised and commercialised, the result has not been, as neoliberal logic 
would suggest, a reduction in the intervention of the state on individual’s lives (Tyler, 
2013). Instead, the neoliberal state has developed new technologies of regulation and 
governance, such as an intensification of responsibility on the individual (Foucault, 
1977). Many of the women in this study expressed a feeling of pressure to do 
motherhood ‘right’ by delaying childbearing and working on themselves – through 
developing their careers, or getting counselling to improve their ability to parent, for 
example. This can be expressed as a dimension of biopolitics, the concept developed by 
Foucault to describe strategies of power over life, death, health and reproduction which 
emerged from the eighteenth century onwards (Foucault, 2008). One dimension of 
biopolitics is the ‘modes of subjectification’ through which individuals are encouraged 
to regulate themselves in the service of certain discourses or forms of authority; in the 
name of health, for example. The broader theme of responsibility that emerged from the 
data will be examined in more depth in Chapter Five; however, here I examine how, in 
response to feelings of precarity, several of the women described the strategies they 
employed to ensure they had children at the ‘right’ time and in the ‘ideal’ 
circumstances.  
Timing motherhood 
Delaying childbearing has been described in academic literature as a particularly 
middle-class practice (Beynon-Jones, 2013; Smith, 1993; Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody, 2001); however, the average age of all first-time mothers in the UK has 
increased by almost 4 years in the last 4 decades (Office for National Statistics, 2016); 
The average age of first-time mothers in the UK in 2015 was 30 years old, according to 
the Office for National Statistics (2016). Several studies have noted that a woman’s 
point in her life course affects her decision-making around abortion, but also how that 
decision is perceived (Beynon-Jones, 2013; Sihvo et al., 2003). Older women having 
abortions are more likely to encounter directive advice or concern from medical 
professionals that this may be an opportunity to have a child they may not have again; 
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in contrast, young mothers are heavily stigmatised in British society, and therefore 
younger women’s abortion requests are more likely to be seen as justifiable (Beynon-
Jones, 2013; Greene, 2006; Hawkes, 1995). 
If women in general are having children later in life now, and contemporary conditions 
mean that the generation of women who are coming into their mid to late 20s now are 
experiencing more precarity than previous generations, it might be expected that the 
pressure to have children at the ‘right’ time has increased. This anxiety was certainly 
expressed by several women in this study. For example, Lucy described how her mother 
expressed regularly a hope that Lucy would not have children young: ‘my mum had 
kids really, really young. So she instilled this, you do not have kids until you’ve done 
what you want to do with life. And that pretty much stuck.’ Similarly, Sarah explained 
that it was important for her to have children, but ‘I don’t wanna, like, not sacrifice my 
life for a kid,’ stating the importance of achieving her ‘life goals’ before becoming a 
mother. Anja’s partner, as she described him, had a similar outlook. She said, ‘he also 
wants children, but he has a few projects he wants to do before focusing on raising a 
child. He’s very clear about what he wants to do in his life, and what he wants to at least 
try to achieve certain goals before he has a child.’ 
As well as the ‘ideal circumstances’ involving material security and job security, for 
many of these middle-class women and their partners parenthood is something that 
comes after achieving one’s life goals. Walkerdine, Melody and Lucey (2001) identify 
this as a middle-class sensibility which imagines the middle-class female body as 
secondary to her cerebral development (in contrast to the fecund, fleshy figure of the 
working-class woman). Therefore, middle-class women are expected to delay 
childbearing until after their educations and careers are established. They write: 
For middle-class girls, regulation of their sexuality and reproductive capacity is 
part of the wider regulation of academic achievement – they are not allowed to 
fail, and pregnancy and motherhood is seen as a failure, incompatible with 
success in academia and work (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001, p.194). 
 
However, they argue, this clashes with the expectation that womanhood is synonymous 
with motherhood, leading to what Walkerdine et al. call a ‘psychic struggle’ against 
these competing expectations (2001, p.187). Motherhood at the expense of personal 
development constitutes failure for these women, but so does not having children at all. 
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These competing expectations produced anxieties in several women in this study that 
revolved around the potential consequences of opting out of motherhood today and 
trying again in the future. For example, Karen, 32 at the time of her abortion, worried 
that whilst she does not feel regretful about her decision, she may in the future: ‘if for 
example in a few years’ time I’m in a relationship and decide to have children, and I 
found that I can’t, I just wonder how I’ll feel about that abortion.’ This also worried 
Anja, whose friend had had an abortion in her twenties, as Anja had, and had tried to 
have children in her thirties but could not get pregnant. Anja said, ‘that’s just so sad…I 
worry that’s going to happen for me too.’ 
This concern about the ‘biological clock’ which gives women a small window of 
opportunity to have children at the ‘right’ time was so strong for Rebecca that she said 
‘I feel like if I was forty and single and I got pregnant by the wrong person, I’d keep it if 
I wanted a baby.’ In other words, if she had been older at the time of her pregnancy, she 
would not have had an abortion. Rebecca also voiced her concern that abortion might 
affect her fertility in future; she had requested medical abortions both times she was 
pregnant because she had read that surgical abortions carried more risk of affecting 
fertility. The loss of fertility by age or as a result of abortion was therefore threaded 
through many of the women’s narratives as a consequence or even a punishment they 
may have to pay later, adding to their feelings of risk and uncertainty about the future. 
Older women face a different set of obstacles. Elizabeth was 41 when she discovered 
she was pregnant, and initially she decided to continue with the pregnancy. She was in 
many ways exactly the ‘right sort’ of mother: she owned her own flat, lived in a 
beautiful, residential area of a large city, and had a steady, permanent job that she 
enjoyed. However, she would have been a single mother, and furthermore, an older 
single mother. She explained the feeling of risk she experienced from the beginning of 
her pregnancy and the strategies she took to manage them:  
I Googled chances of miscarriage. I read somewhere that I had, at the age of 
forty-two there’s a 50/50 chance of miscarriage…but I don’t know where A&E 
is, I don’t know how to get there. Would I have to call a taxi? Have I got to 
make sure I’ve got enough cash on me to get a taxi to go to A&E in the middle 
of the night? When I’m in pain? And I even thought maybe I should do a trial 
run to A&E so I know how to get there. 
She described these anxieties as ‘exhausting,’ and a constant weighing up of risk: risk of 
miscarriage, risk of Down’s Syndrome (more common in children of older mothers), 
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and risk of having a non-baby-proofed flat. She recalled the moment she decided to 
have an abortion, sitting in bed and reading the ‘large pile’ of pregnancy materials that 
her GP had given her. The material, she explained, was full of images of young, happy 
women doing things she could not:  
It starts off when she breaks the news to her parents that she’s pregnant, and 
they’re weeping with joy. I just sat there in bed reading this and felt complete 
despair. Here was this happy scenario, I read through all this literature and I 
couldn’t find anything about having a baby on your own. 
This normative representation of pregnancy and motherhood produced such 
overwhelming feelings of failure in Elizabeth that she had not done everything ‘right,’ 
despite her best efforts, that she ultimately ended the pregnancy.  
Pressure on women to ‘have it all’ – to have successful careers as well as raise a family 
and do everything at the ‘right time’ - is not new. Feminist scholars have noted for years 
that one perverse consequence of advances in the rights of women has been the 
expectation that there are no longer any structural disadvantages for women, therefore if 
they find it difficult to combine work and home life they only have themselves to blame 
(Faludi, 1992). However, many of the women above expressed anxieties about timing 
motherhood that they explicitly linked to contemporary socio-historic conditions, like 
the recent escalation of the rollback of the welfare state and contemporary precarious 
conditions of employment. Furthermore, women now have access to a wealth of 
reproductive technology that enable control over how, when and whether they have 
children, from contraceptive options to in-vitro fertilisation. This array of choice, 
however, is accompanied by medical and moral discourse which enables a biopolitical 
regulation of women’s reproductive lives through production of anxiety and a desire to 
get motherhood ‘right’ (Foucault, 1978). As a result, it is useful to see these expressions 
of precariousness not only as a product of perennial gender equality issues, but also as a 
new formulation of them within these specific social conditions.  
‘Working on yourself’ 
As well making the ‘right’ choices in timing motherhood, there is also a contemporary 
requirement to account for oneself, to produce discourses of the self (Skeggs, 2005). 
Foucault argued that the confession – to a priest, a psychologist, a doctor – operates as a 
mechanism of subjectivity in neoliberal times, particularly in relation to stigmatised or 
prohibited behaviours; these behaviours are ‘constantly connected with the obligation to 
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tell the truth about oneself’ (Foucault, 1988, 1978). Applying Skeggs’ theorisation, 
these discourses of the self (ways of ‘telling and knowing’) are unevenly distributed 
classed resources, requiring as they do not only the resources but knowledge of how to 
display subjectivity in legitimate ways (Skeggs, 2005). These discourses of the self 
were displayed in various ways in the data. For example, Anja’s distress about being in 
too precarious work to have a child meant she needed to ‘invest’ in her career now in 
order to be a good mother later: ‘I just have to progress my career now, I need to work 
hard now to put myself in that situation in future.’ However, this ‘work’ on the self was 
also expressed in other ways, for example Lucy, before she decided to have an abortion, 
was planning on continuing her unexpected pregnancy, and told me that she had 
immediately booked herself some counselling in order to prepare for motherhood. She 
did not position this as for her own benefit, but as a way of improving herself for her 
future child, to get into the ‘right frame of mind for parenting.’ 
Lucy came from an aspirational upper-working-class family, and her family’s trajectory 
of upward social mobility – through, she believed, the hard work of her parents – 
structured the way she conceived of parenting. There were traits she saw in her mother, 
for example, that she did not want to ‘hand down’ to her own children, such as her 
mother’s lack of emotional attention that she attributed to having had children ‘too 
young’ and having to work hard outside of the home to provide for them. ‘So that’s why 
I started counselling, cause I thought, I need to not do what [my parents have] done, 
cause I’ve seen it trickle down the family line,’ she explained. ‘You can see it being 
handed over.’  
Lucy’s rhetoric of traits being ‘passed down’ family lines is almost pathological, 
framing her parents’ lacks as inherited traits that it is her responsibility to ‘cure’ in 
herself before having children. Both Anja and Lucy’s narratives could be read through 
what Anthony Giddens called the ‘reflexive project of the self’ (Giddens, 1991). 
Giddens suggested that in late modernity, selfhood need no longer be constrained by 
birth, but could be a flexible ‘project’ unrestrained by old forms of classification. 
However, Lucy and Anja’s narratives demonstrate that they were shouldering the 
burden of reinventing themselves as more employable, or more psychologically healthy, 
in order to be good mothers and in order to compete in the broader economic and 
symbolic ‘systems of exchange’ which imbue them with value (Skeggs, 2004) and 
enable them to become successful neoliberal citizens. This, far from being a process 
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unconstrained by class, was shaped by what Skeggs calls ‘compulsory individuality,’ 
the requirement that middle-class subjects in particular must display their ability to 
make good choices and investments in themselves. 
The risk of failure associated with the anxieties of many of these middle-class (or, 
proximately middle-class) women was expressed as somewhat of a double bind in 
Heidi’s story. She told me that she felt ‘guilty’ about her abortion, because previously 
she had believed that if she found out she was pregnant, she would ‘just be a mum.’ 
However, when she discovered that she was pregnant, she felt strongly that she ‘didn’t 
feel ready’ for a child, and felt ‘a bit like, what’s the word? I dunno, what’s the word for 
that? Guilty, I guess. A bit like a failure.’ However, the prospect of continuing the 
pregnancy and becoming a mother was also positioned as a failure; ‘what kind of mum 
would I be? I don’t have a job, I don’t have permanent housing, you know, I can’t do 
that.’  
Heidi is therefore caught by the competing expectations Walkerdine et al. (2001) 
identify in the narratives of young middle-class women. Expected on one hand to delay 
their childbearing in pursuit of security and achievement in their intellectual, work and 
love lives and on the other to have children before they are too old, they are left with a 
narrow window for success. Through their abortion narratives, the women in this study 
demonstrated that many of them experienced feelings of risk and precarity when making 
the decision of whether to end a pregnancy. These feelings were intimately related to 
their gendered experience of middle-classness, because of which they felt under 
pressure to succeed in their work, love and reproductive lives without calling on support 
from the state, their families, or even their partners. These expectations were occurring 
in a context of increased insecurity and precarity produced by the casualisation of 
labour, meaning that the hope of security in contracted, permanent employment has 
become more difficult. The competing pressures this produces is demonstrated by, for 
example, women being constantly reminded by medical professionals and the media 
that they are leaving motherhood ‘too late’ due to their ‘selfish’ prioritisation of their 
careers over their family lives (e.g. Ivens, 2015; Sassoon, 2015; Selvaratnam, 2014), 
whilst also being expected to maintain successful careers alongside motherhood. This 
leaves middle-class women with few opportunities to avoid the risk of ‘failure’.  
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Using and resisting discourses of precarity 
Throughout the preceding analysis, I explored how the women in this study experienced 
and narrated the first two of the three dimensions of precarity that frame this chapter: 
material conditions and subjective experiences. I now turn to the third dimension of 
precarity that was introduced at the beginning of the chapter, that of precarity as a 
discourse. As I argued above, in mobilising the term ‘discourse’ here I am drawing 
upon Foucault’s understanding of discourse as systems of thought, signs and meanings 
which construct objects of knowledge (in this case, precarity) (Foucault, 1989) , but also 
upon Skeggs’ theorisation of culture and discourse as resources (Skeggs, 2005). 
Classed discourse about abortion is not new. The reformist arguments during the 
parliamentary debates in the 1960s when the Abortion Act was being proposed in the 
UK are an example of the use of the discourse of precarity and poverty to garner 
sympathy and legitimisation for abortion, and for women who have them. Those in 
favour of legalising abortion used emotive vignettes of women who the reformed law 
would benefit, one of which was the figure of the over-burdened working-class mother, 
who had too many children to feed already and no space for them (Sheldon, 1997). As 
noted in Chapter Two (‘Medicalisation and regulation,’ p. 51), research suggests that 
medical professionals still find this reason particularly understandable and acceptable 
for granting an abortion to women they read as working-class, and their reasoning 
contains heavily classed assumptions about who is and is not in a position to support a 
child (Beynon-Jones, 2013). In this section, I move on from considering precarity as a 
material condition and a subjective experience, and consider precarity as a discourse 
which some women engaged with in order to present ‘understandable’ or ‘legitimate’ 
abortion stories, and others who resisted it. I analyse, through the work of Beverley 
Skeggs, how the discourse of precarity in this context ‘fixes in place’ (Skeggs, 2004) 
some subjects, whilst being used by others as a resource that they might take on or 
discard at different moments. 
In order to explore in more depth how these accounts of precarity act as discourses 
which were used and resisted by different women in this study, two women’s stories 
will be used as mini case-studies. The first is Anna, a young, middle-class university 
graduate, and the second is Violet, 35, a PhD student from a working-class background. 
In contrasting these two cases, I argue that they demonstrate why women like Anna 
might invest in discourses of precarity to describe their abortion experience, whereas 
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women like Violet risk being ‘fixed in place’ by those same discourses and therefore 
might resist them (Skeggs 2004). In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that Anna’s 
engagement with precarity is somehow inauthentic or calculated. On the contrary, I 
wish to argue that all women have limited ‘cultural scripts’ by which to articulate their 
abortion stories, and, as Violet’s story demonstrates, to reject or resist them is not 
always possible due to the gatekeeping roles medical professionals play in granting 
abortion requests.  
Anna 
Anna was 20 when she unexpectedly became pregnant. Studying at university, young, 
with her life and career ahead of her, becoming pregnant could have been a derailment 
of the trajectory she imagined for herself (and that others expected of her). Instead, she 
chose to have an abortion. However, throughout our interviews she used a rhetorical 
device that emphasised the impossibility of her circumstances: ‘I couldn’t have a baby.’ 
She described the choice to have an abortion as more of an immediate gut reaction, and 
the only conceivable response to this potential obstacle that threatened to derail her 
future. She described her expected trajectory quite clearly: finishing her degree, starting 
a career, and then (and only then) contemplating having a child.  
Anna’s life narrative was peppered with ‘facts of life.’ For example, of going to 
university, she said, ‘that’s what you do. You go to school, you go to university...Yeah, 
it was just, like, normal.’ She described her childhood as replete with access to her 
grandparents’ large bookshelves, encouragement to read, and trips to museums at the 
weekends. Her middle-classness became obvious to her when she and her sister moved 
schools from the local comprehensive to a grammar school. She described the 
comprehensive as ‘horrible’: 
[W]hen we first moved to City we lived in Area which was quite, it’s quite a 
like, white working-class part of City. We went to this school, and it was a 
horrible school, like, mum used to drop us off and there’d be people, like, 
screaming at their kids, calling their kids, like, a bitch, and just, my mum hated 
the fact that we were there. 
Their mother’s discomfort was exemplified in an episode Anna remembered well: ‘my 
sister came home and said [in a thick regional accent] Mum, can I go to so-and-so’s 
party, and my mum was like, oh my god I have to get them out of here (Laughs)!’ Her 
mum’s discomfort was validated when a teacher sent a letter home to their mother, 
pleading: ‘you’ve got to get your daughters out of here, like, they don’t belong here.’ 
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‘Culturally’, Anna explained, she did not fit in at the comprehensive. She laughed at her 
mother’s attitude, and did not seem to share her fear of contamination from exposure to 
screaming, swearing, thickly accented children. However, she seemed to accept the 
decision that her and her sister needed to ‘get out’, and her mother’s decision to send 
them instead to an all-girls grammar school. Here, Anna felt different too, but this time 
because she and her sister were comparatively poor next to their wealthy classmates. 
Despite the material inequality they experienced, Anna is clear that culturally, they 
belonged. ‘My friends always said like, at school, we used to, like, we used to talk about 
this fairly frequently,’ she explained. ‘They’d be like, yeah you’re definitely middle-
class cause you eat hummous (laughs) so it’s like, we all agreed, out of my friendship 
group I was definitely the poorest, but we were all, like middle-class.’ 
Using Bourdieu’s metaphor, her middle-classness meant that the field of private school 
(and later, university) was as comfortable to her as water to a fish (Bourdieu, 1984). Her 
family’s relative lack of wealth featured in a handful of stories she chose to recount – 
for example, when on a holiday one of her sister’s friends had made her a basket of food 
for the family: ‘they thought we were so poor that they had to make us a food basket!’ -  
but these were presented as humorous anecdotes about her classmates’ absurd excesses 
rather than evidence that she did not belong at the grammar school. Throughout her 
narrative, Anna positioned herself as a middle-class woman with high cultural capital, 
comfortable in the social fields of the grammar school and the university, despite her 
and her family’s material precarity. 
When I asked Anna why she decided immediately on finding out that she was pregnant 
that she was going to have an abortion, her first answer was ‘I don’t know, really.’  She 
initially referred to her position as a young student – ‘Just too young, really. Um, I was 
still at Uni, it was February so I was still in Uni writing my dissertation’ – but then 
began to talk about her middle-class upbringing and the expectations she suggested it 
provided. ‘My mum had me when she was thirty-five, my grandma had my mum when 
she was in her thirties, like, it’s not usual in my family, like, people don’t have kids 
young.’ Similarly, in discussing her hope that her sister would also have children, she 
said ‘although I’d love her to have a baby, as her sister, I think she should go and do her 
Masters first, do it the proper way or whatever.’ Anna’s positioning of delayed 
childbearing as the ‘proper way’ to do things implied that this was a universally 
understood norm, and is an example of what Savage calls the practice of the ‘particular-
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universal’ class: ‘the middle class … around which an increasing range of practices are 
regarded as universally ‘normal’, ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ (Savage, 2003, p.536). 
After explaining these expectations and their impact on her decision after finding out 
she was pregnant, I asked Anna, ‘Did you have an idea in your mind of where you want 
to be, or where you wanted to be, in the next few years, like, was that in your head, like, 
I want to finish my degree, or?’ After this prompt, Anna answered: 
I guess so, yeah. I knew that, like, I don’t have any money. I was on my student 
loan, I didn’t have a job. Boyfriend was working as a chef. I dunno, I felt like I 
never really got to those thoughts, because I, like, the decision had been made 
so, like, quickly. I never really had chance to think about why. I don’t know 
though. 
Anna’s unplanned pregnancy was not the ‘proper way’ of doing things, and her 
discovery that she was pregnant was a shock. Walkerdine et al. (2001) suggest that in 
making a decision to go against the norm of their class position – for example, 
continuing with an unplanned pregnancy as a middle-class teenager – young women 
risk undergoing a ‘psychic struggle’ as they ‘have to hold together the contradictions 
their gender and class positions imply’ (p. 187) In this sense, for Anna, the teenage 
middle-class mother was an impossible figure. That is not to say that she does not exist, 
but that she cannot be imagined in the schema of middle-classness. Therefore, the 
intense, physical response Anna described feeling in discovering she was pregnant was 
a response to this threat of becoming an impossible figure, and the ‘heavy psychic costs’ 
this would entail (Reay, 2015). 
In our interview, Anna did not seem to feel that her material, working or housing 
conditions were the most important elements in her decision; the realisation that she had 
not done things the ‘proper way’ was more of an immediate and urgent reason to end 
her pregnancy. Despite this, during her consultation at the abortion clinic, Anna was 
able to draw upon the discourse of precarity and a set of legitimate, middle-class tropes 
to describe her experiences and her desire to complete her education and become stable 
and secure in order to be a better mother later in life (Beynon-Jones, 2013; Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody, 2001). She described the process of obtaining medical approval for 
her abortion as ‘easy,’ reflecting: ‘the process just seemed really easy for someone like 
me, really easy to navigate.’ I interpreted her meaning of the phrase ‘someone like me’ 
through comments she had made earlier in our interview about her gratitude that being a 
feminist meant she knew about the abortion process and how to begin it. However, I 
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would argue that there is another reason why someone like Anna might find the process 
of medical approval easy: her social position allowed her to draw upon the discourse of 
precarity as a ‘justifiable’ way to describe her experience to abortion gatekeepers, who 
find stories like hers easy to approve (Beynon-Jones, 2013). This ease is heavily 
predicated on one’s classed location and experiences. 
Violet 
I now turn to a different experience which facilitates an analysis of how discourses of 
precarity might be resisted rather than embraced by some, as well as their relation to the 
regulation of abortion through medical gatekeepers. Violet was a 35-year-old PhD 
student when I met her, and she was settled in a flat she had been renting in the 
Northern city in which she was born for fifteen years. She was working part-time 
alongside her PhD, living on that salary and her grant. 
Her story was interspersed with the language of survival. She expressed gratitude that 
she was pursuing her passions through academia rather than working a job she hated for 
more money, ‘but I could do with a few grand in the bank, cause if my washing 
machine went tomorrow, I’d be stuck.’ Having left home at the age of 16 with no A-
Levels, she was used to precarity and the anxiety that goes along with it: 
[By the age of 24] I’d had umpteen jobs, and I knew what it was like to be 
starving and not, I knew what it was like to be cut off because you couldn’t pay 
your water bill, and I knew what it was like to hide from the landlord cause you 
hadn’t paid your rent that month, and all that kind of stuff. I knew how to 
change a plug, I knew how to do all these daft things, I knew how to reset a 
boiler if the pilot light had gone off. I know it sounds a bit daft and it’s all like, 
well these are just little things, but in the grand scheme of things I knew how to 
look after myself, and I kind of knew how to survive.  
From this point, Violet worked various jobs and completed some A Levels part-time. 
One of her tutors suggested she apply for university, which she did two days before the 
UCAS deadline. She got in, and went on to study English Literature as a mature student, 
something she had not imagined for herself before her tutor encouraged her to apply. 
When I met her, she was studying for a PhD.  
As a PhD student with a limited amount of material security, Violet had theoretically as 
much a claim to precarity as Anna did. However, at the same time as acknowledging her 
material precarity, Violet attached value and significance to her experiences of poverty 
and insecurity. They taught her how to survive and be self-sufficient, something she 
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noted most people she later went to university with lacked. Researchers have previously 
argued that there are forms of gendered and classed skill or capitals which are 
undervalued within the dominant ‘symbolic economy’, such as emotional capital (Reay, 
2004) and emotional labour (James, 1989), which working-class women in particular 
develop in order to navigate classed and gendered relations. Violet did not only see her 
childhood in terms of a deficit of cultural capital (e.g. leaving school with no A Levels 
as a lack of institutional cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984)), but attached value to the 
skills she was forced to learn in order to make the most of things.  
Despite this, Violet was used to being treated by others as if suffering from a deficiency 
as a result of her class and gender. After leaving school at 16, she had a series of jobs in 
retail, which she found ‘boring’ but ‘what [she] had to do to keep a roof over [her] 
head.’ During these years, she described herself as ‘really angry’:  
I was really angry at life, and angry at my parents mainly, and angry at myself, 
angry that I could’ve, should’ve had a better life. I was quite bright, and had I 
had the right opportunities, then, you know, angry at the world that I wasn’t born 
with the right connections and stuff. 
Violet located the problem in the structural conditions that had put her at a disadvantage 
compared to others, explaining that as she absorbed information about sociology and 
politics, she began to see the world through this critical lens. She reflected on her 
experience working as a manager at a sports shop, where she was ‘their very first female 
golf and bike department manager,’ recalling that ‘customers would come on to the 
shop floor, and look at you, as a young woman, I was, what, 18, 19 at the time, and 
they’d be like, what do you know?’ She described how she quickly developed the skill 
of ‘talking a good game’ in order to negotiate these dismissals:  
So many things in life are about acting. Not lying, but acting. The way you 
present yourself. If you come across as confident even when you’re not, you can 
sometimes pull it off, and I think I learned that from when I left home, that’s 
how I got on in life to start with. 
This experience proved useful when Violet sought an abortion when she became 
pregnant, and later a sterilisation, which she had previously been denied. She described 
two things appearing to block her way to both the sterilisation and the abortion: her age, 
and her reasoning for requesting the procedures. In her late twenties, Violet had made 
enquiries about getting a sterilisation, certain in her almost life-long knowledge that she 
never wanted to have children, and was told, ‘they’ll not even look at you. They’ll not 
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look at you until you’re 35.’ However, after becoming pregnant and having an abortion 
aged 30, she requested again, this time more forcefully, that she wanted to be sterilised. 
She recounted the questioning of the doctor who consulted with her: 
And the guy who, yeah, the male doctor who saw me for that initial thing was, I 
got really annoyed at him, cause he said well, why do you want sterilising? 
Cause he’d asked how many kids have you got? None. Are you married? No. 
Are you in a relationship? No. Well, what if you end up in a relationship and he 
wants kids? And was like, if he wants kids I wouldn’t be in a relationship with 
him in the first place. What kind of a question’s that? 
And he said, well why do you not want kids? And I said, because I don’t want 
children, I said, this isn’t about anyone else, this isn’t about (laughs) I remember 
saying, this isn’t about being in a relationship and a boyfriend not wanting 
children, or having children already and not wanting any more, this is about me 
and what I want.  
She notes that ‘having to justify being sterilised was the same as having to justify the 
termination. And I do get fed up of fighting for things I’m entitled to.’ As well as her 
age, which prompted the rather directive questioning from her doctor, the second thing 
Violet felt was an obstacle in obtaining both her abortion and sterilisation was her 
unwillingness to perform precarity to medical professionals. She had never wanted 
children, and did not think she ever would, and that was, as far as Violet was concerned, 
the only reason she should have to give. However, she felt she was made to ‘justify’ 
herself, and noticed cues from the doctor in order to ‘play the game’: 
[Y]ou have to have these reasons for an abortion. Just saying I don’t want kids 
doesn’t cut it. You have to be, I can’t financially look after a child, at the time I 
was finishing my Masters so I said I need to concentrate on my studies. 
Violet’s words can be read in tandem with Anna’s: 
I was still at Uni, it was February so I was still in Uni writing my dissertation… 
I don’t have any money. I was on my student loan, I didn’t have a job. 
Despite having a similar ‘script’ available to her, Violet was resistant to using it. She 
indicated that she considered this confessional aspect of the appointment intrusive and 
irrelevant to her understanding of her situation, and felt forced to adapt her language to 
the rubric the medical practitioner was working with.  
The idea of performance in the abortion clinic is not new, as explored in Chapter Two 
(‘Medicalisation and regulation,’ p. 51). There have been notable critiques of the ways 
in which the medical establishment, through the lens of the Abortion Act, requires those 
seeking abortions to  shape their reasoning through a variety of recognisable figures or 
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scripts (Lattimer, 1998; Sheldon, 1997). The only ground on which Violet could be 
deemed to have a ‘legitimate’ abortion was that her circumstances prevented her from 
being an effective mother. Violet vehemently disagreed with this: her abortion was 
legitimate because she simply did not want children. As friendly as the doctors and 
nurses she interacted with were, they forced a framing of her decision through a deficit 
of the necessary characteristics of a good mother, rather than a positive assertion of her 
reproductive rights and desire for a child-free life. 
The experiences of Anna and Violet can be theorised through the lens of Skeggs’ work. 
In Class, Self, Culture, Skeggs explores the processes by which the classed self is 
brought into being, in particular: 
how some people can use the classifications and characteristics of race, class or 
femininity as a resource whilst others cannot because they are positioned as 
them (2004, p. 3). 
Through Bourdieu’s work, she argues that the misrecognition of inscribed values on 
certain bodies as natural and inherent means that some bodies are fixed in place by these 
inscriptions, whereas others are more free to remain mobile (Skeggs, 2004). Skeggs 
explains how this happens using the example of race using an example I quoted in 
Chapter Two (‘Embodiment, inscription and biopolitics’, p. 33) which I wish to do here 
with another example. In the early 2010s, Black feminists critiqued the popular 
‘Slutwalk’ movement which emerged in Canada and spread to countries across America 
and Europe as being blind to the relative freedom white women have to identify with 
the term ‘slut’ in contrast to their sisters of colour. In a 2011 open letter in the Black 
Women’s Blueprint, African American activists and scholars wrote: 
As Black women, we do not have the privilege or the space to call ourselves 
“slut” without validating the already historically entrenched ideology and 
recurring messages about what and who the Black woman is. We don’t have the 
privilege to play on destructive representations burned in our collective minds, 
on our bodies and souls for generations (Black Women’s Blueprint, 2016). 
As women historically categorised as hypersexual objects, Black women risk more 
violence, both literal and figurative, in placing themselves in proximity with a term that 
has historically been used to strip them of humanity. This is precisely how Skeggs 
argues classed and gendered selves are also produced: the powerful have access to 
‘symbolic domination’ which ‘imposes fixity onto those from whom they draw and 
claim moral distance’ (p. 4). White women have historically been positioned in 
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opposition to Black womanhood, as pure, chaste and restrained, and as such have more 
freedom to pick up and later discard terms like ‘slut’, whereas Black women are 
positioned as inherently promiscuous. 
Returning to Anna and Violet, we can see how their different class positions enable 
different engagements with the discourse of precarity. Anna was able to draw upon the 
discourse of precarity to negotiate the medical gatekeeping associated with accessing an 
abortion, but outside of this interaction, she was not at risk of being fixed in place by 
those discourses. Her middle-classness and cultural capital means she will not be 
associated with the other inscribed markers that come along with precarity, that 
condition which produces a ‘dangerous’ class (Standing, 2011): laziness, fecklessness, 
low intelligence. In contrast, whilst Violet’s experiences in higher education imbue her 
with a form of cultural legitimacy, she is more at risk than Anna of being fixed in place 
by the discourse of precarity she was forced to use to articulate her experience. Her 
view of herself as a 30-something woman making a positive choice to remain child-free 
was not legitimate; she had to ‘confess’ to her inability to care for a child. The idea that 
she was deficient is one that she described as having followed her throughout her life 
story, and she felt less able to take on and discard the markers of precarity that Anna 
was more free to do. In this way, Violet’s experience of material and felt precarity 
throughout her life course informed her cautious use of precarity as a discursive 
resource. 
What this suggests is that processes of classed ‘inscription’ (Skeggs, 2004) affect which 
discourses women of varying social locations can use to articulate their experiences of 
abortion. Furthermore, despite the shift away from individual doctors’ invasive medical 
gatekeeping of abortion (Lee, 2017a; Sheldon, 2017), it is clear that the institution of 
medicine retains the symbolic and epistemic power to grant certain abortion experiences 
legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
The theme of precarity emerged from the data in three ways, or as three dimensions: 
precarity as a material condition, as a subjective experience, and as a discourse. I 
focused in this chapter firstly on the millennial women I spoke to during this study, of 
whom many were positioned as middle-class. For these women, feelings of 
precariousness and anxieties around timing motherhood were important aspects of their 
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abortion experiences, and whilst this is not necessarily a new concern for women (who 
have faced the pressure to ‘have it all’ for several decades), the way in which these 
women linked these feelings to contemporary conditions is particular to this socio-
historical moment. I have argued in this chapter that the ‘zeitgeist’ of precarity amongst 
millennials alongside the roll-back of the welfare state was felt alongside the pressure 
on middle-class women to be the ‘vanguards of neoliberal subjectivity’ (Harris, 2004). 
Their feelings of risk and precariousness are produced by the knowledge that it is 
possible to ‘fail’ when it comes to timing motherhood and producing the ‘ideal 
conditions’ for starting a family. 
I also argued through the work of Skeggs that the discourse of precarity could be used 
as a resource for some women to legitimise their abortions, whereas it threatened to fix 
in place other women with more proximity to working-classness. This can happen 
unconsciously, in the case of Anna who seemed somewhat surprised at how easy her 
process of obtaining medical approval for abortion, or consciously, in the case of Violet 
who had to ‘play the game’ and articulate her abortion request in a way she morally 
objected to. 
In this analysis of how these women talked about uncertainty and risk in their abortion 
stories, the concept of responsibility was closely entwined with the three dimensions of 
precarity explored in this chapter. It is clear from these women’s stories that the 
emphasis on ‘choice’ that dominant abortion discourse creates is not an inherently 
liberating phenomenon for women carrying these burdens, as to make the wrong choice 
carries the penalty as being classified as irresponsible, immature, or selfish. In 
shouldering the insecurity and precarity associated with living in ‘neoliberal times’, 
class and gender interacted in complex ways in these largely middle-class women’s 
abortion narratives in ways which produced anxiety, anger and resistance. 
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Chapter Five: Responsibility 
As argued in the previous chapter, a key feature of ‘neoliberal times’ is the 
intensification of the individualisation of responsibility (Francombe-Webb and Silk, 
2016; Phipps, 2014; Walkerdine, 2011). This is a clearly gendered phenomenon, 
producing particular pressures on women to, for example, have successful careers and 
raise families without relying on the state for support; indeed, women who have 
children whilst on state benefits or in receipt of social housing are demonised by the 
media and political rhetoric (Jensen, 2013; McKenzie, 2013; Tyler, 2008). Allan and 
Charles (2014) have proposed that ‘the image of the successful/failed neoliberal subject 
often gathers around the figure of the feminine,’ using the example of young girls in 
elite educational settings who are trained to be self-responsible, mobile, and resourceful 
in order to ‘succeed’ (p. 342). 
Throughout this analysis, I mobilise Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, which denotes 
the supervision of the ‘mechanics of life’ – birth, death, and reproduction – of the 
population which is facilitated by ‘a series of interventions and regulatory controls’ 
(Foucault, 1978, p.139). One of these mechanisms is ‘modes of subjectification’ that 
encourage individuals to self-regulate and internalise the value of individual 
responsibility. I use Foucault’s concept of biopolitics throughout this chapter to explore 
how these women were both subjected to and resisted these gendered forms of 
responsibilisation, as well as his concept of governmentality, the insidious, subtle 
mechanisms of discipline which produce the desire to self-regulate one’s body and 
‘conduct’ (Foucault, 1977).  
Through this lens, I analyse these women’s reproductive lives as part of a matrix of 
moments of choice that must be justified and done ‘right.’ The risk of making wrong or 
‘irresponsible’ choices is to become a failed neoliberal subject. This shaped several of 
the narratives examined in this chapter, through internalisation of blame or fault for 
getting pregnant or having an abortion, and through the interpellation of ‘others’ against 
which the responsible self could be constructed. Much of the women’s engagements 
with the concept of responsibility revolved around presenting oneself to others as 
having made a rational, responsible, and compassionate decision to end a pregnancy, 
rather than having made a selfish or irresponsible one (as previous research has noted 
e.g. Jones, Frohwirth and Moore, 2008; McIntyre, Anderson and McDonald, 2001).  
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In order to do so, there were various classed figures constructed in these narratives as a 
foil to the responsible self, like women who have multiple abortions and fail to ‘learn 
their lesson’, and women who fail to use contraception. However, there were few 
examples of explicit class ‘disgust’ in these women’s narratives (Tyler, 2008; Lawler, 
2005), and several instances of explicit resistance to classed judgements about the 
responsibility or otherwise of women who have abortions. Discursive space was also 
opened for accounts of abortion that transcended the binary of responsibility and 
irresponsibility, and these offered examples of how reproduction of stigmatising 
discourse can be ruptured or subverted. I argue that these moments of challenge and 
resistance expose a common resentment and frustration most of these largely middle-
class women felt about the fact that they carry the burden of responsibility for 
reproduction.  
The ‘responsible’ abortion story 
Previous research has noted that there is a societal expectation that those who have 
abortions need to justify their decisions, and this expectation produces pressure to 
present a ‘responsible’ abortion story (Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017; 
Kirkman et al., 2011). This expectation can be read through Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of neoliberal society as infused with the ‘obligation to tell the truth 
about oneself’ (Foucault, 1988), and Skeggs’ classed ‘discourses of the self’ (Skeggs, 
2009, 2005) through which individuals ‘account for themselves.’ The need to ‘account 
for’ was certainly a concern for many of the women in this study, some of whom had 
internalised blame for becoming pregnant and having an abortion. These women 
positioned pregnancy as a risk that could have been avoided through being more 
responsible. Women who had become pregnant through unprotected sex used words 
like ‘foolish’ and ‘stupid’ to describe themselves, and even some of those who had done 
everything ‘right’ and used contraception expressed frustration at themselves. For 
example, Heidi described her reaction to discovering she was pregnant after having 
protected sex: ‘I had this kind of reaction where I was like, no, that cannot be, I cannot 
have allowed that to have happened’ (my emphasis). In her narration, she positions 
herself as the protagonist, and notes the moments that she could have chosen differently. 
‘I was stupid to be in that position to begin with,’ she says of having sex with the man 
who made her pregnant; ‘if I had just been more choosey, I shouldn’t have given him 
the time of day, basically.’  
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If even women who did everything ‘right’ found it difficult not to blame themselves for 
becoming pregnant, the internalised stigma was even stronger for women who had had 
unprotected sex. Anna said, ‘I do feel like it was a silly thing to get myself into, you 
don’t have unprotected sex,’ and as a consequence she explains she thinks it would be 
‘stupid’ to be ‘that person’ who has a second abortion: ‘I dunno, it’s kind of like, the 
principle. I’d feel like an idiot if I had let myself get accidentally pregnant with 
someone [again]. And I think if it did happen again, I would just keep the baby.’ 
Lisa reflected on the effects of this internalisation of responsibility, explaining that ‘the 
internal pressure to make an excuse for why you were pregnant in the first place is 
really intense.’ She said that she was in the habit of explaining that she had an IUD 
when she became pregnant in order to emphasise that ‘there was contraception 
involved, I was responsible.’ She problematised this extensively in her interview, 
explaining that she made a conscious decision to stop ‘making excuses’ for her 
abortion; ‘[I decided to start saying that] I had an abortion, and not to explain.’ She 
reflected on the limited subject positions available to women who have abortions: ‘you 
only have an abortion because you took all the precautions and something has gone 
wrong, or you’re an idiot.’  Her decision to stop explaining why she had an abortion 
was partly a response to what she saw as a patriarchal positioning of women as 
capricious and irresponsible, but also to what she saw as the lack of representation of 
women who have abortions and feel ‘fine,’ as she put it. As a result, she expressed a 
commitment to creating new discursive spaces for women to talk about abortion and 
occupy alternative subject positions to ‘responsible woman for whom contraception 
failed’ and ‘idiot.’  
One of the ways, therefore, in which the women managed the possibility of judgment, 
was to actively resist these dominant understandings of abortion and the subjectification 
of responsibility (Rabinow and Rose, 2006). For other women, however, it was more 
practical and less exhausting to present their abortions in a ‘socially acceptable’ way, as 
Jackie put it. Jackie found out she was pregnant during a routine health screening as part 
of a medical trial she was participating in, which was testing a new treatment for 
multiple sclerosis. Her decision to have an abortion following this discovery was 
dominated, she said, by her and her partner’s lack of desire to have children together. 
However, she described having a list of ‘socially acceptable’ reasons ready to shut down 
any potential judgement: ‘I just say, well, Ryan’s [her partner] already had children, and 
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I have this health condition. Shut down. You can’t argue with either of those things.’ 
Whilst these were relevant factors in her decision, she nevertheless said this ‘feels like a 
lie’; she felt it was less socially acceptable to give the reason that ‘I’ve never felt 
remotely like I should have a baby.’  
This was an example of the awareness many of the women displayed of a hierarchy of 
acceptable reasons for an abortion. In Jackie’s case, her health condition meant that she 
felt ‘[having a child] would have been maybe an irresponsible thing to do when you 
have a chronic health condition, with all the needs that a child has, babies and toddlers, 
that’s a huge issue.’ Whilst she did not identify this as an important part of her decision, 
she described how she was able to use to her advantage people’s assumptions about her 
ability to look after a child. She was able to use this as ‘an easy concept for someone to 
get. Like, oh, well, she can’t have children with a disability. That’s what people think.’ 
In this way, she protected herself from sexist judgments about her lack of desire to have 
children, which she said had been directed towards her for years since she had been 
married, and presented her abortion as a responsible choice.  
These examples demonstrate how complex the role of ‘responsibility’ was in these 
abortion narratives. First, there were a number of women who internalised blame and 
stigma, and in response saw their abortions as prompts to become more responsible. 
Their subjectification of responsibility was turned into a ‘technology of the self’ 
through which they transformed and regulated themselves (Foucault, 1988). Second, 
there were women who actively resisted and challenged this process of 
‘responsibilisation’ (Foucault, 1978; Rabinow and Rose, 2006). Third, there were 
women who were critical of the pressure to appear ‘responsible,’ but who chose to 
develop an appearance of responsibility to others whilst privately disagreeing with the 
need to ‘justify’ their abortions (Jackie is a good example of this). It is also important to 
note that these three ‘relationships’ with the concept of responsibility were not mutually 
exclusive; more than one of these might present at different points in one person’s 
narrative. Using this framework, it is possible to examine how these largely middle-
class women both (re)produced and challenged classed discourses of reproduction and 
responsibility.  
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Classed distinctions 
In positioning their abortions as responsible choices, some women produced narratives 
of differentiation and distinction between the responsible self and the irresponsible 
Other. Whilst rarely engaging with the concept of class, previous work on abortion has 
highlighted this process of ‘stigma transference’ that can occur in abortion stories 
(Cockrill and Nack, 2013). Cockrill and Nack define ‘stigma transference’ as a process 
of ‘shifting the stigma burden onto specific or abstract others,’ a process by which a 
person accepts the legitimacy of stigma or stereotypes – for example, that women who 
do not use contraception are irresponsible – while simultaneously challenging its 
application to their particular experiences (p. 982). 
Sociologists of class have suggested that one of the mechanisms by which this type of 
stigma transference happens is disgust, a mechanism that Steph Lawler calls part of a 
‘long-standing middle-class project of distinguishing itself’ (2005, p.429). The 
‘resource’ of class disgust (Skeggs, 2005) can be used to distance oneself from 
undesirable Others and reproduce class norms that define what is acceptable and 
respectable. For example, the stereotype of the ‘chav mum’ – the young, promiscuous, 
working-class, single mother – is a figure in British cultural discourse that one can point 
to in order to define oneself against (Tyler, 2008). Whilst there were several examples 
of women who did construct irresponsible Others in their abortion narratives in classed 
ways, this type of differentiation was not often explicit or clear-cut, and rarely 
communicated disgust. It was often entangled with self-judgment as well as a stated 
opposition to judging women for their reproductive choices. It is therefore useful to 
analyse these entanglements through the lens of governmentality, the mechanism that 
Foucault argued connected wider processes of power to individual self-regulation 
(Foucault, 1988). There were also several examples of women who challenged or 
resisted this type of ‘stigma transference,’ refusing to judge other women for their 
reproductive decisions. In this section, I begin by analysing the few examples of 
explicitly classed narratives of responsibility and distinction, before contrasting them 
with examples of resistance to classed judgments of (ir)responsibility.  
Lucy explicitly linked responsibility, class and reproduction together in her interviews 
with me, and she gave the most explicit classed judgments of all of the women I spoke 
to. Her outlook was heavily shaped by her upbringing in a working-class, upwardly 
mobile family. Her dad grew up with ‘nothing’, and through hard work and ambition 
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became successful, and she described being ‘trained’ by her dad to be competitive and a 
‘winner.’ Her dad was positioned in her narrative as the ideal neoliberal subject: self-
responsible, adapting to the market, he made himself employable and through this work 
on the self, he became successful. Throughout her narrative, Lucy emphasised the moral 
imperative she felt to take responsibility for her actions and not blame them on external 
forces. She made explicitly classed judgments about working-class parents (despite her 
own parents having working-class backgrounds), who she described as too permissive 
of their children and lacking in aspiration. ‘Parents with money are more competitive 
and driven and want their kids to be as successful as they are,’ she explained, whereas 
‘working-class people don’t see what they could achieve, and they don’t see it for their 
kids. It saddens me.’ She placed great emphasis on the inter-generational transmission 
of values like hard work, responsibility and aspiration, noting that as well as her dad’s 
trajectory, she was influenced by her mum who told her to avoid having children young, 
as she had. She explained that ‘especially working-class parents’ have a tendency to 
permit their children having their own children young, because ‘oh yeah she got 
pregnant, but I did so I can’t say anything.’ She emphasised that the appropriate 
response is ‘Yes you can! You can say, look what I did and what an idiot I was.’  
Lucy carefully distinguished herself and her family from this type of working-class 
person, particularly in her discussion of benefits claimants, displaying an investment in 
neoliberal discourses of meritocracy and self-invention. She took the view that people 
‘take advantage’ of the welfare system, symptomatic of a culture of ‘I deserve this, I 
deserve that.’ Once again, she related this to her dad: ‘I think the way my dad has 
worked his way up, it’s like, you earn it, and if you don’t earn it you don’t appreciate it. 
If you don’t appreciate it you don’t respect it, and if you don’t respect it it’s gone.’ 
Interestingly, both Lucy and her mum relied on state benefits at some points in their 
lives. She positioned both herself and her mum as people who deserve support, the type 
of people that the welfare system was designed to help. Her mum started a business that 
went bankrupt during the recession, and she relied on state benefits for 18 months. 
Whilst benefits claimants were positioned as greedy and work-shy elsewhere in her 
narrative, Lucy positioned her mother as someone who did it ‘right’ (my emphasis):  
And she was, she was different, bless her, she got up at seven every morning. She 
said, I’m not becoming lazy. She started volunteering, and from her volunteering 
and being proactive, she actually got a job through them. How hard she worked, she 
got a job.  
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Lucy suggested her mum was in the minority as a person who worked hard whilst she 
was on benefits, and took all of the opportunities available to her to gain employment. 
Similarly, when she was unemployed and looking for work, Lucy initially refused to 
claim Job Seekers’ Allowance ‘because of the stigma.’ Her girlfriend convinced her that 
people like Lucy are ‘what the system’s there for.’ She claimed Job Seekers’ Allowance 
for four weeks and found another job, rather than becoming ‘complacent.’  
Her belief that the welfare system will support those who really need it is an expression 
of the ‘deserving vs undeserving poor’ trope, historically used to differentiate between 
hard-working poor who deserved support, and the feckless poor (Skeggs, 2004, 1997; 
Todd, 2014). Its contemporary deployment can be found in the rhetoric of ‘strivers and 
skivers’ which was a heavy feature of the Conservative Party’s 2012 conference 
(Jensen, 2014a), and who later went on to win the 2015 general election on a platform 
of austerity. Lucy echoed this rhetoric: ‘working-class people don’t see what they could 
achieve ... [e]veryone’s just born, you can achieve whatever you want.’ She expresses 
the belief that if you are hard-working, you deserve support and can succeed. In contrast 
to people who let class ‘define what they should achieve,’ Lucy emphasised the value of 
self-responsibility and aspiration. 
However, whilst Lucy reproduced classed stigma through her narratives of 
responsibility and aspiration, she does not do this in order to constitute herself as 
entirely different from these irresponsible figures. When she spoke about her two 
abortions, Lucy expressed the fear that she had failed to be responsible. For example, 
her first pregnancy was a result of cheating on her girlfriend by having a one-night-
stand, and she initially decided to continue the pregnancy before later changing her 
mind. Lucy recalled with embarrassment the moment she had to let people know she 
had decided to have an abortion rather than carry her pregnancy to term: ‘I had to get 
my friend to lie to people, because I couldn’t tell them what I’d done. I think I was so 
mortified with myself…So my friend told everyone I’d had a miscarriage.’ The stigma 
she feared would be directed towards her made her feel unable to tell people she had 
changed her mind, even though she suspected that many of her friends guessed what 
had happened. ‘It just made me look really bad, and I’ve always been, like, good 
(laughs) and it’s just this one thing that made me look really awful and I just couldn’t 
handle it,’ she said. Similarly, her second pregnancy, a result of rape (as discussed in 
Chapter Three, ‘The abortion interview as therapeutic,’ p. 92), made her feel 
132 
 
embarrassed and ashamed because she felt that she should not have been drunk enough 
for it to happen: ‘I shouldn’t be in those situations. I shouldn’t have allowed it to 
happen.’ 
Whilst her two abortions were moments in her life story she felt uncomfortable or even 
ashamed about, because they stood as examples of failures to be responsible, she 
presented these as exceptions to her good, ‘true’ self. She was at pains to point out that 
her one-night-stand was out of character: ‘I don’t know, I don’t even like sex, I don’t 
know why I did it (laughs). I don’t, I find it weird. Yeah, I’m a bit of a prude.’ 
Similarly, whilst she blamed herself for her second pregnancy, she still struggled to 
fathom her actions: ‘it makes me feel like I wasn’t there, does that make sense? Like, 
someone was controlling my actions, because I wasn’t.’ She narrated both her abortions 
as moments that prompted her to change her circumstances and improve her life, for 
example, of her first abortion she said, ‘it was a moment of clarity, like, what good 
needs to come out of this? OK, that’s shit, but what have I learnt from it, or what can I 
do from it?’ She also positioned having abortions both times as the responsible option, 
contrasting it with people who ‘have children for the wrong reasons, and people [who] 
have kids because they think they should, or they think they shouldn’t have an 
abortion.’  
Lucy’s story was the most explicit example of distancing and differentiation using 
classed figures and stereotypes. Whilst they reproduced class stigma, they also indicate 
how thoroughly Lucy internalised the imperative to ‘be responsible,’ and to continually 
improve and reinvent herself. Her responses to both of her abortions, to take stock of 
her life and improve it, were governmental ‘technologies of the self’ which Foucault 
argued individuals used to transform ‘bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being’ in order to be better neoliberal citizens (Foucault, 1977). Her experiences should 
be seen in context of growing up in an upwardly mobile, working-class family who 
underwent a period of hardship during the recession. This period of recent British 
history was marked by the crafting of an ‘anti-welfare common sense’ (Jensen, 2014b) 
during which the poor and benefits claimants were rhetorically positioned as lacking 
aspiration and work ethics, rather than being structurally disadvantaged. This attitude 
permeated Lucy’s narrative, prompting her to differentiate herself from these ‘abject’ 
working-class figures through ‘taking responsibility’ for her pregnancies and 
subsequent abortions. Her narrative stands as an example of the way in which 
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contemporary class stigma can be reproduced through abortion narratives characterised 
by the rhetoric of distinction and differentiation.  
‘They don’t even think’ 
Whilst Lucy’s narrative was explicitly classed, there were other, more ambiguous 
engagements with responsibility and class in the narratives of other women, as well as 
outright challenges to classed and gendered stigma. Heidi’s story is an example of the 
latter. In deciding what to do after she found out she was pregnant, she briefly 
considered having the child and giving them up for adoption, but felt this was 
irresponsible: ‘if you have a kid you are responsible for it, that’s what I believe. It’s 
never ideal to give it away, and it’s not the kinder thing to do at all.’ Her view of herself 
as responsible was tested by the experience of discovering she was pregnant and having 
an abortion, as it violated the assumptions that if she did everything ‘right’ – used 
contraception, for example – she would never have to deal with an accidental 
pregnancy. 
After going to a local clinic to confirm she was pregnant, she recalled being offended at 
the doctor’s suggestion that she be given a chlamydia and gonorrhoea test, telling the 
doctor ‘I’m really careful,’ and that she would never risk having unprotected sex. 
Despite the doctor’s insistence that she get tested, since the condom she and her partner 
used must not have worked, Heidi could not disentangle the idea of unintended 
pregnancy or contracting an STI from the possibility of blame. In retelling this 
encounter in the clinic, she described emphasising how responsible she was when it 
comes to sex. She told the doctor, ‘I’ve never had chlamydia in my life, I’ve never had 
an STI, there’s no point in testing me, I’m really careful,’ and ‘I really don’t put myself 
at risk.’ Her anxiety around this possibility of judgment and blame was assuaged by her 
partner’s reassurance that she, unlike many other women, was thoughtful and 
responsible (my emphasis): 
Michael actually said, in some ways, you are a good parent, cause you know that 
you couldn’t be, and most people, they get pregnant, they don’t even think, they 
just have it. They don’t think about who they are or what they can offer, what 
it’s actually like, gonna be good. And you did, you knew it wasn’t right and you 
were worried that you’d damaged it, and you worried about things that most 
people don’t even consider at all. That shows you can be responsible, it just 
wasn’t right. So don’t be too hard on yourself. 
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This is arguably another example of ‘stigma transference’ (Cockrill and Nack, 2013) to 
abstract others, who Heidi and her partner imagined themselves to be different from. 
Whilst differentiating herself from women who ‘don’t even think,’ Heidi may not be 
explicitly making a classed judgment, but the language she used is strikingly familiar to 
coded classed language around reproduction. As discussed in Chapter Two (‘Stratified 
reproduction outside the abortion clinic ,’ p. 56), previous research that has examined the 
discourses employed by medical professionals in family planning clinics and teenage 
pregnancy units reveals the same covert mobilisation of class to distinguish responsible 
from irresponsible women (Arai, 2003; Greene, 2006; Hawkes, 1995). For example, 
Arai notes that young motherhood for women of low socioeconomic status is 
understood in policy discourse as a result of ignorance about contraception rather than a 
conscious desire to become a mother, despite accounts from these young mothers that 
suggest otherwise (2003). The idea that poor or working-class women ‘don’t even 
think’ when it comes to contraception and having children has been identified as a 
feature of family planning professionals’ discourse, for example the idea that women in 
‘deprived’ areas ‘want [contraception] they don’t have to think about’ (Hawkes, 1995: 
266). The same judgment was identified when these professionals talked about women 
having children; women who were not middle-class and wanted children were 
positioned as unthinking and irresponsible, their desire to have children being a whim 
that was compared by one doctor to wanting a dog or cat (Hawkes, 1995: 267).  
Heidi elaborated on her frustration with women who ‘don’t think’ by giving the 
example of a friend who had had multiple abortions. She described her as using 
‘abortion as birth control,’ becoming pregnant three times over three years and having 
an abortion following each pregnancy. Heidi said that she ‘never judged her for having 
the abortions,’ but did assign clear moral values to her friend’s behaviour, lamenting 
that ‘she wasn’t very in control of her sexual health’ and that she ‘didn’t treat herself 
with any self-respect.’ Despite not wishing to judge her friend for her abortions, she 
offered this example as an implicit contrast to her, more respectable, abortion story. 
Heidi’s comments can also be interpreted as covertly mobilising class to differentiate 
herself from other, irresponsible women who ‘don’t even think.’ They also demonstrate 
that for Heidi, the decision to have an abortion was imbued with moral weight that she 
struggled to carry alone. Implicit in Heidi’s discussion of other women who ‘don’t even 
think’ is envy that she does. She described agonising over the decision, balancing her 
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responsibilities to herself, her partner, and the potential child, and finding no support in 
her partner who she ‘fought with’ constantly, and who made her feel like ‘fine, I’ll just 
deal with it myself then, fine, if you don’t want to be involved, yeah, it’s just my 
problem and no-one else’s, fine.’ 
Heidi reflected on this envy she felt with a second example of another one of her friends 
who, at the time Heidi discovered her own pregnancy, had been having unprotected sex 
with her partner for months. ‘They didn’t get pregnant and I did, and I was livid that it 
was me and not them, that they got away with it.’ However, they did not ‘get away with 
it,’ as they discovered soon after Heidi had her own abortion that her friend was indeed 
pregnant: ‘so I don’t think anyone gets away with it, it catches up with you. And when I 
heard I felt so bad for her. Maybe I shouldn’t have been so judgmental and jealous that 
they got away with it when I didn’t, cause it’s all different isn’t it.’ Heidi’s 
identification of this resentment as jealousy points to a function that the ‘irresponsible 
woman’ figure plays in these abortion narratives. They act not only as a way to 
differentiate the speaker from stigmatised behaviour and therefore moral standing, but 
also as a scapegoat for the frustration and sense of injustice these women feel that they 
did everything ‘right’ yet still ended up pregnant and needing an abortion.  
There were other examples in other interviews of resistance to this type of distancing 
and differentiation between responsible and irresponsible women. Jackie reflected on 
the fact that before it happened to her, she did not believe that women could easily get 
pregnant ‘accidentally’: ‘I always thought this, that people who get pregnant by accident 
and keep their babies, I used to think, there’s definitely some complicity there. I used to 
say to myself, I don’t wanna get pregnant, so I don’t get pregnant. Now I can’t say that 
anymore.’ Anja also felt this way before her own abortion: ‘I thought I’d just be careful 
and have a baby when I wanted, then that’s it.’ Having become pregnant accidentally 
prompted them both to reflect on this judgment, concluding that accidental pregnancy 
was not necessarily a result of insufficient responsibility. 
Karen gave a nuanced reflection about when these moments of responsibility take place 
and can be negotiated during sex, prompted by my question of whether there were any 
reasons for abortion she would find hard to accept. She thought carefully about my 
question, and asked what kind of scenarios I had in mind. I gave the example of Heidi’s 
frustration with her friend, who she viewed as someone using abortion as contraception, 
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and Karen was quick to indicate her disagreement with this sentiment. ‘I would disagree 
with that,’ she said, ‘I don’t think there are many women out there doing that.’ She 
reflected on the discourse surrounding teenage pregnancies, and the tendency to 
‘demonise working class women for not being responsible,’ especially around the issue 
of contraception. ‘[T]hat moment when you’re having sex with somebody, it’s not this 
clear moment really or a rational process when you decide whether or not to use 
contraception, it’s so complicated and there are all sorts of other things going on about 
yourself and your relationship with that other person,’ she said, drawing on her own 
experience with her previous partner. ‘So that’s what you’re saying about women who 
just use it as a form of contraception, I just don’t think those women exist to be honest.’ 
Karen’s statement was a strong condemnation of the tendency to construct figures of 
irresponsibility when it comes to reproduction, who are often coded as working-class. 
Her assertion that ‘those women’ – the irresponsible ‘other’ against which one might 
constitute oneself – do not exist is an example of the moments of struggle and resistance 
which Tyler has argued are central to class (Tyler, 2015a). Drawing on Jacques 
Rancière’s work, Tyler argues that ‘the sociology of class should be grounded not in the 
assumption and valorisation of class identities but in an understanding of class as 
struggles against classification’ (Tyler, 2015a, p.493, emphasis in original). Karen 
describes her own class position as ‘precarious,’ having come from a working-class 
background before going to university and becoming an academic. Her resistance to the 
assignment of negative moral value to working-class bodies is a moment of talking back 
to the discourses she has a complicated relationship to, such as ‘the working class have 
a lack of aspiration, or bad taste, or don’t have the right orientation to things, don’t think 
in the right ways, are irresponsible.’ 
Thus, in the narration of the ‘responsible’ abortion story, there were examples of 
explicit class antagonism whereby discourses of the immorality and reproductive 
irresponsibility of ‘other’ – working-class – women were mobilised in opposition to the 
responsible self. However, there were also examples of more ambiguous engagements 
with responsibility and class, including outright resistance to dominant discourses that 
some women recognised as damaging. Accounts like Karen’s complicated the issue of 
responsibility and responsibilisation, and in particular drew attention to their gendered 
aspects. Gender is notably absent from Foucault’s theorisation of responsibilisation and 
self-governance (as Pylypa, 1998; Rabinow and Rose, 2006 have noted), but in their 
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accounts of sex, pregnancy and abortion, the women in this study repeatedly drew 
attention to the gender politics of reproduction and responsibility. 
The gendered burden of responsibility 
Cockrill and Nack in their work on abortion stigma have argued that there tends to be a 
narrow focus in policy and research around individual women’s ‘justifications’ for 
abortion, which they argue ‘fail to disrupt the narrow constructs that fuel individual 
experiences of stigma’ (2013, p.988). ‘A longer-term strategy,’ they write, ‘will seek to 
problematize the expectations placed on women and deconstruct stigmatizing labels 
such as ‘‘good mother’’ and ‘‘irresponsible’’’ (p. 987). However, it is clear from the 
interviews gathered as part of this study that this is not only the task of researchers and 
policy-makers; women who have abortions are already doing this in their discussions 
about their experiences. In this section, I explore the reflexive accounts several women 
gave of the highly gendered expectations of responsibility for reproduction they felt 
subjected to, arguing that these are not only expressions of a historical expectation 
women have been subjected to for decades, but also demonstrate new forms of 
responsibilisation.  
Felicity talked extensively in her interview about her frustration with her partner after 
she gave birth to their daughter. Ana was Felicity’s third child, who she had delivered 
via caesarean section after a difficult labour; in her late thirties, and recovering from 
major surgery, Felicity found it exhausting to look after Ana, even with her help of her 
partner. Not long after giving birth to Ana, Felicity became pregnant again accidentally 
when her partner ejaculated inside her. She had an abortion, feeling too exhausted to go 
through another pregnancy so soon after giving birth to Ana. Her experience during this 
abortion was a difficult one: after deciding to have a medical abortion, Felicity had to 
return to the clinic after the pregnancy did not pass completely. She had a surgical 
procedure to complete the abortion, but did not opt for general anaesthetic after a 
traumatic experience with her first birth; she described her fear of allowing doctors to 
have complete control over her. As a result, she had the surgical procedure awake, 
which was very painful, and she struggled to forgive her partner. ‘I was essentially 
really pissed off because he came inside me,’ she said. ‘Maybe I didn’t want to take the 
responsibility myself for not having gone to get the morning after pill,’ she reflected, 
before concluding, ‘I definitely felt like, we always have a conversation that he 
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generally won’t be coming inside me. So I really hated him, that it was his fault. He got 
off his head and just let go of responsibility that we’d discussed.’ 
This burden of responsibility Felicity felt was unjust – ‘It’s kind of easier for guys. 
They don’t have to carry them, breastfeed them, you know’ – and extended beyond the 
physical burden of pregnancy and childbirth and into the social realm. ‘Maybe it’s a 
generalisation, but mum seems to know everything that’s happening in the schedule, all 
the extra classes, and takes them there, and dentist appointments and passports and all 
that,’ she explained. In other words, mothers are the ones expected to do the majority of 
domestic and emotional labour when it comes to raising children, and this was not 
something she felt she could put herself through so soon after having her daughter. 
Felicity drew attention to the pressure to internalise responsibility for not having gone to 
get the morning after pill herself, before challenging this with an analysis of 
motherhood as labour, both physical and emotional. 
Lisa was even more explicit than Felicity in locating the gendered burden of 
responsibility in the structural rather than the individual, offering a historical argument 
that ‘[since] the pill became available and women could control their fertility to an 
extent, it’s now become completely a woman’s responsibility.’ She noted that if 
anything goes ‘wrong’, for example, an accidental pregnancy, then it is ‘completely 
your fault, because…now you’ve just shown you really can’t be trusted to control your 
own fertility, and probably you should give it back to the men now.’ She concluded that 
the cause of these unequal gendered expectations is ‘patriarchy (laughs) ... There is no 
place in this world for women who don’t want to be mothers, really. Realistically, you 
are still aberrant and weird [if you reject motherhood].’ In her everyday life, Lisa 
explained she openly talked about her abortion and her lack of desire to have children in 
order to open up discursive space for this ‘aberrant’ way of being in order to normalise 
the idea that ‘women [are] autonomous beings who have other shit in their lives they 
want to do other than just churn out babies.’ 
Similarly, Karen talked about her awareness after her abortion that she may want 
children later in life, and how she might balance that with her career. ‘I’ve made 
sacrifices that means that potential of having a child is, you know, somehow will 
prevent that a bit,’ she said, but resisted the individualisation of responsibility for this. ‘I 
don’t know how to feel about that guilt or regret in a really individualised way,’ she 
139 
 
said, ‘because it’s very much about what’s happening on a broader level in our society, 
and it’s not just this individual choice,’ citing the contemporary lack of support for 
women under pressure to have children whilst maintain a successful career at the same 
time. 
Felicity, Lisa and Karen all drew explicit attention to the mechanism of 
responsibilisation, that ‘mode of subjectification’ that Foucault argued was one 
dimension of biopolitics (Foucault, 1978; Rabinow and Rose, 2006), and Lisa and 
Karen also linked this mechanism to the contemporary context of austerity and 
withdrawal of state support. These moments of resistance and critique of structural 
forces acted as counterpoints to other women’s accounts of the internalisation of blame 
for accidental pregnancy and abortion, offering ways in which this dominant 
understanding of gendered responsibility for reproduction might be resisted. It is 
important to note, however, that whilst not every women actively displayed resistance 
to responsibilisation in their interviews with me, they were still often engaged in 
strategies to navigate abortion stigma that required energy and support.  
The frustration and fatigue that the individualisation of responsibility for reproduction 
produced in these interviews spoke to wider issues of gendered and classed 
‘responsibilisation’. As argued throughout this thesis, the narratives of the women in 
this study are contextualised by a broader neoliberal project which explicitly and 
implicitly sets the terms of successful citizenship as individualised success in the 
‘market’ – and in neoliberal states, the market encompasses every area of social life 
(Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001). Under this logic, women making reproductive decisions 
are weighing up their choices as cost-benefit analyses (Shahvisi, 2016), and the 
importance of abortion as an individual and private decision is an integral part of how 
abortion is understood in law and medicine in the UK (Sheldon, 1997). As a result, 
women experience a heavy burden of responsibility when it comes to making 
potentially difficult decisions about whether or not to continue pregnancies.  
In their interviews with women in the US, Kimport et al. noted that ‘[w]omen in this 
study  felt the bulk of responsibility for pregnancy and abortion, often recognizing how 
childrearing duties would fall on their shoulders, while many of their partners felt no 
responsibility for the pregnancy’ (2011, p.108). Their analysis suggested that whilst 
feeling that the decision was primarily hers was an important factor in preventing 
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women’s ‘emotional difficulty’ following an abortion, the authors also stated that ‘the 
wish for decisional authority is not a wish for decisional isolation’ (2011, p.108, 
emphasis mine). They finish by arguing that ‘as a society, we need to find better ways 
of allocating these responsibilities.’ This call for a redistribution of reproductive 
responsibility is certainly pertinent to the experiences communicated by the women in 
this study. The effect of pervasive, invasive technologies of governance and discipline 
that subjectify responsibility for reproduction is to produce ‘docile bodies’, rendered 
more easily governable by being held in a state of uncertainty and constant competition 
for ‘deservedness’ (Foucault, 1978; Tyler, 2013). As Walkerdine et al. argue, 
governance of ‘potentially unruly or disaffected subjects’ is enabled in neoliberal 
societies through the promise of ‘self-invention through a discourse of limitless choice’ 
(2001, p.3); in this way, the fatigue and frustration of women carrying the burden of 
reproductive responsibility can be subsumed under discourses of choice, autonomy and 
reproductive control. However, as the analysis in the above section demonstrates, there 
were moments when women challenged and questioned this subjectification of 
responsibility, opening pockets of resistance and subversion. 
Opening new discursive spaces 
One of the ways the reframing of responsibility for reproduction was achieved in these 
narratives was through some women’s accounts of their relationships to the pregnancies 
they had chosen to end. These complex accounts transcended the tension between 
responsibility to the self and responsibility to the other, as the pregnancies were 
understood as occupying a spectrum between these discrete positions. In particular, 
these accounts emphasised compassion to both the self and the pregnancy, and the idea 
of ‘honouring’ the pregnancy that was coming to an end. I argue that these accounts 
offer a radical reframing of reproductive responsibility, as they do not fit comfortably 
within either pro-choice or pro-life discourse. Instead, they present new subject 
positions for women to occupy which do not enforce either an understanding of the 
foetus as a separate entity with rights, or a medicalised understanding of pregnancy as a 
biological event devoid of sentiment.  
It has been argued that a key feature of pro-choice discourse is the discursive separation 
of the woman and the foetus (Ludlow, 2008). Attempts to undo this separation by 
examining the possible relationships between woman and foetus in the context of 
abortion are met, Ludlow has argued, with scepticism and suspicion by the pro-choice 
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movement (2008). The constantly reinscribed position is that of rupture between the 
woman and the foetus, because it is the woman, pro-choice discourse argues, who 
should be at the centre of abortion discourse as a whole. In contrast, pro-life discourse 
centres the foetus, arguing for its right to personhood, and therefore the pregnant 
person’s responsibility to nurture it. 
Both of these discourses locate responsibility in the individual – the mother. Indeed, as I 
have argued above, many women did talk about the responsibility they felt towards the 
future potential child that might result from their pregnancy as a way to ‘legitimise’ 
their abortion decisions, and Lucy’s life story (‘Classed distinctions,’ p. 129) is a 
particularly clear example of the individualisation of responsibility. However, some 
women offered complex accounts of their relationships with their pregnancies which did 
not conceive of the self and the foetus as separate entities, and subsequently opened a 
new discursive space within which the idea of compassion and ‘honouring’ the 
pregnancy replaced discussion of responsibility. 
Several women drew on medicalised discourse to describe their pregnancies, and 
sometimes their political view of abortion. Izzy described herself variously as ‘blunt,’ 
‘numb’ and ‘unemotional’ when it came to her pregnancy and abortion, expressing 
some embarrassment that she was largely curious about seeing the foetus when it came 
to her appointment at the clinic: ‘[The doctor] said, do you want to see the scan? I said 
yeah, and I remember laughing and asking if that was weird, I thought she might think 
I’m a weirdo for wanting to see the baby I’m about to abort. But she said no, some 
people find it helps. Which I think it did. I was like, where is it?’ She tentatively drew 
upon the idea of scientific understandings of the foetus to explain her lack of emotional 
attachment to her pregnancy, saying ‘It doesn’t have any, maybe scientific, it doesn’t 
have feelings. I see it as a thing, not as a living life, which is maybe why I’m so 
detached from it. To me it’s not a living thing that you’re aborting.’ 
Violet demonstrated a firmer deployment of medical discourse to express both her 
experience but also her anger at people who would contradict her by asserting the rights 
of the foetus: 
Like, oh what about the rights of the unborn child? What, this piece of tissue 
that’s still part of my body? […] Again, maybe that’s just about my values, but 
for me a baby’s a baby once it’s born. When it’s not part of my body anymore 
and it’s living and breathing on its own, it’s a baby. But when it’s like a little 
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ball of cells or whatever, it’s a ball of cells, not a baby. Maybe that’s just 
because how I view life, but. It’s my tissue and my body, just like my cellulite is 
and the roll of fat around my stomach is part of me. 
For her, the medical description of the foetus or embryo as a ‘ball of cells’ and therefore 
as much part of her as any other group of cells in her body was the most salient, and 
precludes an identification of the foetus as a ‘baby.’ Her understanding of her pregnancy 
also complicated the idea of the foetus as a separate entity, as she understood it to be 
‘part of me.’  
Elizabeth, in contrast, displayed more ambivalence. She felt that her decision to have an 
abortion was not an entirely free one; the father was a married man who did not want 
her to continue the pregnancy, and her parents also advised against it. She felt 
unsupported and unsure, and subsequently sought counselling after the abortion. One 
thing her counsellor advised was to stop referring to a ‘baby,’ and instead think of it as 
an ‘embryo’: ‘She said, it’s like it’s grown. It’s grown in your imagination into a baby 
or a person, when it was never a person, it wasn’t a person.’ Her counsellor’s advice to 
her to shift her language from ‘baby’ to ‘embryo’ or ‘pregnancy’ was a compassionate 
attempt to help alleviate Elizabeth’s negative feelings about her abortion, even though 
her ‘slips’, when she thinks of or talks about the pregnancy as a baby or child, are not 
incompatible with the scientific categorisation of the embryo (after all, parents in early 
pregnancy who are carrying to term might refer to their embryo as a baby and not be 
contradicted). However, the social meanings surrounding these two modes of 
understanding the foetus make them difficult for her to hold simultaneously without 
revisiting her decision and wondering whether she did the right thing. 
This type of ambiguous relationship to pregnancy was more common in the women’s 
interviews than an entirely medicalised understanding. The concepts of compassion and 
‘honouring’ the pregnancy came through strongly in the narratives of several women, 
who, whilst not seeing the foetus as entirely alive or independent from themselves, also 
did not understand the foetus as simply a ‘ball of cells.’ For example, Heidi felt 
immense guilt that before she realised she was pregnant she had drank alcohol and 
smoked cigarettes. Despite the fact that she decided almost straight away that she was 
going to have an abortion, she was worried that she might have ‘damaged’ the foetus. 
She described talking to it one day: 
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I said, I’m sorry, I’m really sorry. If this were under different circumstances I 
would have you, but not now. It’s not the right time. If I’d known I wouldn’t 
have drunk, I would have treated you a lot better. But I can’t do it, I’m sorry. 
As a result, the routine scan during her consultation at the abortion clinic offered a 
chance to assuage this guilt. Viewing the photos from the scan and confirming that the 
foetus was healthy and ‘normal’ was reassuring, and it also helped Heidi feel certain in 
her decision: ‘I just felt really relieved after I’d seen it, that actually, I knew, yeah, 
there’s no attachment, I don’t feel anything for it, I know I’m doing the right thing now, 
I totally know, it’s totally good.’ 
Rebecca also described an ambivalent relationship to her pregnancies. She had had two 
abortions, both of which she had commemorated with a tattoo. Whilst she did not feel 
any guilt or uncertainty that she had made the right decision in both cases, she also did 
not think of the foetus as lifeless:  
I feel like it’s, I dunno, it’s a life, even though it’s not a life in the sense of, you 
know. Yeah. It shouldn’t just be forgotten about… Particularly the one with my 
boyfriend, because that, you know, if one day we have children, that was one of 
them, in a way. 
 She struggled to find the right language to express her understanding of the pregnancies 
as both babies and not-babies, as lives but not-lives.  
Jackie also struggled to articulate her relationship with her pregnancy: 
It’s very difficult to, I found it quite difficult to think about how to think about 
it. It was easiest for me to think of, you know, I love you. And just putting my 
hands here (resting on her stomach) and saying, I love you. Because it was 
myself.  
She described a complex understanding of the pregnancy as a ‘process’ that occupied an 
ambivalent place on the spectrum between the self and the other, alive and not-alive: 
 I didn’t feel like I was killing anything, but I was ending something that would 
otherwise have ended very differently, in a life. I know a lot of people would 
argue, well, life’s already started immediately, and of course it has, but I saw it 
more as a process.  
Her experience of pregnancy is of being a ‘source and a participant in a creative 
process,’ as (Young, 1998) describes pregnant embodiment, ‘she is this process, this 
change’ (p. 54).  
Central to Jackie’s relationship with the pregnancy was kindness and compassion. 
Despite not wanting to be pregnant, and feeling very sick in the days before the 
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abortion, she emphasised that she had no negative feelings towards the pregnancy. ‘It’s 
not that I’m bad or you [the foetus] are bad or, I don’t feel angry, I don’t feel annoyed, I 
don’t feel upset about being pregnant. I just am.’ I asked about choosing between the 
surgical method versus the medical method, and this was the only moment in our 
interview when Jackie became upset: 
I didn’t fancy the idea of, I don’t like the idea of miscarrying into a toilet. It feels 
really horrible, you know. I felt like, that’s not (pause). (Begins to cry). Sorry. 
[...] I thought, you’re not going to end up in a toilet. This is not, that felt 
horrible, that idea. No, that’s not what you are.  
Her commitment to ‘respecting the whole experience’ of being pregnant was a radical 
reconceptualization of responsibility and self-care: on one hand, she felt a responsibility 
to end the pregnancy in an appropriate way, and on the other, she could not separate the 
pregnancy from herself. Young (1998) describes the pregnant subject as ‘de-centred, 
split, or doubled,’ who ‘experiences her body as herself and not herself’ (p. 46). Whilst 
Young is describing the experiences of women with wanted pregnancies, or at least 
women who intend to carry their pregnancies to term, it is clear that this experience can 
also apply to women who have decided to end their pregnancies.  
This also speaks to feminist discussion of moral frameworks, for example Carol 
Gilligan’s work on the ‘ethic of care.’ Gilligan argues that abortion presents women 
with a difficult choice because it requires them to be assertive about their individual 
needs, which contradicts the societal role of women as self-sacrificing and passive 
(Gilligan, 1982). She argues that women’s discussion of the idea of responsibility when 
it comes to abortion exposes the male-centric nature of previous work on moral 
reasoning, which frames adulthood as featuring ‘independent assertion in judgment and 
action’: 
While society may affirm publicly the woman’s right to choose for herself, the 
exercise of such choice brings her privately into conflict with the conventions of 
femininity, particularly the moral equation of goodness with self-sacrifice. 
Although independent assertion in judgment and action is considered to be the 
hallmark of adulthood, it is rather in their care and concern for others that 
women have both judged themselves and been judged. (p. 70) 
Gilligan notes the limited subject positions the ‘feminine voice’ can acceptably occupy 
means that women can struggle to achieve a resolution to the problem of unwanted 
pregnancy which both asserts their own needs and makes sure that ‘no-one is hurt.’ She 
sums up the dilemma thus: ‘[n]ow she is asked whether she wishes to interrupt that 
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stream of life which for centuries has immersed her in the passivity of dependence while 
at the same time imposing on her the responsibility for care’ (p. 71).  
Gilligan concludes, using data from her own interviews with women who have had 
abortions, that the only useful resolution to this dilemma is to reject the binary between 
care for the self – which is often interpreted as selfishness in women – and 
responsibility for others by understanding the self and others as interdependent (p. 74). 
She gives the example of one participant, Sarah, who during the course of her 
interviews ‘reconsiders the opposition between selfishness and responsibility’ that she 
had earlier invested in, ‘realising that this opposition fails to represent the truth of the 
connection between the child and herself’ (p. 118).   
The types of relationships to their pregnancies that Jackie, Rebecca and Heidi describe 
operate in a similar way. They represent the type of abortion story that still, thirty years 
after Gilligan, remains difficult to express. Their accounts of their pregnancies do not 
comfortably fit within pro-choice discourse or pro-life discourse; as discussed in 
Chapter Two (‘Competing frameworks,’ p. 38), the former tends to conceptualise the 
foetus in highly medicalised terms, whereas the latter tends to attribute full personhood 
to the foetus. The philosopher Jacques Rancière defined as ‘politics’ a phenomenon 
which ‘makes visible that which a social order wishes to render invisible, and it does so 
in such a way that it does not just “add” to what is already given. Instead, it undermines 
the purity of the given’ (Chambers, 2011, p.305). In this sense, these accounts acted as a 
political rupturing and troubling of the concept of ‘responsibility’ and offer an answer to 
Cockrill and Nack’s call for discussion of abortion which ‘disrupt the narrow constructs 
that fuel individual experiences of stigma’ like the ‘good mother’ or the ‘irresponsible 
woman’ (2013, p.988). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in response to abortion stigma, many women emphasised how their 
decisions were responsible, rational, and compassionate. In doing so, implicit ‘others’ 
were constructed, and some of the women in this study– who mostly have some degree 
of class privilege – reproduced discourses of classed judgment and stigma. However, in 
their reflexive accounts it became clear that these women constructed these figures 
partly as an expression of their frustration with the gendered burden of reproductive 
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responsibility. Discursive space was also opened for accounts that transcended this 
binary of responsibility and irresponsibility, and these offered examples of how 
reproduction of stigmatising discourse can be ruptured or subverted. 
The biopolitical mechanism of the subjectification of responsibility was internalised by 
several of the women I spoke to, but was also pointed out and critiqued by several 
others. This resistance to the isolation of the individual abortion decision, driven by the 
gendered assignment of responsibility for reproduction to women, was also a resistance 
to the diffusion of collective responses to inequality, a central tenet of neoliberal 
statecraft (Tyler, 2013). The explicit critiques several women had of the ways in which 
class is covertly mobilised to justify the ideological scapegoating of certain ‘types’ of 
women who make ‘irresponsible’ reproductive choices were disruptive and political (in 
the Rancièren sense), challenging what is ‘given’ or ‘common sense’ (Jensen, 2014b). 
What these narratives also indicated was that the issue of responsibility for reproduction 
and abortion was always playing out against the backdrop of abortion stigma. 
Internalisation of responsibility for accidental pregnancy, for example, was explicitly 
accompanied for many women by acceptance of discourses that positioned accidental 
pregnancy as a moral failing. Women who described taking great pains to present a 
‘socially acceptable’ abortion story were engaged in discursive work to avoid stigma, 
and those women who chose to talk openly about their abortions identified their 
motivation as a commitment to challenging stigma. Therefore, it is to this final theme 
that I now turn. 
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Chapter Six: Stigma and Punishment 
In previous chapters, I argued that middle-class women – especially young middle-class 
women – were able to use discourses of precarity to ‘legitimise’ their abortions, and to 
locate their experience within the familiar middle-class script of delaying childbearing. 
However, being young, middle-class and delaying their childbearing through abortion 
did not protect them from stigma. The fear of ‘letting the family down’ was shared by 
several women from middle-class or aspirational families, and they felt that their status 
as ‘good women’ or ‘good daughters’ would be threatened by disclosing that they had 
had abortions. In this chapter, I examine this fear of loss of status, and the regulatory 
practices that these women engage in in order to maintain it. In particular, I examine the 
decision some women made to experience the painful aspects of abortion as a form of 
penance or punishment, and contextualise it within the landscape painted through many 
women’s narratives of stoicism and acceptance of pain as an inherent part of 
womanhood. I argue that the confluence of abortion stigma, the injunction to self-
regulate, and this societal construction of womanhood as biologically painful can 
produce extreme regulatory practices. 
Theorising stigma 
As discussed in Chapter Two (‘Formations of abortion stigma,’ p. 45), sociological 
work on stigma is heavily influenced by Erving Goffman’s conceptualisation of the 
concept in Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963). Goffman 
defined stigma as a discrepancy between a person’s attributes and the attributes we 
expect a ‘normal’ person to have; if it becomes clear that a person does not live up to 
this normative expectation, they are no longer a ‘whole or usual’ person, but a ‘tainted, 
discounted’ one (p. 2). His work emphasises the relational nature of stigma, focusing 
particularly on moments of ‘mixed contact’ between the stigmatised and non-
stigmatised in order to theorise its formulation between individuals (p. 12).  
This is certainly an issue of concern to those who have had abortions. A great deal of 
previous research on abortion stigma has followed Goffman’s lead in focusing on 
stigma as it arises in one-to-one interactions between people, or a person’s assumption 
that they will be stigmatised if they revealed their abortion to someone in conversation 
(e.g. Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017; Shellenberg et al., 2011). Goffman’s 
work is useful in its exposure of stigma as something socially ascribed rather than 
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inherent in the individual, and its focus on the strategies of concealment and ‘passing’ 
that stigmatised individuals use in order to negotiate these processes of ascription. 
However, Goffman’s work lacks a theorisation of the structural, which more recent 
work on stigma has sought to include. For example, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that 
stigma requires a context of social, economic and political power which ‘devalues and 
differentiates’ the stigmatised party: ‘power’ they argue, ‘is essential to the social 
production of stigma’ (p. 375). This conceptualisation of stigma as not only 
interactional but also a product of unequal power relations in wider society is mobilised 
in Kumar et al.’s (2009) theorisation of abortion stigma as ‘a negative attribute ascribed 
to women who seek to terminate a pregnancy that marks them, internally or externally, 
as inferior to ideals of womanhood’ (p. 628, my emphasis). They begin from Goffman’s 
conceptualisation of stigma as a process of ascription and marking, but also identify that 
it is gendered social structures that define normative womanhood and provide the 
unequal power relations required to stigmatise.  
This mobilisation of stigma is paired in this chapter with a consideration of the tools of 
regulation and control that the women in this study were subjected to and enacted on 
themselves. To do this, Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self’ is mobilised, 
developed from its use in the previous chapter as a mechanism of the subjectification of 
responsibility, by considering technologies of the self as mechanisms of stigma and 
classed, gendered embodiment. Foucault argued that the modern nation state has 
developed ‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies 
and the control of populations’ (Foucault, 1978, p.140). Technologies of the self are one 
such technique which ‘permit individuals to effect … operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order 
to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ 
(Foucault, 1988, p.16). This is recognised in this chapter as disciplinary, productive 
power that produced the desire in the women in this study to invest in technologies of 
the self to regulate their bodies in order to be ‘good’ or ‘respectable’ middle-class 
women. 
Thus, this chapter is framed by Kumar et al.’s conceptualisation of abortion stigma 
(through the work of Goffman) as ‘a negative attribute ascribed to women who seek to 
terminate a pregnancy that marks them, internally or externally, as inferior to ideals of 
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womanhood’ (p. 628). The chapter explores in particular how certain types of middle-
class womanhood are positioned as ideal in these abortion narratives. Furthermore, the 
chapter examines the self-regulatory practices or ‘technologies of the self’ the women in 
this study enacted in response to abortion stigma, and their relation to the constitution of 
the middle-class, feminine subject. 
Experiences of abortion stigma 
There were many examples in interviews of women experiencing stigma for having had 
an abortion. As well as abortion stigma being often theorised using symbolic 
interactionist frameworks like Goffman’s, Gregory Herek’s (2009) typology of stigma 
is also widely used. Herek’s typology includes internalised stigma in which the 
individual accepts negative valuations, felt stigma in which the individual anticipates 
others’ attitudes towards them will be negative, and enacted stigma in which others 
commit actions towards the individual which reveal prejudice against them (examples 
of abortion stigma research which uses this typology include Cockrill and Nack, 2013; 
Hoggart, 2017). This typology directs analytical focus to relations between people 
rather than necessarily the social structures that produce negative valuations of 
particular attributes. Nevertheless, this typology is useful in delineating the distinct 
modalities of stigma often expressed by women interviewed about abortion. In Chapter 
Five, my analysis of responsibility as it appeared in my participants’ narratives was 
largely an analysis of the first modality, internalised stigma. Here, I wish to address the 
remaining two modalities of enacted and felt stigma, before moving on to consider the 
social structures and technologies of power that make the conditions for abortion stigma 
possible. 
Enacted stigma 
There were few examples of enacted stigma – explicit or subtle negative (re)actions 
from others –  in the narratives of women in this study, which is perhaps indicative of 
England’s relatively liberal attitude to abortion (Park et al., 2013). However uncommon 
they were, moments of enacted stigma produced strong reactions in the women who 
were subjected to it, often prompting feelings of anger, outrage and, in some cases, 
guilt. For example, Izzy gave two examples of moments when abortion unexpectedly 
came up in conversation with friends, in which she calmly revealed she had had one 
herself. In one conversation with friends who she described as ‘quite religious’, she 
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‘shocked’ them by disclosing her abortion in a ‘blasé’ manner; in the other, she 
intervened on behalf of a friend who was deciding what to do after finding out she was 
pregnant. Izzy described one of her friends reacting strongly: ‘her reaction to her was, 
you can’t get rid of it, you’re 24 years old, you can look after a baby.’ Izzy countered 
with, ‘well, she can, if she wants to get rid of it it’s completely up to her.’ Neither of 
these moments particularly affected Izzy in a negative manner, apart from feeling 
outrage on behalf of her pregnant friend. 
This was not the case for Elizabeth, who confided about her abortion to a work friend 
who had talked openly about her experiences with miscarriage. Elizabeth had found the 
decision to have an abortion hard to make, and still felt some guilt about it; her work 
friend wrote down a website that she said she had found helpful after her miscarriages. 
‘She wrote it on a post-it note and left it on my desk with some kisses on it,’ said 
Elizabeth, but when she looked, it was a link to an anti-abortion website. ‘It was like, 
you know, you shouldn’t bear the sole guilt of the decision to have an abortion, because 
everyone else involved is just as guilty,’ Elizabeth said. ‘You should have a ceremony 
and name the child, and everyone should say they’re sorry, etc. etc. I was so upset about 
this.’ The experience left her shaken, and she was more ‘careful’ in future about who 
she disclosed to: ‘sometimes I half tell people, that I lost a baby. Because I want people 
to know that, but they might be judgemental if they knew I had an abortion, so I sort of 
half tell them.’ 
Two women, Heidi and Rebecca, described encounters with anti-abortion protestors 
either at the time of their abortions or soon after. Rebecca was approached by a 
protestor as she walked into the clinic where she had her first abortion, and again on the 
way out, who she had to ‘bat away’. There were other protestors present with rosaries 
and bibles excerpts, with ‘some crying woman with a giant photograph of a baby and a 
candle.’ Although she saw the protestors as somewhat absurd – describing them as 
‘religious nuts’ - the encounter made her ‘very angry’, because ‘you feel guilty and sad 
and all of these things, then someone praying on you in that moment when you’re trying 
to deal with it, and you’ve thought about it a lot, you don’t do it lightly, and then 
someone going, here’s a picture of a baby, that’s really gross.’ 
Heidi’s encounter with anti-abortion protestors did not come at the clinic, but 
unexpectedly a few weeks later as she was walking through the centre of her town. ‘I 
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just crossed the road and all of a sudden I was surrounded by all this crazy stuff,’ she 
said, ‘they literally had massive posters of eight-week-old foetuses who had been killed, 
in the middle of town.’ Heidi described the experience as ‘really quite scary,’ as it 
provoked unexpectedly strong feelings of anger. ‘When I saw that stuff I just went 
mental, shouting at them and stuff,’ she said. ‘I wasn’t prepared for how I would feel at 
all, cause I had this awful, like, just this wave of anger. Like, you’re sick, you people 
are sick, shouting at them.’  
What is notable about these experiences with enacted stigma was the ways in which 
they were almost always met with resistance and anger. There were very few examples 
of women recounting moments of enacted stigma which they internalised or which 
prompted them to change their feelings towards their abortions. However, as discussed 
in Chapter Five (‘The responsible abortion story,’ p. 125), other modes of stigma such 
as internalised stigma can be more insidious, producing self-regulatory practices like 
presenting a ‘responsible’ abortion story. The same is true for ‘felt’ stigma, the final 
mode to which I now turn. 
Felt stigma: silence and shame 
Stigma is partly about silence; what it is hard, or impossible, to say. Foucault argued 
that silence is ‘an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourse,’ 
and that ‘we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how 
those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of 
discourse is authorised’ (Foucault, 1978, p.27). Secrecy and silence were prevalent 
themes in the narratives of most women who took part in this study, and the effects of 
this was often an isolating one. ‘So many women go through it,’ Karen reflected in our 
interview, ‘and it shouldn’t carry any shame or secrecy, but it is something that very 
few women will talk about, I think.’ This observation that abortion is rarely talked about 
or shared was echoed by many other women, for example Anna, who told some close 
friends after her abortion. ‘I don’t think I’d be in a position where I’d openly say, oh 
yeah I did have an abortion, unless I knew everyone in the room already knew,’ she 
said, and identified stigma as the main reason for this.  
Anna recounted specific moments when this fear of stigma and rejection meant she 
stopped herself telling friends that she had had an abortion: ‘My best friend from uni, I 
still haven’t told her, but at the time I really wanted to tell her, and every time I worked 
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myself up to tell her, my heart would get really fast, and I’d be like, oh I can’t.’ She 
reflected on the way in which this type of stigma can act like a marker, noting that ‘I 
don’t want people to be like, she had an abortion, like, that’s not an important thing 
about me.’ In Goffman’s theorisation of stigma, he points out that the term originally 
referred to a literal mark or blemish, like a brand, that was ‘designed to expose 
something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier’ (1963, p.2). Despite 
abortion being an ‘invisible’ stigma, Anna’s worry that making it ‘visible’ will become 
the only important thing about her speaks to Goffman’s characterisation of stigma as a 
blemish, pollution, or taint. 
Rebecca was one of several participants in this study who had had multiple abortions, 
and described how she told fewer people about her second abortion because she was 
‘ashamed’ that she ‘hadn’t learnt [her] lesson the first time.’ There is a punitive aspect 
to Rebecca’s narrative; the idea that she should have ‘learnt her lesson’ and been more 
responsible casts abortion as a kind of punishment that should prompt a change in 
character (a reaction discussed in Chapter Five, p.125). Similarly, after Felicity had her 
third abortion, she told no one except her partner. As well as feeling some shame for 
having had multiple abortions, she also worried that people would judge her because 
one of her children had died when he was young: ‘somehow having lost a child, I 
always feel like that’s mixed up with it as well. Like I’m choosing to lose more 
children, you know.’ She felt this sense of guilt more after her third abortion than her 
first or second, and worried that ‘it feels like murder somehow, even though it’s not.’ 
Most of the women in this study spoke about this ‘felt’ stigma – the assumption that 
others will judge them negatively if they disclosed their abortion – even if they had 
never had an experience of ‘enacted’ stigma, a phenomenon previous researchers have 
also identified (e.g. Shellenberg et al., 2011). Some women were reflexive in their 
accounts of ‘felt’ stigma, identifying that their fears of being judged or marked by 
stigma were not necessarily produced by the actions of those around them. For example, 
Felicity reflected that once she disclosed to friends, they were generally supportive, and 
some even told her they had had one themselves. ‘But I think there is guilt and shame,’ 
she said, ‘and I guess if you’re feeling them yourself you project them onto other 
people…I was judging myself and projecting that onto others.’ Lucy also reflected on 
her feelings of shame and embarrassment about her abortions: ‘you know when you’re 
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so ashamed, you can’t, you don’t, the way you feel, you assume that’s the way other 
people are gonna feel about you.’ 
These are not only examples of the operation of ‘felt’ stigma, but also of its 
individualising and isolating effects. These women were kept ‘in check’ not by 
experiencing explicit stigma enacted by others, but through constant fear that they might 
experience it if their ‘blemish’ was to become known. Kumar et al. (2009) provide a 
thorough exploration of how this fear is produced on multiple levels, from broad 
discursive framings of abortion, through governmental and institutional levels, to the 
level of the ‘individual psyche’ where it manifests as guilt and shame (pp. 630-33). The 
effect of this fear is self-governance, reminiscent of Foucault’s ‘panopticism,’ a 
technology of discipline whereby individuals become accustomed to acting as if they 
are being observed at all times (1977). 
This is reflected in the way that many women I spoke to presented their reticence to tell 
others about their abortions as an obvious or neutral fact. For example, Nat said of not 
telling her mum about her abortion, ‘I didn’t really want people to know, I don’t know 
why. I didn’t feel ashamed, I just I’m quite personal, I don’t tell people lots of things 
about me, I like to keep things personal, really.’ Rather than secrecy, Nat frames her 
decisions not to disclose as an issue of privacy. For most other women, however, the 
‘obvious’ reasons that one might wish to keep an abortion secret were related to shame 
and fear of judgement, for example Anja simply stated, ‘I haven’t told anyone who 
might react in a way I don’t like. I don’t want to feel rejected in any way.’ Beynon-
Jones suggests that women who have had abortions engage in ‘discursive labour’ in 
order to construct non-disclosure as obvious and reasonable, as a way of managing the 
‘rhetorical difficulties involved in accounting for silence’ (2017, p.237). Rather than 
troubling silence, concealing their abortions and choosing not to disclose was 
normalised by the women in this study as acting in a ‘socially appropriate’ way.  
One of the effects of silence and secrecy around abortion is the reproduction of stigma, 
as it conceals the true commonality of the experience, which in turn makes breaking the 
silence more difficult; Kumar et al. call this a ‘mutually reinforcing cycle of silence’ 
(2009, p. 629). Furthermore, the self-governance it produces, such as careful 
management of disclosure, is normalised as reasonable despite its negative effects like a 
lack of interpersonal support (Major and Gramzow, 1999). As argued in the previous 
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chapter in relation to the individualisation of responsibility, this self-governance 
diffuses collective experience, and, as Cockrill and Nack argue, hinders the possibility 
of ‘collective stigma management’ (2013, p.987). 
Troubling silence 
It is not the case, however, that the women in this study who talked about ‘felt’ stigma 
were entirely unreflexive about the effects of silence and secrecy. Indeed, some women 
explicitly ‘troubled’ silence, and talked about breaking silence as a way of combatting 
this individualisation of stigma. Many of the women who took part in interviews were 
motivated by a desire to combat abortion stigma by sharing their stories, whether they 
were positive, neutral, or negative, and the act of sharing their abortion stories was, for 
many of the women who took part, a positive experience (as discussed in Chapter 
Three, ‘Reconceptualising vulnerability,’ p. 86). For example, Heidi experienced it as ‘a 
way of moving forward’ and ‘ending [the abortion] as a chapter in my life,’ and 
Rebecca shared, ‘I find talking about it so therapeutic, so it’s quite selfish of me to 
make you come all this way!’  
As well as the individual benefits these women experienced, many of them also 
discussed the altruistic benefits they hoped would emerge from the research. For 
example, Heidi hoped that research like this study would ‘[let] people know that 
actually, it’s not as bad as you think it’s gonna be,’ and that ‘people do understand, and 
there are people who you can talk to about these things.’  
These kind of accounts were complex, however. Heidi expressed a commitment both to 
letting women know that abortion ‘not that hard,’ but at the same time was explicit 
about the fact that, physically and emotionally, her abortion was one of the hardest 
things she had ever done. These accounts constituted discursive space within which 
women could express complex and sometimes contradictory narratives which there is 
little space for in mainstream discourse about abortion (Ludlow, 2008).  
Karen reflected on this lack of space using the example of her reaction to a film called 
Obvious Child, a comedy-drama that depicts a woman who has an abortion after a one-
night stand. Karen described the film as ‘pivotal’ and ‘significant’ in that the abortion 
decision is made quickly, and the film ‘is about something else in a way.’ She reflected 
that since  ‘there’s still a lot of shame and secrecy around [abortion] … the fact that this 
is 2015 or whatever, this is the first film of its kind to have that sort of narrative, I 
155 
 
thought that was amazing but shocking that that’s what the availability of cultural 
representations are.’ The lack of nuanced cultural representations of abortion has been 
well-documented; analysis of TV and film representations of abortion suggest it is 
portrayed as a more risky procedure than in reality, and adverse consequences for the 
women who has one are also more common in TV and film than in reality (Raymond 
and Grimes, 2012; Sisson and Kimport, 2014).  
In attempting to open these discursive spaces, these women drew attention to the 
diffusion of experiences in a highly individualised society. Reflecting on the power of 
telling her abortion story, Rebecca said, ‘[t]hat’s one of the things I noticed about it, as 
soon as you say, I had an abortion, hands start popping up. Me too, me too, me too.’ In 
this sense, these women are describing an implicitly feminist project which, as noted 
above, Cockrill and Nack have called ‘collective stigma management,’ (2013) but 
which bears resemblance to the consciousness-raising workshops of the 1960s and 70s, 
encouraging women to share and compare their experiences to engender a class 
consciousness (Firth and Robinson, 2016; Sowards and Renegar, 2004). The idea of 
sharing personal narratives as a political statement is a practice embedded in feminist 
thought (Stephenson-Abetz, 2012). 
Whilst this ‘consciousness-raising’ aspect of sharing abortion narratives was discussed 
in interviews as an important motivation for taking part in the study, it is also notable 
that the act of disclosing abortion, either in interviews for this study or in their everyday 
lives, was often characterised as a confessional experience. The affective power of 
telling a non-judgemental listener about her abortion was described by Heidi as a huge 
relief after feeling guilty and alone in her decision: ‘So I told [my friend], cause I knew 
she wouldn’t judge me at all. I told her, and I just burst into tears and cried, and she 
gave me a hug.’ Foucault characterises the confession as one of the mechanisms by 
which the modern subject is produced; we undergo the confession as a process of self-
formation, mediated by an external authority like the priest or psychoanalyst, but 
ultimately forming ourselves into ‘meaning-giving selves’ (Foucault, 1991). 
Therefore, ‘breaking the silence’ about abortion was on one hand characterised in these 
narratives as a way to combat the individualisation of stigma by encouraging other 
women to disclose their experiences, thereby disrupting the ‘cycle’ of silence 
surrounding abortion (Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). However, it was also a 
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therapeutic, sometimes confessional, and entirely individual experience that engendered 
relief. In this latter respect, these abortion narratives can be seen as a Foucauldian 
‘accounting of oneself’ (Foucault, 1991) through which the subject comes to know and 
understand itself. It is from this premise that the remainder of the chapter follows. 
Gender, class and self-governance 
As Kumar et al.’s definition of abortion stigma suggests, an important dimension of the 
abortion stigma the women in this study faced was produced by normative constructions 
of womanhood (2009). Beynon-Jones has argued that research on abortion stigma 
should approach stigmatisation as ‘the reproduction of social relations of power which 
depend on differentiating normal from deviant identities through discourse,’ something 
continually (re)produced rather than a ‘thing’ that can be possessed or ‘something which 
spoils’ (Beynon-Jones, 2017, p.227). Having identified women’s accounts of ‘enacted’ 
and ‘felt’ stigma, it is now necessary to analyse how normative womanhood was 
(re)produced or challenged in their narratives, and the discursive strategies they 
developed to negotiate this process. 
One recurring facet of normative womanhood that appeared in several women’s 
narratives was the idea of the ‘maternal instinct.’ For example, Heidi said that she had 
always imagined that if she became pregnant, she would feel some natural connection to 
her pregnancy, and that she would ‘just be a mum.’ She was surprised to find that her 
immediate reaction to discovering her pregnancy was negative, and following her 
abortion had ‘intrusive thoughts’ which left her feeling ‘basically like a murderer.’ ‘I 
kept thinking, you’re not really a woman, what woman would kill their own child? It’s 
weird you feel the way you do,’ she said, ‘I was thinking, you probably should a bit, 
most people feel a maternal instinct.’ This belief that women possess an instinct for 
nurturing that is triggered by pregnancy was also discussed in my interviews with 
Jackie, whose attitude towards the ‘maternal instinct’ was more circumspect. She 
described herself as different from most of her friends, many of whom had expressed an 
‘incredible need to have a child.’ She had never felt this way, and described feeling like 
there was a ‘piece missing’ that was not ‘switched on’ in her, concluding that she was 
not ‘hormonally-geared’ towards having children and therefore ‘more objective’ than 
her friends who had expressed this urgent need to get pregnant.  
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The maternal instinct in Heidi’s narrative was positioned as part of ‘normal’ 
womanhood, and her perceived lack of it made her feel like she was ‘weird’. In contrast, 
Jackie, whilst agreeing that the desire to have children was normal, saw her lack of it as 
a freedom from a hormonal pathology that allowed her to make the rational choice not 
to have children. Lisa, in contrast to both Heidi and Jackie, rejected the idea of 
instinctive nurturing as inherent to womanhood. She pointed instead to the social 
construct of gender, which ‘culturally’ assigned roles to men and women. She argued 
that this was why abortion ‘has always been seen as not a normal thing that women do,’ 
because motherhood has been positioned as ‘natural and normal for women’ rather than 
a socially assigned role. This contested status of normative facets of womanhood like 
the ‘maternal instinct’ in these abortion narratives reflects the fact that stigma is not a 
straightforward possession of an attribute, but is continually produced and resisted 
through discourse (Beynon-Jones, 2017). 
‘Letting the family down’: respectability 
Another recurring theme that emerged from interviews revolved what it meant to be a 
‘good’ woman. These discussions were of particular concern to women who described 
themselves as middle-class, or whose biographies suggested they came from middle-
class families. The family was an important space in these narratives, and the status of 
these women as ‘good’ women was often linked to their family’s status as respectable. 
In order to examine in more detail this construction of the ‘good’ middle-class woman 
and its relation to reproduction, I now turn to an important mechanic that these women 
described as central to their everyday practice: self-regulation and control.  
Difficulty in disclosing and sharing with others was a common theme across most of the 
women’s interviews, but in particular, several women talked about their reticence to tell 
their families. The fear of disappointing or ‘letting down’ their families was shared by 
many of the women who had abortions when they were relatively young; these women 
also tended to be from middle-class backgrounds. For example, Alex was 19 when she 
became unexpectedly pregnant, and decided to have a medical abortion. Choosing not to 
tell her parents, the fear of what might happen if she disclosed to them occupied her 
mind significantly during our interview. ‘Me and my mum are good friends, which is 
why I wouldn’t wanna tell her, cause I feel like I’d ruin it,’ she explained, and ‘me and 
my dad are really close, and I think it would let him down as well.’ She feared in 
particular disrupting her relationship with her dad, ‘[j]ust cause we’re really close, and 
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I’m his little princess, kind of thing.’ She described her dad as ‘still uncomfortable’ with 
her relationship with her boyfriend, who was her first. If her parents knew about her 
pregnancy and abortion, ‘it would kind of let down the family.’ 
The historical trope of the ‘fallen woman’ was in evidence in Alex’s narrative, a trope 
that is classed as it is gendered. The original ‘fallen woman,’ Eve, in her temptation by 
the serpent in the Garden of Eden represents a transition from innocence to experience 
which is perhaps most famously represented in John Milton’s Paradise Lost; 
subsequently the ‘fallen women’ developed into a trope of Victorian and nineteenth 
century literature (Auerbach, 1980). This figure falls from grace through some form of 
‘sexual trespass’ which casts her out of the sphere of respectability, and, as literary 
critics have argued, demonstrates the ‘neurosis of a culture that feared female sexuality 
and aggression and so enshrined a respectably sadistic cautionary tale punishing them 
both’ (Auerbach, 1980, p.31). This trope has a life beyond Victorian literature, 
appearing in accounts of women who, for example, engage in transgressive sexual 
activities or who are diagnosed with sexually transmitted infections (Herek, 2009; Nack, 
2002). Their transition from ‘good’ girls to ‘fallen women’ is predicated on a social 
‘caste’ system which ‘divides women according to perceptions of moral transgression,’ 
based on cultural beliefs about ‘feminine ideals of sexual morality’ (Nack, 2002, p.463). 
Thus, Alex’s worry that her relationship with her dad might be ‘ruined’ if she told him 
about her abortion is not only based on the status of abortion as a socially transgressive 
act, but also on its capacity to reveal that she is sexually active and no longer her 
father’s ‘little princess.’ This fear of a loss of respectability is not only gendered, but 
also classed. As Skeggs argues, the fallen woman comes from the ‘respectable classes’; 
she must have somewhere to fall from (Skeggs, 1997, p.47). This was demonstrated by 
Heidi’s story, who was 25 when she had her abortion. Whilst she did tell her parents, it 
had become a taboo subject, especially for her dad: ‘We can’t talk about the abortion. 
He just says that thing, that thing that happened. We don’t really want to be telling 
people about that thing you did. We don’t talk about it.’ Her mum also found it ‘hard’ to 
accept, as it is ‘It’s not something that she ever thought any of her kids would do.’ Heidi 
said of her mum: 
She has loads of friends who had children when they were sixteen, you know, 
like, oh they got pregnant out of the blue, they’re such a worry for the parents. 
She’d say, you know, we never have to worry about you cause that’s never 
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gonna happen. And then in her mind it’s kind of embarrassing that it’s one of 
her kids it happened to. 
Heidi’s parents reactions seemed tied up with their social status. She described them as 
being preoccupied with their status as a middle-class family: ‘My mum says we’re 
middle-class, and we’re meant to be proud of that, like it’s something we’ve worked 
hard at and we should be proud of the status as middle-class people.’ Heidi relates this 
to their material position, describing them as ‘living the capitalist dream’, having 
‘worked very hard’ from their working-class backgrounds to be in a position to own 
their own home and earn enough money to retire on. However, there is clearly a social 
and cultural dimension to her parents’ middle-class identities, which is threatened by 
Heidi’s admission that she was pregnant and had an abortion. Their investment in 
respectability is perhaps an indication that they experience their class status as 
precarious given their working-class roots (Skeggs, 1997). Heidi’s abortion threatened 
not only her own reputation, which she countered by presenting herself as responsible 
and ‘careful’ (as discussed in Chapter Five, ‘They don’t even think,’ p. 132), but also 
that of her family who had worked hard to climb their way into middle-class 
respectability. 
The issue of family history was also important for Izzy, who was 18 at the time of her 
abortion. She said her dad, who died when she was younger, would have been ‘so 
disappointed’ to learn his daughter had had an abortion, and that she had more than her 
parents to consider. Her decisions about who to disclose to was shaped heavily by 
cultural context, and she described negotiating different types of stigma from her dad’s 
English side of the family to her mum’s Namibian side. Her English family were very 
different to Izzy and her siblings, who she says ‘grew up in an area which is a very 
common area, so me and my sister and brother are the complete opposite of what my 
dad’s family are … I guess you’d describe it as a chavvy, it’s quite a chavvy area.’ 
Despite the fact that Izzy was studying for a postgraduate degree when I interviewed 
her, she described feeling lost in discussions with her dad’s family, who are ‘very 
intelligent’ and intimidating. As a result, she would never disclose her abortion to them: 
I feel like with my dad’s side, they would be extremely disappointed in me, and 
I’d lose this, they see me as the good child, the one at school, blah blah blah. I 
always get praise from them. I think as a group of people, there’s a certain 
appearance you have to put on in front of them. 
This appearance or performance that Izzy feels expected to produce with this side of the 
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family was one of restraint and dutifulness. She was the ‘good child’ because despite 
growing up in a ‘chavvy’ area, she was in Higher Education, and she described herself 
as reserved and calm. Educational settings have been argued to be key sites in which 
middle-class femininity is constructed and instilled, promoting values like self-
regulation, entrepreneurship, and investing in projects of the self (Allan and Charles, 
2014). As a result, middle-class women are expected to delay childbearing until they 
have completed their education or established careers (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 
2001). Izzy’s decision to have an abortion was informed by this expectation; she recalls 
her dad ‘really pushed and pushed’ for her and her siblings to do well at school, sending 
them to a grammar school. She contrasts herself – ‘all about academia’ – to her sister, 
who she describes as ‘kind of wild’ and ‘did her own thing, didn’t care about school. I 
was always the one…that came back with good results.’ When she became pregnant at 
18, ‘it wasn’t a case of maybe keeping the baby’; she decided straight away that she 
would have an abortion.  
Izzy also described negotiating the different cultural context of her Namibian family, 
and the different reasons she had for not disclosing her abortion to them. In contrast to 
England, Izzy said that ‘if you get pregnant [in Namibia] you’re more likely to keep it 
cause it’s a very religious country and abortions here are very expensive.’ The risk of 
disappointing her Namibian family was less easily expressed in terms of class, as ‘it’s 
hard to determine what class you’re in’ in a Namibian context; however, her Namibian 
family were religious. ‘If I was in Namibia and I was pregnant and they found out, it 
would be the worst thing in the world if I had an abortion. Like, they’d offer to look 
after the child. It would be very frowned upon to have an abortion.’ As Kumar et al. 
have argued, whilst abortion stigma is generally contextualised by widely-found 
normative constructions of womanhood, it is also ‘profoundly local’ (2009, p.627). Izzy 
is caught between English middle-class expectations, and Namibian religious, moral 
expectations, and her decisions about who to disclose her abortion to is informed by 
these differing contexts.  
Being ‘good’ women – and fearing this loss of status – was therefore present in the 
narratives of these women in a way that engaged with the historical trope of the ‘fallen 
women.’ The reputation of their families as respectable was tied to their ability to 
conceal their abortions, or their being sexually active. What these narratives therefore 
demonstrate is how the production of the neoliberal subject is entwined with the ability 
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of these women to present themselves as able to regulate their bodies and sexualities.  
 
Technologies of the self 
The practices by which the women in this study described regulating themselves can be 
understood, as argued in the introduction to this chapter, through Foucault’s concept of 
‘technologies of the self.’ These practices describe how individuals actively transform 
their ‘bodies and souls, thoughts [and] conduct’ in order to constitute a ‘self’ (Foucault, 
1988). This section analyses moments when technologies of the self were exposed in 
the women’s narratives, and how the women ‘accounted for themselves’ and actively 
presented themselves as particular types of subjects in response to stigma. In particular, 
this section analyses how self-regulatory technologies of the self were intimately linked 
to the production of normative, middle-class femininity. This analysis is not only 
concerned with the work the women in this study did to present themselves in certain 
ways to others; it is also concerned with how they understood themselves as stigmatised 
subjects. 
Regulating the body 
Pregnancy was described by several women in his study as a moment when the physical 
body refused to be regulated by the will, and abortion was a method of bringing the 
body back under control (a finding corroborated by previous research, such as Harden & 
Ogden, 1999). Regulation of the body has historically been a prominent way of 
displaying ideal femininity, which in the eighteenth century was associated with the 
luxurious bodily dispositions of the upper classes: ease, restraint, control, and calm 
(Skeggs, 1997, 99). This construction of ideal femininity offers a narrow line for 
middle-class women to tread between ideal, upper-class femininity characterised by 
respectability, restraint, and chastity, and working-class excess.  
In this context, unwanted pregnancy and the loss of control over the body it represents 
can present a crisis for women invested in bodily regulation as a form of middle-class 
respectability. One woman for whom this was a particular issue, Karen, was 32 at the 
time of her abortion. Throughout her life, she had suffered from eating disorders, and 
described how they had allowed her to disassociate herself from any sense that she was 
‘really a sexual being, or a woman, like, that there was a possibility of having children.’ 
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When she did fall pregnant unexpectedly, it was experienced as an eruption of the 
materiality of the body into her consciousness: 
it’s all about self-discipline and the power of my mind to such a degree that I 
think that I have just not given full acknowledgement to myself as an actual 
fleshy being, really […] It almost felt like my body was saying, serves you right. 
I’m here, like (laughs) pay attention to me, this is what I can do, you know? 
Having the abortion was experienced by many participants as going ‘back to normal’. 
For Karen, however, the experience was more transformative in that it prompted her to 
treat her body ‘more kindly’: 
…maybe the abortion made me feel like I needed to take care of my body more, 
to recognise it and be nice to it rather than punish it constantly. And I am still 
very disciplined in my relationship to my body, but the abortion reminded me 
that it was there in this really real way, if that makes sense. 
Her life-long anxiety around regulating her body was an important part of her history 
that informed her experience of abortion. Karen grew up as the daughter of aspirational 
working-class parents; she describes her mum as being obsessed with being respectable 
and becoming middle-class. Her parents, who both left school at 16, raised their family 
in a town built after the war that attracted a large number of aspirational working-class 
families, where her dad worked in manufacturing, working his way up from an 
apprenticeship to a management in later life. Her mum worked in clerical roles and also 
worked her way up until they both earned good salaries and became homeowners.  
The expectation that her and her sister would do better than their parents was a fact of 
life for Karen, and her trajectory of going to university, getting a PhD, and becoming an 
academic was accompanied by a continuing necessity of self-regulation and self-
surveillance. She describes her position as a middle-class woman to be ‘shaky’: 
I know I embody middle-classness so much and I’m very privileged in lots of 
different ways, but that very recent history of my family’s class mobility means 
that I don’t feel secure in that position. […] I’m also not solidly middle class. 
Whatever my professional status is and who I date or who I’m friends with, or 
what I might embody, I feel like that’s never a fully secure position or identity. 
She notes that her presence in the academy is an uncomfortable one, and locates that 
discomfort in her bodily performance of femininity, which she describes as ‘too hyper-
feminine or heterosexual,’ a ‘site of dismissal.’ Her discomfort about her ‘hyper-
feminine’ or ‘heterosexual’ embodiment is related to her discomfort with what she 
characterised as her body intruding into her consciousness and ‘reminding’ her that she 
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was, in fact, a fertile, ‘fleshy’ woman. Fecundity and ‘fleshiness’ is historically 
associated with working-class femininity coded as ‘out of control, in excess’ and 
associated with ‘the lower, unruly order of bodily functions’ like sex and reproduction 
(Skeggs, 1997, 99). Karen’s precarious relationships to gendered embodiment and to 
middle-classness produced a hyper-vigilance about her body that can be read as a 
‘technology of the self,’ a method by which she  presented and policed herself 
(Foucault, 1988), and an attempt to discipline her body out of its ‘shaky’ relation to 
restrained, cerebral, middle-class femininity.  
Pain and punishment 
The role of technologies of the self in other women’s narratives was not always as 
optimistic. Many women’s discussions of their ‘reproductive lives’ – including 
menstruation, sex, childbirth and sterilisation – was replete with the language of pain 
and suffering, and several women identified stoicism in the face of such pain as being 
an unfortunate side-effect of womanhood. In amongst this talk of pain and stoicism, 
there were some moments in which women talked about choosing more painful 
methods of abortion as a form of penance, and to ensure they ‘learnt their lesson’. 
Whilst these discussions of self-punishment may seem shocking or extreme, they are 
understandable within the context of societal discourses that suggest women must 
accept pain as part of womanhood, as well as the previously identified discourses of 
self-regulation and control. 
Whilst abortion in legal contexts like England’s hospitals and abortion clinics is a very 
safe procedure (Raymond and Grimes, 2012), some methods of abortion entail some 
discomfort and pain. Surgical abortion, for example, is generally performed under 
general anaesthetic, and was commonly described by women in this study as painless 
and quick – you ‘just go in, [have the procedure], wake up, you know.’ Medical 
abortion, in contrast, is not normally performed under anaesthetic, as it is generally 
offered to women at very early stages of pregnancy. After taking two tablets, which 
induce a miscarriage, women can go home and ‘pass’ the foetus. This was more likely 
to be described by women in this study as painful. 
For example, Alex said, ‘I assumed the medical would be the better option, just taking a 
pill. But I didn’t realise what that entailed until it happened. They said it would create 
contractions, but I didn’t think about how painful that would be.’ Women who chose 
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this method described hours of painful cramps, and some went so far as to describe the 
experience as, variously, ‘horrific,’ ‘traumatic’, and ‘the worst pain I’d ever felt in my 
life.’ There was also an opinion shared by several of these women that the information 
given by clinic staff was somewhat euphemistic, presumably to avoid scaring them. ‘I 
don’t think they really, really explain to you,’ said Lucy. ‘They’re like (soft voice) and 
then you’ll have the miscarriage. But people need to know what the miscarriage actually 
entails, cause the miscarriage is actually pretty traumatic.’ Another aspect of medical 
abortion at home that some women found difficult was being awake for the ‘passing’ of 
the foetus, which Sarah described as ‘a bit gory and graphic.’ 
The ability to choose between abortion methods (which not every woman in the study 
had; very early pregnancies are usually only terminated with the medical method) 
created an act of differentiation women felt they had to justify. Some women couched 
their choice to have surgical abortions as taking the ‘easy’ way out (despite the fact that 
surgery under general anaesthetic carries greater risk), whereas several women who 
chose medical abortion emphasised its more ‘natural’ form. Medical abortion was also 
sometimes explicitly framed as a form of self-punishment, a way to connect the 
decision to its ‘consequences’ i.e. pain and the visible passing of the foetus. Whilst 
increased reproductive choice (e.g. the ability to choose an at-home medical abortion) is 
generally presented as a moral good, some women are using this choice to embrace the 
essential, biological, painful aspects of reproduction which reproductive technology is 
generally understood to liberate women from. 
For example, Rebecca said, ‘I had this thing in my head that I wanted the pill, because 
there was, like, this kind of, I wanted to suffer. Does that make sense?’ Later, she 
explained, ‘I felt like I needed some sort of redemption.’ Experiencing the pain and 
visual passing of a medical abortion was described as cathartic as well as an attempt to 
have a more ‘natural’ experience similar to miscarriage; although, Rebecca noted, ‘the 
reality of it is not appealing at all.’ Similarly, Felicity explained that she chose the 
medical method for her second and third abortions after having a surgical abortion when 
she was younger. ‘This was a situation that I found myself in and I needed to go through 
the experience of what I was doing rather than just having it taken out of me and 
forgetting it had ever happened,’ she explained. ‘It was almost like I had to put myself 
through that in order not to put myself in that situation ever again.’ 
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These accounts of self-punishment demonstrate a powerful convergence of internalised 
abortion stigma and the individualisation of responsibility and regulation. They are also 
contextualised within the women’s accounts of pain and ‘female’ bodily experiences 
throughout the life course. Rebecca described herself as an ‘early developer’ who 
started her periods when she was eleven. They were extremely heavy and painful; she 
recalls ‘I used to not get the bus home because I’d be so embarrassed, I couldn’t sit for 
more than half an hour without bleeding through my clothes.’ She was diagnosed with 
dysmenorrhea – abnormally heavy menstruation – and was prescribed hormonal 
contraception at thirteen to regulate the bleeding. She described this as ‘quite traumatic,’ 
and frustrating that there was no explanation offered by her doctor as to why this was 
happening to her. Later on, Rebecca also experienced vaginismus, which made 
penetrative sex painful. Vaginismus is another condition she was unable to find an 
explanation for, and it took many years for a diagnosis and a treatment that allowed her 
to manage the pain.  
During this time, she said: 
 I felt like my body was so alien to me, like, having, I don’t know, having 
something, like a part of you that’s so, kind of crucial to your identity, or at least 
I feel it is like an intrinsic part of female identity, particularly at that age when 
you’re growing up and experiencing sex and sexuality in a different way.  
This alienation was accompanied by a frustration that ‘if there was an unexplained 
disease that was causing men to not be able to have sex due to burning pain and agony, 
it wouldn’t be unexplained for very long.’ The societal expectation that women endure 
pain is related to the way in which the female body has been constructed as mysterious 
and unknowable throughout Western thought (de Beauvoir, 1993), and research has 
shown that women report difficulty in being believed by medical staff when they 
complain of pain (Reid, Ewan and Lowy, 1991; Werner and Malterud, 2003). Whilst 
Rebecca and Felicity’s discussions of self-punishment may seem shocking or extreme, 
they are understandable within this context of societal discourses that suggest women 
must accept pain as part of womanhood. 
These accounts of self-punishment demonstrate a powerful convergence of abortion 
stigma and the individualisation of gendered responsibility and regulation. The literary 
conventions of the ‘fallen woman’ trope mean that her story normally end with 
destitution or death as a result of her transgressions, which she can either be 
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rehabilitated from, or be destroyed by (Auerbach, 1980). This was reflected in 
Rebecca’s hope that she might reach a form of ‘catharsis’ through her abortion, and 
Felicity’s determination to ‘learn her lesson.’ These accounts of pain and punishment 
can also be understood as examples of ‘technologies of the self.’ Both Rebecca and 
Felicity underwent more painful methods of abortion in order to discipline their bodies 
and transform themselves into more responsible, ‘mindful’ subjects. The intense 
imperative to individualise responsibility for reproduction means women who already 
feel under pressure to be ideal neoliberal subjects develop these strategies of self-
governance to ensure they do not ‘fail.’ If they do, they are expected to learn from the 
experience of failing to control their bodies, and become more responsible and resilient 
in the face of difficulty as a result (Bracke, 2016).  
This is contextualised by a wider project of neoliberal biopolitics invested in producing 
‘docile bodies’ through techniques of discipline in order to more easily govern them 
(Foucault, 1977). In Chapter Five, I argued that the subjectification of responsibility for 
reproduction was part of a disciplining of women’s bodies, mediated by classed 
discourse that positions middle-class women as aspirational, neoliberal subjects. The 
accounts in this chapter of women accepting pain and punishment as part of their 
gendered embodiment is a more extreme example of this disciplining, but is 
contextualised within the same project of governing ‘potentially unruly or disaffected 
subjects’ through the promise of ‘self-invention through a discourse of limitless choice’ 
in relation to reproduction (2001, p.3). After making the choice to have an abortion, a 
number of other choices must be made: at what stage of pregnancy, by which method, at 
home or in the clinic. In the context of the lives of middle-class women in neoliberal 
England, these choices are not experienced as straightforwardly positive or liberating. 
Instead, these moments of choice also produce moments of regulation and discipline. 
Conclusion 
Abortion stigma takes many forms, and has many effects. Whilst abortion has not been 
positioned as contentiously and politically in England as it is in other countries such as 
the USA or Northern Ireland, my participants’ narratives show that the injunction to 
silence and secrecy remains an important aspect of having an abortion in contemporary 
England. The three dimensions of stigma examined throughout this thesis – internalised, 
felt and enacted (Herek, 2009) – are contextualised by unequal power dynamics of 
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gender and class in wider society which produce expectations of normative womanhood 
all of the women in this study felt some pressure to conform to.  
In particular, the figure of the ‘fallen woman’ was present in the accounts these largely 
middle-class women gave of ‘letting down’ their families by becoming accidentally 
pregnant and having abortions. Whilst this is a trope with a long history, its appearance 
in these narratives suggested that respectability and stigma were very contemporary 
concerns for these women. Harris (2004) has drawn attention to the figure of the 
middle-class girl in contemporary society as a ‘vanguard’ of neoliberal subjectivity; 
Francombe-Webb and Silk (2016), drawing on Harris’ work, have argued that ‘she 
embodies a distinctively neoliberal subjectivity that strives for self-fulfilment, and 
demonstrates conduct of the self through monitoring, surveillance and self-investment’ 
(p. 654). The practices of ‘monitoring, surveillance and self-investment’ which go into 
producing middle-class womanhood – these ‘technologies of the self’ – seen in the 
accounts of women like Karen, Rebecca and Felicity demonstrate that the expectations 
identified by Harris do not end at girlhood. These practices can also been seen in direct 
relation to abortion through these women’s investment in themselves as ‘good’ women. 
In the extreme, the stigma attached to abortion, the loss of status it risks, and the 
expectation that middle-class women self-regulate combined with the societal conflation 
of womanhood with the acceptance of pain. In this confluence, extreme regulatory 
practices like Rebecca’s ‘redemption’ through painful abortion and Felicity’s 
determination to be ‘present’ in order to face the consequences of her decision were 
produced.  
However, the women in this study were not confined to acceptance of these regulatory 
practices. They were often critical and aware of their social positioning, and identified 
strategies to combat stigma, silence and the effects they entail. Whilst their narratives 
were at once preoccupied with loss of status as ‘good’ women, at the same time they 
deconstructed this, and offered their narratives partly in the name of this feminist, 
deconstructive project to uncover and combat stigma. In summary, the specific 
regulatory practices that produce middle-class womanhood can be seen starkly through 
these women’s abortion narratives, and they shed some light on wider gendered and 
classed discourses in society. They also offer examples of women resisting and 
challenging regulatory practices, demonstrating that stigma is not a straightforward 
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possession of an attribute, but is continually produced and resisted through discourse 
(Beynon-Jones, 2017). 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The research questions that framed this study were: 
1. How do women in England make meaning about their abortion experiences? 
2. What aspects of their identities and life experiences contribute to this meaning-
making? 
3. In particular, how does class structure this meaning-making? 
I have answered these questions in the following ways. In Chapter Four, I argued that 
the concept of precarity emerged from women’s abortion narratives in three ways. First, 
as a material condition that was characterised by employment and housing insecurity 
and which was linked to wider political and economic shifts like austerity programmes. 
Second, as a subjective experience that even women in relatively secure material 
positions felt. Third, as a discourse that delineated what the ‘ideal’ conditions for 
continuing a pregnancy were and, conversely, what conditions made abortion the more 
‘responsible’ choice. Furthermore, I argued that that the legal and medical framework of 
abortion in the UK extends a demand for women to ‘perform’ precarity, the state of 
uncertainty and instability that would indicate that they are truly ‘deserving’ of an 
abortion. My analysis demonstrated that doing so was more possible for certain women 
than others. I used the example of a young, middle-class woman who had access to an 
‘understandable’ cultural script about delaying childbearing in favour of Higher 
Education, contrasted with the account of one woman from a working-class background 
who displayed more ambivalence about using the same ‘script’. I concluded that classed 
discourses about precarity could work as useful resources for some women seeking 
abortions, whereas for others these discourses worked to reify classed stereotypes. 
In Chapter Five, I examined the previously identified phenomenon of women 
constructing a responsible self through abortion narratives, using class as a new avenue 
of analysis. Whilst there were few examples of class ‘disgust’ in the narratives I 
collected, it was still the case that classed judgments and expectations were latent in 
many of the women’s narratives. The most prevalent way in which this was expressed 
was through a distinction between women who ‘don’t think’ about reproduction and 
women who do. I argued that this was a product of the gendered subjectification of 
responsibility for reproduction, about which the women in this study expressed fatigue 
and frustration. The burden of responsibility for reproduction is a perennial 
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phenomenon for women, but one which under neoliberal governance has developed a 
particular significance, becoming incorporated into wider technologies of 
subjectification which create ‘successful’, self-governing neoliberal subjects. However, 
this chapter also demonstrated that some women were critical and reflexive about this 
process, resisting subjectification and challenging the use of classed stereotypes about 
abortion and reproduction. In particular, some women’s complex accounts of their 
pregnancies opened a disruptive discursive space for talk of ‘responsibility’ that did not 
fit easily into pro-choice or pro-life discourse, and that challenged straightforward 
accounts of the self. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, I analysed the women’s accounts of abortion stigma, examining 
in particular two dimensions of stigma: ‘felt’ and ‘enacted’ (Herek, 2009). I mobilised 
an understanding of abortion stigma that contextualised it within unequal power 
dynamics of gender and class in wider society, which produce expectations of 
normative womanhood all of the women in this study felt some pressure to conform to. 
In particular, this chapter examined the ‘technologies of the self’ that were exposed by 
women’s accounts of negotiating respectability and their positions as ‘good’ or ‘fallen’ 
women. I argued that through these accounts of abortion stigma and attempts to 
negotiate it, it was possible to see the specific regulatory practices that produce middle-
class womanhood.  This was analysed in relation to Foucauldian ideas of 
governmentality and the middle-class feminine subject as restrained and controlled, the 
most extreme manifestation of which was ‘redemption’ through painful abortion 
experiences.  
Making meaning, producing knowledge 
To conclude, I will now outline the main contributions this thesis has made to the fields 
of the sociology of class and the sociology of reproduction. I will also consider the 
implications this study carries for abortion practice and advocacy, its potential impact, 
and the future directions it suggests for abortion research.  
Middle-classness and class ‘disgust’ 
Understandably, middle-class experiences of austerity and precarity have not been 
widely researched. Much of the work which constitutes the ‘cultural turn’ in the study 
of social class (work which, as discussed in Chapters One and Two (pp. 14; 33), has 
shaped this study) has focused on ‘vertical differentiation’ (Méndez, 2008) between 
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working- and middle-class groups, in particular the ‘class disgust’ which powerful 
groups in society mobilise to Other those without power (Lawler, 2005; Tyler, 2008). 
Steph Lawler argues that middle-classness is maintained by an assertion of difference 
and disgust against that which is in proximity to it (i.e. working-classness) (Lawler, 
2005). Although my study produced an in-depth analysis of (largely) middle-class 
experiences of abortion, the mechanism of class disgust was notably scarce in the data. 
What this study has demonstrated instead is how middle-class women are affected by 
neoliberal self-governance and its relationship to the body and reproduction. Whilst 
working-class women are more often the subject of scholarship on class and the body 
(e.g. Skeggs, 1997; Tyler, 2008), the narratives of the women in this study were replete 
with ‘technologies of the self’ which regulated their ‘bodies and souls, thoughts [and] 
conduct’ (Foucault, 1988). This suggests that regulatory practices and technologies of 
middle-class women in the context of a neoliberal society require more study, 
particularly their relationship to gendered issues like reproduction and parenting which 
have been addressed by few studies (for example, Johnson, 2008 on childbirth and 
breastfeeding; Perrier, 2013 on parenting).  
For example, the effects of abortion stigma and technologies of neoliberal governance 
were largely internalised by the women in this study rather than being projected 
outwards in the form of disgust, differentiation or ‘stigma transference’ (Cockrill and 
Nack, 2013). Whilst some participants did make classed judgments and differentiations 
during their life narratives, many also expressed an opposition to stereotypes and 
assumptions about ‘irresponsible’ women and the coded classed signifiers they carried. 
There are a number of reasons why this might be. For example, four of my fifteen 
participants were undertaking doctorates in the humanities and social sciences and were 
therefore well versed in issues like social inequality and the effects of stereotyping. 
Another is that class disgust may not manifest in interviewing, but may be expressed 
instead in private or anonymous spaces (for example, Tyler, 2008 analysed anonymous 
forums as well as media discourse in her study of class disgust). However, it does 
suggest that there are other mechanisms as well as disgust that are at work here. The 
internalisation of responsibility and technologies of governance I identified in the data 
were a product of the confluence of abortion stigma, which encourages silence and an 
internalisation of blame, and the wider project of responsibilisation that characterises 
neoliberal states. The fear of precariousness and failure expressed by many of the 
172 
 
middle-class women in this study was not a straightforward fear of becoming a ‘fallen’ 
women or slipping down the class ladder, but was also a response to the state of 
uncertainty and risk produced by the context of austerity and ‘crisis management’ in the 
UK since the financial crash (Tyler, 2013). This context made it difficult for many of 
my participants to feel like they were making truly free or ‘correct’ choices about their 
reproductive lives. 
The fact that many of the women in this study responded to this by expressing solidarity 
and sympathy with other women who were making similar choices suggests that a 
shared experience of abortion acts as a complex catalyst for both differentiation and 
solidarity between women. Further research might take a similarly intersectional 
approach to abortion experiences by ‘digging down’ into the inequalities which 
underpin them (Purcell, 2015), and indeed that may underpin the experiences of those 
subjected to other types of stigma. 
Discourse as a resource 
Another key finding of this study is that abortion narratives are shaped by differential 
access to ‘discursive resources.’ In previous work on abortion, these resources have 
been described variously as ‘cultural narratives,’ (McIntyre, Anderson and McDonald, 
2001) ‘interpretative repertoires’ (Beynon-Jones, 2017) and ‘framing discourses’ 
(Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). What this study has done is to draw on Beverley 
Skeggs’ (2004) theorisation of social class as both a resource (for example, in its 
existence as a distribution of capitals) and a position which enables or restricts access to 
the discursive resources that allow people to make meaning about abortion, disclose 
their experiences to others, and negotiate medical gatekeeping.  
Imogen Tyler has described class as fundamentally a ‘struggle against classification’ 
(2015a) within which individuals attempt to narrate their lives against dominant 
discourses which might devalue and delegitimise them. However, the same dominant 
discourses may legitimise and assign value to others. This was seen most clearly in 
Chapter Four in the contrast between Anna and Violet’s experiences of accessing 
abortion services, Anna finding it ‘easy’, Violet finding it frustrating and judgmental. 
These women identified themselves, respectively, as middle-class and working-class, 
and the life history method was useful in revealing how their classed histories, 
upbringings and expectations produced different experiences in the GP’s office. Both 
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women used the discourse of precarity to present a ‘legitimate’ abortion story, despite 
indicating in their interviews with me that the precarity of their financial, employment 
or student status was not the most important factor in their abortion decision (Anna felt 
she was too young in comparison to her family’s normal trajectory of having children 
later in life, and Violet simply did not want children).  
I argued that Violet’s position as a working-class women who had accrued cultural 
capital through Higher Education meant she was able to use an understandable abortion 
‘script’ which her doctor could approve – that she was a student who did not have 
enough material security to raise a child. However, the affective impact of using this 
script left Violet feeling angry and her true reason for her abortion delegitimised. She 
had survived in material precarity throughout much of her life, acting ‘like a mother’ to 
her younger brother, and therefore felt angry that she had to capitulate to the idea that 
someone in her position would not be able to raise a child. 
What this demonstrates is that one’s class position affects how and whether one can use 
particular discursive resources to articulate one’s experience, how that articulation will 
be received, and what the material and affective outcome of this will be. Whilst Violet’s 
experience demonstrates the ways in which dominant discourses about class and 
abortion can delegitimise and ‘fix in place’ (Skeggs, 2004), this study offered examples 
of women utilising other types of dominant discourses about abortion to their advantage 
when negotiating access to abortion services. For example, in Chapter Five, I shared 
Jackie’s mobilisation of ableist assumptions to ‘shut down’ questions about her 
abortion, using her chronic health condition as a ‘socially acceptable’ justification even 
if it did not reflect her true reasons for ending her pregnancy (‘The responsible abortion 
story,’ p. 127). In the same chapter, I wrote about Nat’s position as a mother and how 
she was able to use this as evidence that she was ‘deserving’ of an abortion after 
becoming pregnant soon after giving birth to her sons (p. 128). However, whilst the 
women in both of these examples were able to use these discursive resources to 
convince medical staff to grant their abortion requests and prevent judgement from 
others, it is clear that the process engendered anger, frustration and an uncomfortable 
mis-match between the women’s ‘true’ feelings about their pregnancies and the 
performance they felt it necessary to put on for medical staff (and, sometimes, friends or 
family).  
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Medicalisation and abortion practice 
This leads to the issue of medicalisation and abortion practice. The experiences with 
medical staff the women in this study described were mostly positive, with GPs 
generally being described as helpful and unobstructive in referring on to abortion 
providers, and abortion providers themselves being described as compassionate and 
friendly. Abortion providers are undergoing a period of increased scrutiny and criticism 
following the recent sex-selective abortion debate in the UK (during which two doctors 
faced the first ever private prosecution for committing abortions on the grounds of 
foetal gender, a case later dropped by the Crown Prosecution Service as ‘not in the 
public interest’; see Crown Prosecution Service, 2013) and newspaper investigations 
into their practice (Sheldon, 2017). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to draw 
wider conclusions, it is notable that the women in this study were generally full of 
praise for providers and their practice. 
Despite this, the findings of this study contribute somewhat to long-standing critiques of 
the medicalisation of abortion (e.g. Beynon-Jones, 2013; Lattimer, 1998; Sheldon, 
1997). ‘Medicalisation’ in this context describes the social control of reproduction 
through medical discourse and knowledge, which is valorised as true and objective. 
Sally Sheldon’s work on this issue and subsequent research has been influenced by 
Foucault’s critique of medicine as an institution which enables ‘surveillance, 
normalisation and judgement’ (Sheldon, 1997, p.11; see also Foucault, 1973). Critiques 
of the medicalisation of abortion therefore point to the status of doctors as the only 
figures able to legally approve requests for terminations as expressive of an 
unwillingness to allow women to control their own reproduction (see Sheldon, 1997 but 
also Chapter Two, ‘Medicalisation and regulation,’ p. 51).  
This study contributes to this literature by building on the work of researchers like 
Beynon-Jones (2013), who found that medical professionals mobilise class when 
determining which abortions requests are rational or reasonable, and Lattimer, who 
argued that women had to construct their abortion requests in particular ways to suit the 
legal framing of abortion which doctors must adhere to (1998). It is clear that for some 
women in this study, these issues directly affected their experience of abortion, and that 
there remains an element of performance that several women felt expected to engage in. 
This not only echoes previous critiques of the medicalised model of abortion 
gatekeeping in the UK and the assumptions that underlie it, but also furthers these 
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critiques by explicitly examining the classed dimensions of these negotiations of 
abortion provision. As discussed in Chapter Four (‘Using and resisting discourses of 
precarity,’ p. 114), the discursive resources available to each women in this study were 
predicated on their class position, and on the other intersecting identity categories 
relevant to their lives (for example, in Jackie’s case, disability).  
This raises the possibility of future research that takes as its object of analysis the 
affective dimensions of this performance of ‘need’ for abortion. The performance of 
need or worthiness has recently emerged from sociological work in two areas that could 
be usefully compared to abortion provision: welfare reform in the UK, and the medical 
gatekeeping of gender transition in Gender Identity Clinics. The Department of Work 
and Pensions since 2013 has required those claiming disability benefits to undergo 
‘disability assessments’ which have been critiqued for relying on bizarre criteria, such 
as how well-done the claimant’s hair looks, or whether they are able to derive pleasure 
from seeing their family (Leaney, 2016). Sarah Leaney argues that one’s access to 
benefits therefore relies on the ability to ‘perform the incapacitated self, physically, 
socially and morally’, conforming to the discursive construction of those in need as 
morally abject, and has a dehumanising effect on those forced to undergo such 
assessment (2016). The need for performance has also been critiqued in relation to 
Gender Identity Clinics (GICs), though which transgender people who wish to 
medically transition access services. Research has suggested a significant proportion of 
non-binary trans people felt that they were pressured by clinicians in GICs to change 
their gender presentation to be ‘more typically binary’ in order to be deemed 
‘transgender enough’ (Valentine, 2016). In the same way that I interpreted the abortion 
request as a requirement for a ‘legitimate’ production of a ‘discourse of the self’ 
(Skeggs, 2005), the requests for welfare and GIC treatment can be read as examples of a 
similar requirement. Future research on abortion and medicalisation might take these 
findings as cues to examine the affective dimensions of performing ‘need’ for abortion, 
as they suggest that medical control of the body is intimately related to wider processes 
of neoliberal reform and governance, as well as the social construction of gender (and 
intersecting categories such as disability). 
Stigma and governmentality 
One of the arguments for the decriminalisation of abortion in the UK is that 
decriminalisation would remove this requirement for people to frame their abortion 
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requests in certain ways for medical approval, and therefore restore autonomy to women 
with regards to their reproductive lives (see British Medical Association, 2017, p.28). 
Whilst this is an important issue, there is a danger for abortion researchers and pro-
choice campaigners to focus too narrowly on legal reform and the demedicalisation of 
abortion. This study demonstrates that issues of regulation and governance in relation to 
abortion are not only concentrated in the institutions of medicine and law, but are 
diffused and individualised. Self-regulation, mediated through dominant discourses of 
gendered and classed subjectivity, was a more prevalent phenomenon in this study’s 
abortion narratives than reports of explicit regulation through legal or medical 
discourses.  
My approach in this study has been to adapt theorisations of abortion stigma to examine 
these accounts of self-regulation and governance. As argued in Chapter Six, recent work 
on abortion stigma is influenced by the symbolic interactionist approach, which focuses 
on stigma production on an individual, interpersonal level. I have adapted this approach 
by considering the role power and wider social inequalities play in the production of 
abortion stigma, and by mobilising Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, biopolitics 
and technologies of the self. 
This study has therefore contributed to research on abortion stigma in several ways. It 
demonstrates the utility of Kumar et al.’s (2009) influential theorisation of abortion 
stigma as both ‘locally produced’ and produced in relation to hegemonic constructions 
of femininity. The women in this study’s experiences of stigma – internalised, felt and 
enacted (Herek, 2009) – were locally produced by their surroundings, including their 
families and the political context in which they were making their reproductive 
decisions, but were also produced by standards of womanhood that several women felt 
they had failed to live up to by getting pregnant accidentally, at the ‘wrong time’, or by 
having an abortion. Whilst previous work has identified that abortion stigma is rooted in 
societal beliefs about womanhood, motherhood, and personhood, it has lacked an 
intersectional understanding of what types of womanhood  and personhood are valued 
and why (Cockrill and Nack, 2013; Hoggart, 2017; Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, 2009). 
The accounts of the women in this study were formed in a context where valued female 
subjects are, as they have been throughout history, reproductive and ‘maternal,’ but also 
in a context in which the framing of women as free, autonomous agents in a post-
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feminist world increasingly underpins popular and political rhetoric, producing 
impossible standards (Aveling, 2002; Genz, 2010; Hewlett, 2002).  
Foucault argued that whilst forms of power may change, power is never completely 
overcome (Pylypa, 1998). Women in England are no longer prevented from taking part 
fully in civic life through legal curtailing of their reproductive rights, but social control 
of women’s reproduction still operates in a way that is productive i.e. produces the 
desire to embody certain subjectivities (Foucault, 1977). Increased reproductive choice 
and pro-choice campaigning has taken abortion out of the back alleys and literally saved 
women’s lives, but women are now expected to take on their new rights to choice and 
freedom by making the right choices, and, if they fail to, the prevailing political opinion 
is that they are not entitled to help (Jensen, 2014b). Women with relative financial, 
housing and employment security and middle-class privilege are, of course, protected 
from the worst excesses of the rollback of the welfare state in England, but this study 
has demonstrated that even these women experience feelings of precarity and anxiety 
about failing to live up to these standards of neoliberal, middle-class womanhood. One 
of the consequences of this for the women in this study was intense regulation of the 
self, including the body. 
Abortion stigma and governmentality are therefore closely related. It was clear from the 
women’s accounts in this study that abortion stigma was not only (or mostly) produced 
interpersonally; several women in this study had never experienced a moment of 
enacted stigma in which another person directly stigmatised them for having had an 
abortion. Almost all women talked extensively about internalised or felt stigma, 
however, demonstrating that they had accepted negative valuations of women who have 
abortions, or feared that if their abortions were revealed they would be judged (Hoggart, 
2017; Link and Phelan, 2001). Thus, insidious governmentality produced a need for 
many women in this study to constitute themselves as responsible, self-sufficient 
subjects.  
This study therefore furthers poststructural feminist theories of class and gender. The 
narratives of self-governance and self-control woven through the abortion stories and 
life histories of women with varying degrees of proximity to middle-class womanhood 
illuminate the ways in which the intense neoliberal imperative to individualise 
responsibility operates for women who have abortions. It means women who already 
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feel under pressure to be ideal neoliberal subjects develop effective strategies of self-
governance to ensure they do not ‘fail.’ In particular, the extreme example of 
acceptance of pain as a form of punishment for having an abortion can be understood as 
a gendered example of Tyler’s argument (2015) that stigma operates as a function of 
control and regulation in neoliberal societies.  
New discursive spaces 
One difficulty presented by Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge is its trouble in 
accounting for agency and resistance. Whilst throughout this thesis I have argued that 
the narratives of the women in this study demonstrate the operation of self-surveillance 
and self-discipline, technologies by which domination over subjects is maintained by 
methods other than repressive power (Foucault, 1978, 1977), I have also sought to 
analyse the ways in which women resisted, challenged and critiqued these technologies. 
Whilst Foucault’s work has been useful in analysing the former, it is less so in analysing 
the latter. If resistance to power produces a reassertion of power in a different form 
(Foucault, 1978; Pylypa, 1998), this would suggest that there is no way in which to truly 
challenge domination. 
I would suggest that mobilising Foucault’s theorisation does not entirely preclude the 
possibility for resistance; instead, it provides a useful reminder that power/knowledge is 
always at work. For example, whilst I have identified ways in which the women in this 
study disrupted specific dominant discourses about abortion – for example, that it is 
irresponsible, or is always a tragedy – this did not constitute a disruption of power. For 
example, some women in this study conceptualised their pregnancies and abortions in 
medical terms, for example Violet whose words I analysed in Chapter Five, said: 
What about the rights of the unborn child? What, this piece of tissue that’s still 
part of my body? […] Again, maybe that’s just about my values, but for me a 
baby’s a baby once it’s born. When it’s not part of my body anymore and it’s 
living and breathing on its own, it’s a baby. But when it’s like a little ball of 
cells or whatever, it’s a ball of cells, not a baby. 
She positioned her view of abortion as a feminist critique of pro-life understandings of 
pregnancy, and of abortion stigma. However, this is also producing an alternative but 
‘ideal’ subject position for women to occupy which understands abortion as a largely 
meaningless medical procedure, something pro-choice discourse has also been critiqued 
for (Ludlow, 2008). It asserts the objectivity and ‘truth’ of medical knowledge – the 
same discourse that positions doctors as the legal gatekeepers to abortion. 
179 
 
Nevertheless, the moments of resistance and rupture in the narratives of women in this 
study provide examples of how dominant framing of abortion can be questioned and 
disrupted. Attempts to do so are not absent in public discourse, but often take the form 
of public storytelling or, more accurately, testimonials. For example, in 2013, New 
York Magazine ran a story called ‘My Abortion’ wherein 26 women shared their 
abortion stories (Winter, 2013). I was struck by one woman, Mayah, and her testimony 
that (my emphasis): 
The only people who would listen to me say I had any emotions were people who 
wanted me to fall down on my knees and ask for forgiveness. I saw a counsellor at a 
crisis pregnancy centre, but she gave me an icky feeling. There’s no room to talk 
about being unsure. 
Mayah’s story was a struggle to find ‘room’ for her experience which was unwelcome; 
she was not regretful or guilty about her abortion, but she also was not certain exactly 
how she felt about it. Several of the women in this study echoed Mayah’s testimony, 
talking about pregnancy and abortion in ways that did not fit comfortably into 
discourses of abortion certainty or regret. There are two reasons why opening space for 
these kind of abortion stories is important. First, it is clear that doing so is helpful for 
women who want to talk about their experiences without being judged. Second, these 
stories have the potential to disrupt stigmatising discourses about abortion by 
demonstrating that emotional complexity does not always come hand-in-hand with 
regret or guilt.  
However, it remains the case that abortion stories remain available for co-option into 
discourses and causes for which they were not originally intended. My analysis of the 
theme of stigma and punishment in Chapter Six should not, for example, be taken as an 
indication that abortion necessarily produces psychological distress. The examples 
analysed in this chapter of the women who talked about embracing the painful aspects 
of abortion do more to reflect the damaging nature of neoliberal self-governance and 
abortion stigma than the procedure itself. These accounts were difficult to hear, and are 
no doubt difficult to read, but as several of the women in this study noted, failing to talk 
about these aspects of abortion is not useful. Abortion can be painful, unpleasant and 
graphic. We do a disservice to women who have them by remaining euphemistic about 
this. Whilst abortion providers do carefully consider the way the talk about abortion to 
patients, and generally try to use the language that patients are comfortable with (which 
might be talking about babies, or foetuses, or pregnancies) (Ludlow, 2016), it was 
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notable that several women who had been given early medical abortions said they 
would have preferred more honesty from medical professionals about the pain and 
discomfort they were going to experience. Wendy Savage, an abortion provider and 
activist, has noted that it is important to not shy away from the fact that abortion is ‘the 
ending of a potential life’ (Savage, 2017). Doing so allows a full, honest discussion 
about abortion and its reality for those who have them and those who provide them. It is 
my hope that studies like mine contribute to a milieu of normalisation of abortion, 
including the aspects of abortion that are difficult or awkward to discuss. 
Conclusion: towards a critical sociology of abortion 
experiences 
Carrie Purcell has called for a sociology of abortion experiences that ‘question[s] and 
disrupt[s] dominant and entrenched ways of knowing and talking about abortion’ (2015, 
p.592). This research has had at its heart a commitment to do exactly this, led and 
shaped by the experiences of those who have experienced abortion. It is my hope that 
this study offers something for abortion providers, advocates, activists, and academics. 
Most of all, I hope that it provides something for those who have had abortions. Many 
of the women who took part in this research shared with me their hope that their stories 
might serve to normalise, raise awareness about, or simply contribute to understanding 
about abortion. As a researcher, it was my wish to entwine the agendas and hopes of my 
participants with my own.  The aims of this research were, first, to produce knowledge 
that could be used as a tool towards the normalisation of abortion. Second, to produce 
knowledge to combat abortion stigma, based on sexist and classist assumptions. Finally, 
to aid in the dismantling and deconstruction of neoliberal ideology that produces 
individualising discourses about a phenomenon that is not the responsibility of 
individual women, but of society as a whole.  
In order to achieve these aims, I would suggest that future research build on the findings 
of this study in several ways, as argued in the discussion above. The first is to continue 
an interrogation of the regulatory practices and technologies of middle-class women in 
the context of neoliberal society, particularly their relationship to gendered issues like 
reproduction and parenting. However, one of the limitations of this study was its small, 
self-selective sample, and research to expand its focus beyond the experiences of largely 
middle-class, highly educated women would be useful. For example, it remains to be 
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researched how class structures the abortion narratives of those who have borne the 
brunt of contemporary austerity policies in the UK, or those who have been cast as 
‘national abjects’ in political discourse (Tyler, 2013). Another limitation of this study 
was its focus on the intersection between class and gender without a sustained analysis 
of other intersections of identity and oppression such as race. Future research might 
adapt the methodology and theoretical framework of this study and apply it to the 
abortion narratives of a wider diversity of participants and expand its relatively narrow 
focus. 
Second, as suggested in the discussion above, there is space for research which takes as 
its object of analysis the affective dimensions of the performance of ‘need’ for abortion 
in the UK, and its relation to class, gender, race, and the medicalisation of abortion. 
Whilst it has been argued that the requirement for clinicians to provide legal approval 
for abortion is a ‘harmless legal fiction,’ if in practice doctors are simply approving 
decisions that have already been made (Jackson, 2001), and that clinicians are generally 
proponents of the demedicalisation of abortion (Lee, 2017a), this study suggests that the 
process of obtaining an abortion in England can still feel frustrating or alienating. In a 
context in which individuals who require medical services like approval from GICs to 
medically transition, or from the state in the form of disability support, performance of 
‘need’ is inherently political, as the standard of ‘need’ is constructed by neoliberal and 
neoconservative understandings of worthiness and deservedness (Leaney, 2016). How 
far this is experienced by people seeking abortions in contemporary England remains to 
be researched. 
Finally, the applications of this work to different national and legal contexts might be 
considered. This study focused on one particular context, and did not seek to analyse the 
abortion experiences of those who travel from outside of England from countries where 
abortion is illegal, restricted, or difficult to access. Whilst excellent work has been 
undertaken on the experiences of those travelling form, for example, Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland to the UK for abortions (e.g. Boyle and McEvoy, 1998), 
undertaking qualitative work in these contexts is difficult, and much of this work has 
focused on socio-legal issues (e.g. Bloomer and O’Dowd, 2014). It has been argued that 
the phenomenon of Irish women travelling to England for abortion throws into relief 
wider issues of mobility rights and reproductive rights, in particular their contingency 
upon issues of nationality, social class and race (Gilmartin and White, 2011). Future 
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research might take the methodology and theoretical framework of this study in order to 
explore how these issues structure the experiences and narratives of the women who 
undertake this journey, and their relation to these broader issues of inequality. 
To conclude, I would like to reflect on the wider implications of this study beyond 
academic research. Whilst some recommendations and suggestions for abortion 
practitioners have been made in the discussion above, I would like to emphasise that 
solutions for combatting abortion stigma and strategies for abortion support should not 
necessarily be primarily located in medical practice. Whilst the medical and legal 
construction and status of abortion is an important factor in shaping the experiences of 
those who have them, my analysis in this study has had more to say about issues of self-
regulation and control in relation to abortion that that of medicine and law. This is 
intimately connected to the social context in which these women’s narratives were being 
constructed. The impact of austerity in the UK is wide-ranging (Fawcett Society, 2012; 
Jensen, 2014b; Tyler, 2013), but abortion is an area which has not received much 
attention from sociologists researching the impact of austerity. More research in this 
area is clearly needed, but one thing is overwhelmingly clear from the findings of this 
study. Neoliberal austerity politics in the UK is not only detrimental in material, violent 
ways to those on the receiving end of the welfare reforms, unemployment, and poverty 
that has come with it (Fawcett Society, 2012; Jensen, 2014b; Tyler, 2013), but it is also 
detrimental in the subjective, affective sense for women making often difficult decisions 
about whether to continue or end pregnancies. Despite the Coalition government (who 
were the first architects of post-recession austerity in the UK) suggesting that we were 
‘all in it together’ (Cameron, 2008), this has proven to be patently false. Neoliberal 
austerity politics relies on undermining collectivity and solidarity, reimagining society 
as a loose collection of individuals; however, at the same time, it intensifies 
‘classificatory struggles’ by reinscribing processes of exploitation, disenfranchisement 
and Othering (Tyler, 2015a). Despite this, the women in this study largely expressed 
solidarity and a wish to collectively combat the stigma that isolated and individualised 
them as women who had had abortions, demonstrating a need for a project of reworking 
and revaluing abortion as interdependent and social rather than isolating and 
individualised. It is this solidarity and commitment to combatting wider processes of 
individualisation and classification that must lie at the heart of normalising abortion in 
contemporary England.  
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Appendix A: Biographical sketches of participants 
All names are pseudonyms. 
Alex is a White, heterosexual 19-year-old undergraduate student who had a medical 
abortion aged 19. Her abortion was in the first trimester (12 weeks or below). She went 
to an all-girls grammar school before going to university, had to move several times 
during her childhood because of her dad’s job, and she and her siblings were often 
looked after by au pairs whilst her parents worked. She has a boyfriend, her first, and he 
supported her decision to have an abortion. 
Anja is a White 26-year-old woman who had a medical abortion aged 26. Her abortion 
was in the first trimester (12 weeks or below). She went to University and studied 
Drama. She lives with her long-term partner, and they both recently moved to the South 
of England for his work after living in Scotland for several years. Anja is originally 
from a European country outside of the UK. She works several part-time care-work 
jobs, but wants to change careers to event management. 
Anna is a White, heterosexual 21-year-old who had a surgical abortion aged 20. Her 
abortion was in the first trimester (12 weeks or below). She was raised by her mum, 
who is an academic, and has an older sister. She went to an all-girls grammar school, 
and went to University aged 18. She now works for a University Student Union, but is 
considering applying to do a Masters. She considers herself middle-class. 
Elizabeth is a White, heterosexual 43-year-old who had a medical abortion aged 41. 
She had an abortion in the first trimester, at 12 weeks or below. She works for a charity, 
and has a Masters degree. She was in a relationship with a married man when she 
became pregnant, and initially considered continuing with the pregnancy before 
changing her mind. She lives in the South of England. 
Felicity is a European, heterosexual 41-year-old who has had three abortions aged 21, 
29 and 40. Her first abortion was surgical, and the second and third were medical. She 
has two children, one teenager with her previous partner, and one toddler with her 
current partner. She also had a child with her previous partner who had cerebral palsy 
after complications during childbirth, and he died when he was three years old. Felicity 
was raised by her mum, who is a business woman; Felicity is now a yoga teacher and 
lives with her partner and children in the South East of England.  
Heidi is a White, 25-year-old woman who had a first-trimester medical abortion aged 
25. She came out as gay when she was younger, but has since also dated men and is 
attracted to more than one gender. She and her twin sister were conceived through IVF. 
Their mum was 35 when she gave birth, after wanting children for years but suffering 
multiple miscarriages. She describes her parents as working-class, but upwardly mobile. 
Heidi dropped out of school aged 16, but went to University and got her degree. She 
now works in a library and lives in the South East of England. 
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Izzy is a mixed-race, heterosexual 25-year-old who had a medical abortion aged 17. Her 
mum is from Namibia, and her dad was from England. He died when Izzy was 18. She 
has two siblings, and describes herself as the academic one of the three. She lived in 
Namibia for the first five years of her life, then moved to England with her family and 
went to an all-girls grammar school after passing the 11-Plus exam. She is now studying 
for a PhD. 
Jackie is a 37-year-old White, heterosexual woman who had a medical abortion during 
the first trimester. She is married and lives with her husband and their six pets. She went 
to University as a mature student, and now works in sound production, as well as 
working part-time at a homeless shelter. During her studies at University, she was 
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Her parents were both teachers, but are now retired.  
Karen is a White, heterosexual 34-year-old who had a medical abortion during the first 
trimester. She lives in a Northern city in a flat with two friends after breaking up with 
her boyfriend, as is about to move in to a place of her own. She describes her 
background as working-class, and her parents as aspirational. She feels that since she 
went to University and did a PhD she is middle-class in many ways. She is now an 
academic. 
Lisa is a 30-year old, White, queer woman who had an abortion aged 25. Her abortion 
was at 12 weeks or below, and was surgical. She lives with her long-term partner in a 
South Eastern city, not far from the town in which she grew up. Her home town is a 
poor area. She describes her parents as lower-middle-class professionals who have a 
steady income and own their house. She left college with one A-Level, then after 
working in admin for a few years trained as a social worker and gained a degree. 
Lucy is a White, 26-year-old who describes herself as ‘soulsexual’: she is attracted to 
people regardless of their gender. She recently broke up with her girlfriend, with whom 
she has had an on-again, off-again relationship. She recently moved down South from a 
town in the Midlands and stopped taking drugs, which she was doing regularly. She has 
had two abortions. Her first, aged 24, was above 13 weeks and was a surgical 
procedure; she initially wanted to continue the pregnancy before changing her mind. 
Her second abortion, aged 26, was an early medical abortion. 
Nat is a 36-year old, White, heterosexual woman. She is a friend of Violet’s. She is a 
mum to three boys, and has had two abortions, one aged 21 and one aged 29. Both 
abortions were surgical and below 12 weeks. Following her second abortion, she asked 
to be sterilised. She is married, and lives with her husband and children in a Northern 
city. She grew up in the city she still lives in, with her mum and siblings. She says her 
and her siblings were brought up on benefits, and her mum went to night school to get a 
degree, so Nat looked after her brothers a lot. She dropped out of school at fifteen and 
had her first child at 17, and then went to university. She now works as a teaching 
assistant. 
Rebecca is a White, heterosexual 26-year-old PhD student. She has had two abortions. 
Her first was a second-trimester surgical abortion that she had aged 23, and her second 
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was a first-trimester medical abortion that she had aged 25. Her mum is a classroom 
assistant, and is divorced from her dad, a university lecturer. She has one younger sister, 
and they grew up in the North-East without much money. She now lives with her 
boyfriend, also a PhD student, in a large Northern city. 
Sarah is a 21-year-old, white, heterosexual undergraduate student. She had a first-
trimester medical abortion aged 21. She was rebellious as a teenager and dropped out of 
college, but wanted to go to university, where she now studies Film. Her parents 
divorced when she was five, and she was raised by her mum in what she describes as a 
middle-class town. She has a twin sister, an older brother, and a younger step-brother.  
Violet is a 35-year-old, White, bisexual woman who had a surgical abortion when she 
was 30. She comes from a working-class background, left home and school at 16, then 
went to college later to study for A-Levels. She went to University as a mature student, 
where she met Nat, and is now a PhD student. She works part-time as a classroom 
assistant, and describes herself as a socialist. She lives in the large Northern city she 
grew up in.  
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Appendix B: Participant recruitment webpage 
www.contextualisingabortion.wordpress.com 
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Appendix C: Recruitment poster and flyer 
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Appendix D: Participant questionnaire 
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Appendix E: Participant consent form 
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Appendix F: Participant Information Sheet 
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Appendix G: Post-interview resource sheet for 
participants 
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Appendix H: Coding ‘tree’ 
Name 
1a. Experience factors 
Changed attitude to abortion or politicisation 
Choosing medical v surgical  
Contraception 
Counselling 
Disclosing to others 
Doubt or changing your mind 
Effects the abortion had afterwards  
Emotional reaction 
Depression 
Detachment 
Embarrassment 
Guilt or regret or shame 
it really isn’t an issue for me 
Relief or gratitude 
Resentment 
Sadness or crying 
Sentiment 
Shock or disbelief 
Trauma 
Expectations versus reality 
Experience of pregnancy 
Experiencing difference 
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Name 
Feelings about the body 
Feelings of inadequacy 
Femininity, womanhood 
Finding info on abortion 
Friends 
How the abortion affected the future 
I don’t think it really shaped anything that came after it, 
I don't think I could do that again 
I just wanted it over and done with 
Inequality of experiences 
it did annoy me that you have to justify yourself 
Media representations 
Medical staff 
Medicalisation 
Mental health 
Miscarriage 
Motherhood 
Moving on 
Multiple abortions 
Physical reaction 
Public discourse 
Punishment 
Repro choice and control  
Reproductive health 
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Name 
Self-care 
Sex 
Steril isation 
Stigma 
Encounters with pro-lifers 
Opposition from others  
Respectable abortion 
Support networks 
The foetus or baby 
The procedure 
The scan 
The self and the other 
Thoughts on gender and feminism 
Thoughts on gestational age 
Understanding her actions 
Unjustifiable abortions  
Not judging other women 
Wanting to do it alone 
1b. Decision factors 
Adoption 
Advice from others 
Age 
Already had kids 
Aversion to planning 
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Name 
Aversion to pregnancy and childbirth 
Balancing work and family 
Complexity 
Concerns about alcohol or drugs  
Future abortions 
Having kids (or not); motherhood 
Hopes and dreams, plans for the future 
I'd never thought it would happen to me 
It was a no-brainer 
It was hard, but it was right 
It's something you never want to have to do 
Job, financial or l iving instability 
Lack of support 
Managing relationships with others  
Mental health 
Parents 
Dad 
Mum 
Partner or ex-partner's role 
Religion 
Wanting to delay childbearing 
Welfare of the potential child 
2. Class 
Act of classification 
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Name 
Aspiration 
Austerity or contemporary issues  
Belonging 
Class 
Class position 
Denial of class 
Education 
Embodiment 
Expectations or Normality 
Experiencing difference 
Generational influences 
I'm really careful  
Judgement of others 
Knowing others who had children 
Middle-class identity or values 
Mobility 
Money 
Neoliberalism 
Precarity 
Regulation 
Resistance 
Responsibil ity 
Role of motherhood 
Snobbery 
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Name 
Struggle 
Survival  
The past 
Work 
Working-class identity or values 
You make it work 
3. Narrative 
Commentary 
Formative experiences 
Ideal l ife 
Identity 
As a woman who has had an abortion 
Sexuality 
Mental health 
Narrative categories 
Assertion or argument 
Narrating a story 
Reporting facts or events  
Reasons for taking part 
What narrative purpose the abortion serves  
Moment of decision to change 
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Appendix I: Extract from analysis grid 
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Appendix J: Examples of analysis diagrams and visual 
aids 
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Appendix M: NHS REC ethical approval 
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